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ABSTRACT
LEIBNIZ'S REVELATION-INSPIRED METAPHYSICS -
AN EXERCISE IN RECONCILING FAITH AND REASON
MAY 1991
BRIAN D. SKELLY
B.A., MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
BACC., GREGORIAN UNIVERSITY
Lie., GREGORIAN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Robert C. Sleigh Jr.
A puzzle about some of the basic commitments of
Leibniz's metaphysics is that they fail to come anywhere
near approaching the self-evidence one should expect of
metaphysical principles. Notwithstanding that Leibniz's
adherence to Christian theology has not generally been
granted as having had a decisive impact on his metaphysics,
the latter, in fact, was largely the result of a life-long
project to give a comprehensive rational defense of
Christianity
.
In particular, a close study of four theological
commitments and six metaphysical commitments in the context
of Leibniz's thought reveals that the former are in a sense
more basic than, are motivationally prior to, the latter.
Namely: that God the perfect being exists, that Real Presence
is true, that the Lutheran, Catholic, and perhaps even
Calvinist accounts of the Eucharist are compatible, and that
VI
Original Sin is true. Each had a resolute impact on the
formation of Leibniz's metaphysical commitments: that the
actual world is the best possible world, that teleological
explanation is indispensible for scientific understanding,
that the substance of body is not its extension but its
active principle, that natures are complete concepts, that
there are no material atoms, and that actual substances were
created all at once.
It is not surprising that Leibniz's best-possible-world
theory and his commitment to the universal applicability of
teleology have their roots in his commitment to the existence
of God the perfect being. But it is also the case that his
i —ma ter ia 1 i s t stance on substances was formed in defense
of Real Presence and in response to a reconciliatory
envisionment of the Eucharist that could resolve
denominational disputes; that his commitment to natures as
complete concepts and his anti-atomism derive largely from a
commitment to God's omniscience; and that his commitment to
the all-at-once creation of substances stems from his
attempts to understand Original Sin.
In short, Leibniz's metaphysics is Revelation-inspired.
Yet although there are some good reasons in favor of calling
it a "Christian metaphysics", as he had hoped, there are some
serious drawbacks to its being considered such.
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PREFACE
There is a long-standing controversy about the
relationship between faith and reason - faith being the
commitment and submission to the existence and content of
some authoritatively transmitted body of truths about divine
or supernatural things and our proper relation to them
carried on in the form of religious practice; reason being
the method of deducing, inducing, or criticizing beliefs
based on an evaluation of evidence directly accessible to us,
and the resultant body of belief or knowledge deriving from
that method. Two conflicting views on that relationship are
not rarely aired. The first is that faith cannot be
knowledge, i.e. cannot be theoretically justified, and the
second is that it can.
Those who hold the first view may be divided into
"believers" and "non-believers": those who have faith of some
sort and those who don't. The latter have a natural
motivation not to believe: it just simply is irrational to
believe something incapable of evidential support. On the
other hand, the former are in a bit of a bind; they must to
maintain faith insist that "you just gotta' believe"; that to
subject faith to rational scrutiny is simply unfaithful.
(The term 'fideism' is a derogatory label for just this view
or attitude.) Both believers and non-believers of this ilk
insist that faith and reason are by nature mutually
antagonistic. Ironically, their agreement on this point
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cuts off all further dialogue. Any "reconciliation" between
them would have to be based on forgetting their differences,
which is arguably a futile endeavor.
The alternate view, in sum that faith and reason don't
have to be mutually antagonistic, again is open to believers
and non-believers alike. But in this case, believers and non-
believers have room for dialogue, as do believers of
different faiths. For believers of this ilk naturally suppose
that any honest rational inquiry into their faith could only
support it, since no truth can be definitively refuted;
whereas non-believers of this kind would naturally want to
investigate the various faiths with an open mind, not wanting
to be left ignorant of whatever religious truth we may have
convincing evidence to believe. On the flip-side, a believer
who is resolutely of this ilk, when faced throughout time
with persistent and increasingly preponderant evidence
contrary to his faith with a corresponding lack of supporting
evidence, would be led to withdraw his commitment to that
faith. Both believers and non-believers of this kind would
consider as a candidate for evidence any item whatsoever of
human experience. Any restriction on admissibility of
evidence would have to be a product of, not precedent to,
rational deliberation. People who hold this alternate view
thus have a way open to reconciliation not based on some
futile exercise of forgetting, but rather on a mutual pursuit
of truth.
xv
St. Thomas Aquinas is the philosopher probably the most
often cited as a proponent of the view that reason and faith
are compatible. Since the Renaissance, however, few of the
most well-noted philosophers have openly advocated or
developed this position. Leibniz is one who did, and this,
perhaps more than anything else, characterizes him as unique
among modern philosophers.
In our time in which we are witnessing an ever-growing
contentiousness between peoples of different faiths, between
people of the same faith, and between believers and non-
believers - all of which is leading to a disastrous breakdown
of a sense of community worldwide in an ever-shrinking world
- we could do well to turn to those such as Leibniz who,
motivated by a passionate desire for reconciliation, seem to
have been on the verge of discovering how people of vastly
differing views and commitments can come together in non-
contentious, truth-oriented dialogue, living with their
differences with an eye to ultimately resolving them in a
truthful manner.
What follows is an examination of Leibniz's metaphysics
characterizing it, following sure indications from Leibniz
himself, as an exercise in the reconciliation of faith -
particularly Leibniz's own Christian faith - and reason.
Although I do not assess it as an entirely successful
enterprise, I think there is enough in it to illuminate us
and inspire us to think along similar lines regarding the
XVI
prospects of faith and reason being mutually supportive
rather than mutually antagonistic.
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INTRODUCTION
THE KEY TO LEIBNIZ'S THINKING
Explanation of Title
In scanning the writings of Leibniz, it is hard not to
notice how much time he spent wrestling with issues of faith,
particularly regarding Christian doctrine and the Christian
Church. I think this fact alone leaves it incumbent on
someone interested in understanding Leibniz as a philosopher
to investigate what relation there may be between his
philosophy and his religious interests. This was the
motivation for the present undertaking.
All would agree, I think, that Leibniz the philosopher
was striving to attain a comprehensively systematic
understanding of reality. This certainly does not set him
apart from other famous philosophers of the modern era, such
as Descartes and Spinoza. But it does give us an initial
reason to suspect that there might be some strong connection
between his more secular-sounding (or secularly received! )
philosophy and his religious writings, most of which
themselves are very philosophical in character. If there is
such a connection, this would indeed set him apart from other
well-known modern philosophers, who continued the Renaissance
tradition of maintaining a separation between religious
inquiry and life on the one hand and philosophico-scientif ic
inquiry and life on the other.
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In fact, one who has some exposure to Leibnizean
philosophy does not have to read far into his religious
writings to see that there is a connection between the two,
and a strong one. It is so strong, in fact, that one should
hesitate to use the term 'connection', as it implies a
relation between two things; whereas it seems that on the one
hand what has popularly been identified as "Leibniz's
philosophy" and on the other the most significant portion of
his religious writings - those philosophical in character -
make up one body of thought. This is a strong statement to
make regarding so systematic or "axiomatic" a philosopher as
Leibniz, for if accepted it forces us to search for an order
of precedence between the commitments of his secularly
received philosophy and the commitments peculiar to his
religious writings, i.e. his religious commitments. More
pointedly, we are forced to query whether his most basic
"secular" philosophical commitments are more basic to his
system of thought than his most basic religious or faith
commitments
.
Leibniz’s Philosophy Revelation-Inspired
A surface analysis reveals four possible outcomes:
either Leibniz's secular philosophical commitments have
precedence over his religious commitments, or his religious
commitments have precedence, or there is blanket co-primacy
between them, or some secular philosophical commitments have
precedence and some religious commitments have precedence.
But the matrix of possibilities expands perhaps beyond
2
manageability when it is observed that there are different
senses in which a commitment can have precedence, such that
it has primacy in some sense and not in another. For
instance, a commitment can have a sort of motivational
primacy and yet not enjoy formal primacy. It can be the
"reason of becoming" of a system of thought, and yet not be a
basic premise of that system of thought.
Bypassing further discussion of the various kinds of
precedence, I shall argue that from what Leibniz expressed
in writing it is clear that his faith commitments have
motivational but not formal precedence in his system of
thought. That is to say they do not, as in positive
theology, serve as basic premises; but they do serve as
goals of the reasoning process, guiding his thought at times
in directions it might not otherwise have gone. Thus
conceived his philosophy becomes perhaps a different entity
from how it is popularly received. Popularly we tend to
conceive the philosophical thought of modern and contemporary
philosophers as originating solely from the enlightenment and
motivation of natural reason. Any influx of religious
commitments tends to be looked on as turning the thought into
something other than philosophical. Accordingly, we tend to
maintain the distinction between straight or "positive"
theology and "philosophical" or "natural" theology as that
between revelation-inspired thinking about things regarding
the divinity and thinking about divine things "ex sola
rations"
.
In defiance of this I propose that Leibniz's
3
philosophy, especially his metaphysics, was revelation-
inspired, yet still deserves to be categorized as
philosophical theology. m proposing this, I am maintaining
that the distinction between philosophical and straight
theology is a formal one and not a motivational one:
philosopical theology merely excludes the possibility of
using the body of what has been received as revelation as a
source for premises.
Without damage to this distinction and without biasing
his tradesmanship
,
a philosopher may and perhaps at times
should openly confess that his work is revelation-inspired,
if indeed it is. It remains incumbent upon him to draw the
premises of his philosophical thought from natural reason
with a sufficiently critical eye to avert the evil of
allowing his inspiration to bias his reasoning. Presumably if
one has a strong theoretical commitment to something one
believes it to be true, and if it is believed true one should
be confident that it would stand up to the most severe
scrutiny, and one should be willing to subject it to just
that. The danger of bias arguably looms only where one has a
strong practical motivation to maintain a commitment that one
lacks confidence in theoretically. Of course if religious
faith is correctly characterized f ideistically in the manner
of Pascal, Kierkegaard, et al. as a practical and non-
theoretical commitment, then certainly any philosopher
should seek to keep his religious commitments separate from
his trade as an inspiration or otherwise - for the sake of
4
his faith as well as his philosophy. But if faith is instead
a theoretical commitment benefitting from as much support
from reason as is available, as Leibniz was convinced, then
the argument against allowing religious inspiration to
motivate one's philosophizing is harder to see. This point
will be taken up again, especially in Chapter 3, p. 194 ff.
Revelation-Inspired - but Christian?
Thus far I've mentioned an influence of "revelation" on
Leibniz's thought without referring to its specific content.
In fact, the revelation we are speaking of is Christian
revelation. Now just what 'Christian revelation' refers to
is a matter of no little controversy. Orthodox Roman
Catholics consider the most recent ex cathedra papal
declaration on faith to be definitive of revelation, while
many other Christian sects hold to an ex sola scriptura
delimitation. Even in the latter case, the question remains
whether the scripture itself or rather the meaning of
scripture, or even perhaps the facts that scripture recounts,
is Revelation. Even if it is universally agreed on (it is
not) exactly which writings constitute Sacred Scripture,
there never seems to be a lack of room even under
the same denominational roof for disagreement on the exact
meaning of scripture or the exact facts it recounts.
Clearly, then, a non-controversial ascertainment of
Christian revelation is not current at this point in history,
much less in Leibniz's time. Nor can I say exactly what
Leibniz took Christian revelation to be; and I think it fair
5
to say that by his own admission he would offer that neither
did he. But I hope to sufficiently bring home the point that
this lack of surety and reasoned consensus on the exact
content of revelation is what led him to so passionately
attempt to establish a Christian metaphysics, the result of
which attempt was his own famous metaphysics.
To be sure, there were several points of Christian
revelation about which Leibniz appeared quite certain, and
these were to be his motivational guides in working out his
metaphysics: the Eucharist, Original Sin, the Perfection of
God, the divinely intended and inevitably forthcoming unity
and harmony of the Christian church, etc. Insofar firstly as
these religious commitments are Christian - the Eucharist
most peculiarly so, since only a Christian could believe in
it - and secondly as Leibniz did in fact use them as
inspirational guides for his metaphysical thought, which I
argue he did, one is tempted to call his metaphysics
Christian. But before justifiedly making that determination,
one would have to examine how his metaphysics squares with
the rest of Christian doctrine, especially with its most
universally agreed upon tenets. A philosophy inspired by
Christian revelation is not necessarily Christian.
Leibniz through the Eyes of His Interpreters
In spite of what I consider to be convincing evidence
that he was indeed a a faith-inspired philosopher, Leibniz
has not typically been interpreted according to this key. It
6
is not an uncommon trend in interpreting philosophical
thought to concentrate on obtaining a formally unified
picture of that thought, a systemic unity, with but perhaps a
passing interest in the underlying motivations or inspiration
of the thought. Considering in addition that Leibniz's
thought lends itself so exquisitely well to formal analysis,
ih is not surprising that the balance of attention on Leibniz
up to now has not been in attendance to the influence of the
tenets of the Christian faith on his philosophy.
This is not to say that his faith inspiration has not
been noted by others. Paul Eisenkopf, at the beginning of his
work Leibniz und die EinicmnQ der Christenheit ( 1975 )
expresses the view that the basic themes of Leibniz's thought
have their origin in close proximity to his concerns for
Christian reunion (p. 23). Frangois Gaquere, editor of Le
Dialogue IrSnigue Bossuet -Leibniz (1966), offered that "the
study of Catholic dogma, of Transubstantiation and the
Lutheran dogma of Real Presence brought him to a conception
of substance consisting in force" (p. 28). This sentiment,
that his commitments to the Eucharist influenced the
formation of Leibniz's notion of substance, is shared by Paul
Janet in concurrence with Guhrauer (Montgomery, p. x). Even
John Herman Randall's view, reported in Wiener (p. xxxix)
that one can "derive the whole of Leibniz's metaphysics from
his life-long polemic against the Cartesians" can be taken as
a support for the present view, when it is seen that its
inability to accommodate the Eucharist was Leibniz's main
7
reason for opposing Descartes's philosophy. Pierre
Burgelin's essay, " Th6ologie naturelle et theologie r4vel6e
Chez Leibniz” ( 1969) does not go as far as express the view
that there was an influence of revealed theology on Leibniz's
thought
,
but suggests that there was an easy openness of the
latter toward the former.
A more common view emphasizing the importance of God to
Leibniz's philosophy is that Leibniz's metaphysics is based
on principles of natural, non-revealed theology. In the
Introduction to his M Dieu ^ Leibniz (1985), Jacques
Jalabert makes it clear that this is his view. Perhaps not
far from this is the view expressed by John Hostler
(1975, p. 16) that an "ethical purpose" is at the basis of
Leibniz's metaphysical system. Such views in themselves are
not incompatible with the assertion that Leibniz was a deist
at heart, an un-believer in revelation as a source of
theological knowledge at least some of which is unattainable
by the human use of reason alone. As such they are not
necessarily supportive of the view of his thought as
revelation-inspired. Along these lines Leibniz, according to
Austin Farrer virtually was a deist or tending toward it
(pp. 9-10). In a similar manner does Leonard Loemker give a
deist depiction of Leibniz:
"in pressing the adequacy of reason, [Leibniz] left
for faith only the role of personal assent and
conviction, the established body of truth being
beyond all possibility of doubt. Faith needed only
follow where reason led. Thus the paradox of his
theological goal; wanting to establish Christian
faith, he actually helped support the extreme
8
rational [deistic!] optimism of the age which
followed." (Loemker, v. 1, pp . 86-7.)
Indeed it is tempting to treat him as a deist; he hails
from a time and place when it was the case both that deism
was fast on the rise among philosophers and that concealing
one's true feelings about God and religion may well have been
a prudential obligation. At least one 19th century scholar
expressed this very suspicion (August Boeckh, 1843)
that Leibniz masked his true beliefs; so did Russell at the
turn of the century, citing "the necessity for giving
satisfaction to his princely employers" (Russell, p. 2) as a
motivation for keeping his own views under wraps. Russell
claimed Leibniz had a good or "esoteric" philosophy he kept
to himself and a bad or "exoteric "philosophy which he
published (See also Mates, p. 16).
Often associated with the dissimulation theory is the
suggestion that Leibniz was not really Christian at heart;
it virtually follows from the suggestion that he is a deist.
Mates notes that at Hannover he had a reputation of a
nonbeliever (ibid.), although he himself concedes that there
is "no room for doubt that Leibniz was a sincere believer"
(ibid.). In fact, Leibniz's writings contain some emotional
expressions of Christian piety which are difficult to explain
away. Here is an example from "Von der wahren Theologia
mystica" (1695; G. E. Guhrauer, v. 1, p. 413):
"Let everyone test himself, whether he has faith
and life; if he finds in himself some joy or
pleasure greater than that of the love of God and
glorifying in his will, then he doesn't know Christ
9
enough, and he does not yet feel the stirring ofthe Holy Spirit." ^
There are many Christians who do not have the inspiration to
say something this strong, much less think of it.
I think it fair to say that with the various kinds of
writings, both public and private, that we have access to
now, the suspicion that the "real" Leibniz has yet to be
revealed is anachronistic. In hindsight it is perhaps more
accurate to say that Leibniz wrote in differing degrees of
rigour, and that scholars should be careful to note the
intended audience of any writing in order to know how to take
it. Still, I have come across no evidence suggesting that
Leibniz radically dissimulated his views.
Also not rare is the belief that Leibniz's philosophy
results from the attempt to reconcile things other than
reason and faith or the various Christian denominations.
Wiener, for instance, argues that an "important clue" to
understanding Leibniz's thought was his attempt to reconcile
dual commitments to certain tenets of traditional philosophy
and "the new concepts and methods of the rapidly growing
sciences" (Wiener, p. xvii). Against this it should be
remembered that Leibniz was enough of a non-"modernist" to
reject the almost universally popular Newtonian physics and
the almost as popular Cartesian metaphysics which went so
well with it; not to mention the runner-up-to-Cartesianism
material atomist metaphysics of Gassendi, which Leibniz also
rejected
.
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One remaining interpretation of Leibniz's thought that
is shared by some noteworthy philosophers is the logicist
angle primarily spearheaded by Bertrand Russell but which, in
Russell's own words, "received overwhelming confirmation from
the work of Louis Couturat" (Russell, "Preface to the Second
Edition", 1937, p. v). Russell was referring to Couturat
'
s
La Lggique de Leibniz
, which came out a year later than his
own work, in 1901. The view expressed by these authors is
simply that "Leibniz's metaphysic was derived by him from the
subject-predicate logic" (Russell, p. v). Also characteristic
of this slant on Leibniz is that mathematics and calculus
played a formative role in his philosophy. The idea is that
Leibniz was primarily a logician and mathematician, and used
these fields as springboards into metaphysics. In
particular, Russell held that Leibniz's philosophy is based
on five supposedly logical, or at least epistemologically
basic, premises. Interestingly, God's existence is not one of
them, whereas the fifth is that perception yields knowledge
about the world. These two facts obscure one chief similarity
Leibniz had with his usual foe, Descartes: that he held the
existence of God is required to make human knowledge
possible; that knowledge of God is prior to knowledge of the
world. It is rather clear why Russell did this: he saw
Leibniz as establishing God's existence primarily by the
principle of sufficient reason, which in turn depends on the
veracity of our primary evidence, sense perception. I shall
argue that the sufficient-reason proof is not Leibniz's
11
principle vehicle for arguing God's existence, and that the
misconception that it is thwarts a truthful understanding of
Leibniz
.
An added twist to the logicist view of Leibniz was given
in Paul Schrecker's contention that the "inner unity" of
Leibniz's philosophy is "the method of the characteristic
universal language" (Schrecker and Schrecker, pp. ix-x),
Leibniz's mysterious "deep-logic" of reality. The basic idea
is that Leibniz as a logician had developed the basic
workings of an a priori yet content-full system deductive at
least in principle of reality; a system formally prior to the
rest of his thought, and therefore the key to understanding
his whole philosophy. Now, there can be no doubt that Leibniz
had such a system on his mind as a hope, and from time to
time trumpeted its advent. But it seems he never produced on
his promises, and this remains a source of disappointment on
the part of Leibniz scholars. But even supposing he had
produced a cogent characteristic universal language, the
conviction motivating and defended by the present work is
that it would yet not be "the key" to understanding Leibniz.
That which is formally prior is not necessarily - and, one
might hazard, not usually! - prior motivationally or
commitment-wise. In Leibniz's case, I'm convinced and will
argue that the "bottom line" for him were revelation-informed
theological commitments.
The problem of searching for a "beginning" to Leibniz
has typically been conceived in a formalist manner. Thus
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conceived, it is understandable that Benson Mates (p. 4)
would conclude that Leibniz's philosophy has no beginning:
for it seems that wherever one starts in Leibniz, one can go
on from there to conceive the whole of his philosophy.
However, even if Professor Mates 's position is correct, its
significance is guite limited. For when we are searching out
a beginning of a system of thought, we are searching for
underlying commitments, which may not appear as basic formal
elements of the system if they appear in it at all. Thought
does not flow from formally basic premises unless guided by
basic motivations, and these latter are at least as and
perhaps more significantly to be considered as the beginnings
of thought; for they guide even the choosing of formally
basic premises. Aristotle appeared to have acknowledged this
point in the Posterior Analytics by claiming science to be
the search for middle terms. Now from a formal perspective
the premises of a syllogism are prior to its conclusion; yet
the conclusion is what generates the completion of the
syllogism by motivating the discovery of the middle term, the
term shared by both premises. Only this discovery allows the
premises to be had. This goes against the popular
(formalist) conception that syllogistic reasoning is carried
out by putting together matching premises to churn out
conclusions not previously considered.
I would suggest further that a purely formalist
undertaking to understand a philosopher is incomplete;
understanding the underlying motivations for holding a view
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is often necessary for their being given a fair shake. Both
Russell and Mates expressed serious difficulties in seeing
the plausibility of Leibniz's thought. Neither could shake
the impression that it was no more than an interesting fairy
tale (Mates, p. 4). I sense this expresses the sentiment
of many readers of Leibniz. Perhaps a study of his underlying
theological motivations would help shake this impression, or
at least demystify the origins of his basic premises. I am
convinced that by steering clear of Leibniz's theological
'^^iiiugs one is doomed to the fairy-tale impression reported
by Mates and Russell.
Layout of Present Work
I shall argue that Leibniz used revelation-informed
theological commitments as a guide to choosing in
Aristotelian fashion the (formally) basic premises of his
metaphysics; that these theological commitments remained
formally on the outside of his metaphysics, although he
expressed them clearly and did not altogether hide their
relation to his metaphysics; and that therefore they have
precedence in his thought as the bottom-line commitments
generative of it.
The strategy for arguing this will be as follows. First
(Chapter 1) I aim to establish Leibniz's commitment to four
key revelation-informed propositions, expaining in sufficient
detail their significance. Secondly (Chapter 2), I will do
the same with respect to six key premises of Leibniz's
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metaphysics. Thirdly (Chapter 3), I will argue first the
primacy in general in Leibniz's thought of revelation-
informed theological commitments over metaphysical
commitments; and next will proceed to elucidate in sufficient
detail the generation of the six previously discussed (in
Chapter 2) propositions of his metaphysics from the four
previously discussed (in Chapter 1) theological commitments.
Fourthly (Chapter 4) I will evaluate Leibniz's project as a
whole, which was to develop a metaphysics of Christian
inspiration, supportive of Christian doctrine.
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CHAPTER 1
FOUR REVELATION- INSPIRED THEOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS
This ch3pt©]r consists in sn 3tt©mpt to show th©t L©ibniz
had four k©y r©v©lation-inspir©d th©ological commitm©nts
,
and
to suffici©ntly ©lucidat© th© significanc© of th©s©
commitm©nts. Th© four do not r©pr©s©nt by any m©ans a
synopsis of his r©ligious commitm©nts. Rath©r, th©y hav© b©©n
chos©n for discussion for two r©asons: first, in that th©y
r©c©iv© consid©rabl© tr©atm©nt in L©ibniz's writings, and
s©cond, in that th©y s©©m to hav© had a p©culiar formativ©
©ff©ct on L©ibniz's m©taphysics - an ©ff©ct I shall att©mpt
lat©r in this work to thoroughly docum©nt and establish.
Th© four propositions to b© discussed in this chapter
are as follows:
Proposition 1 - God, th© perfect being, exists.
Proposition 2 - Th© Eucharistic doctrine of Real Presence
is true.
Proposition 3 - Th© Lutheran, Catholic, and perhaps even
Calvinist accounts of the Eucharist are
compatible in their essential elements.
Proposition 4. The doctrine of Original Sin is true.
Proposition 1 - God, the Perfect Being, Exists
The present discussion of Leibniz's commitment to the
proposition that God, the perfect being, exists will consist
in two parts; the first presenting some of his most
forthright expressions of commitment and discussing their
significance; the second treating Leibniz's consideration
of reasons or arguments in favor of the proposition.
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To some it might not seem worthwhile to spend too much
time establishing a point that is so obvious that it does not
need defending. That Leibniz was committed to God's existence
and that this commitment permeated his philosophy
are simply not controversial claims. Still, the task of
presenting and discussing evidence for Leibniz's belief in
God will not turn out to be banal if it leads to insights
into the significance or precise meaning of the conviction
which in turn provide a key to understanding both its
revelation-informedness (non-deism) and the derivation of
much of his metaphysics from it. The latter two issues are
discussed in Chapter 3. For now, my use of the term 'theism'
is intended only in opposition to atheism and agnosticism,
not to deism.
Evidence of a Commitment
The most convincing evidence of Leibniz's theism comes
from his major works: the Theodicy and its companion Causa
Dei Asserta (both 1710), the Discourse (1686), and the
Monadoloqy (1714). In the latter God's existence is drawn as
a conclusion from metaphysical premises:
"38.
... [T]he ultimate reason for things must be
in a necessary substance... and this is what we
call God." (Erdmann, v. II, p. 708.)
But the other three are rather based on a commitment to
God's existence than attempts to establish it. The first two
are attempts to defend the existence of a perfect being
against the appearance of much imperfection and wickedness in
the actual world. The Discourse is a metaphysical treatise
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whose first premise is the existence of God. So in these
works a commitment to God appears in the form of express
premise, tacit premise, and express conclusion.
This pattern of a triple-role theistic commitment
confirms itself in a scan of Leibniz's writings. Consider two
other instances of its occurrence as an express premise:
"A truth is necessary when its opposite implies
contradiction.... It is a necessary truth that God
exists." (Letter to Mr. Coste, 1707. Erdmann,
V . I
, p . 447 . )
and
"The world is governed by a most wise and powerful
Monarch, whom we call God." {" Definitiones
Ethicae”
,
no date. Erdmann, v. II, p. 670.)
In the first case the conviction expressed is that the
proposition that God exists is a logical truth. In the
second, its use is as a basic premise of ethics. Even as an
express premise its function and range within Leibniz's
thought is varied. Whereas sometimes, as in the second case,
it could be argued that the premise of God's existence is
only basic relative to the subject being treated, at other
times, such as in the first case, it seems to enjoy a
position of logical primacy in his thought.
It is more usual in Leibniz's writings for the existence
of God to serve as a tacit premise than as an express
premise. Unfortunately, the very nature of being a
tacit premise lends difficulty to retrieving convenient
examples of such usage. The following, though, is a rather
common ploy of Leibniz, to use theism as a hidden standard by
which to evaluate various assertions. It occurs within the
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short work, Considerations sur la Doctrine d'un Esprit
Universel ( 1702 ) , in which Loibniz ©vsntually com©s around to
r©j©ct th© th©ory of panth©ism b©ing consid©r©d:
"Th© doctrin© of a univ©rsal spirit is good in
its©lf, for all thos© who t©ach it admit in ©ff©ct
the existence of th© divinity..." (Erdmann, v. l
p. 179).
In contrast to its role as a premise in his thought,
Leibniz's commitment to theism as the conclusion of
metaphysical premises gets a lot of attention, and perhaps
more than it deserves. For just as its use as a premise
doesn't entail its absolute primacy in his thought, its being
subordinated to premises of natural reason doesn't entail its
non-primacy. That which is basic from one perspective may not
be from another; in particular, it could be that Leibniz's
most famous proof of God's existence, the proof from
sufficient reason - discussed in the second part of this
section and again in Chapter 3 - is not a true indication of
Leibniz's priority of reasons. It is not rare for a
philosopher of Leibniz's stature to argue a point from
different perspectives, not all of which represent his own
order of thinking.
In short, one is led to wonder whether in the correct
account of Leibniz's metaphysical thought theism is
ultimately a premise of some sort or a conclusion, or indeed,
whether it could consistently and without entailing
circularity be both.
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Significance of Leibniz's Theistic Commitment
There is no better place to start in trying to ascertain
the signif icifance or meaning of Leibniz's theistic
commitment than the opening words of his Discourse :
"The most accepted and meaningful notion of God that
we have is quite well expressed in these terms:
that God is an absolutely perfect being. But the
consequences of this do not get sufficiently
considered. To do so is a matter of noting that
there are in nature many fully distinct
perfections, that God possesses them all together,
and that each one pertains to him in the highest
degree. One must know as well what a perfection is;
concerning which one thing we can be sufficiently
sure is that those forms or natures which are not
susceptible to a highest degree are not perfections
- as for example the nature of number or of
figure." (Erdmann, v. II, p. 816; see also
Montgomery
,
p . 3
.
)
Leibniz goes on to argue, using this criterion, that there is
no such thing as a perfection of quantity or extension,
whereas perfection of knowledge and power - omniscience and
omnipotence - are possible. Thus we get around having to
ascribe physical qualities to God; for every physical quality
is of extension, and extension is not a perfectible quality.
Thus also, we presumably justify the traditional conception
of God as all-knowing, all-good, all-powerful, and
necessarily existent.
Interestingly enough, Leibniz does not go on to try to
enumerate all the perfections of God in this work,
apparently having felt he'd established his point
sufficiently. This is an apparent continuation of the
medieval habit of assuming that a being shown to have one or
two perfections has all perfections. Perhaps this is just the
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lazy reasoning which results from lack of serious opposition.
Yet both Aquinas and Leibniz had reputations for
thoroughness; more likely it is the result of a hidden
premise that the perfections entail one another. As we shall
see, one of Leibniz's proofs - as I will argue, his principal
one - for God's existence is really a proof of the existence
of necessary being; as if it were obvious that necessary
being should have all perfections. This is similar to
Aquinas's method of arguing God's existence: show that there
is a first mover, a first cause, a necessary being, a
standard for each quality, or a purpose for every thing, and
you've shown God exists.
It is hard to say whether the perfections really do
entail one another; certainly it seems possible to imagine a
being who is all-knowing but not all-good. Some people
conceive an omniscient evil power to be operant in the world.
It is just as hard to say whether Leibniz thought the
perfections entail one another. He calls the various
perfections "completely distinct", which initially would lead
one to suspect that Leibniz did not consider them to be
mutually entailing. On the other hand he claims God to
possess the perfections "all together" { toutes ensembles),
which would suggest some connection between them. Perhaps a
look to other spots in Leibniz's writings will yield some
clue on these puzzling subjects.
Leibniz attempted to identify the perfections of God by
their simplicity, by their limited presence in human souls,
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and by their essential unlimitedness. He covers the first
point in his brief 1696 essay on Locke's Essay Concerning
Hum^ Understanding ( 1690 ), entitled ''Reflexion sur 1 'Essai
^ H'Entendement Humain ^ Locke'' ( New Essays on Human
Understanding ) . After arguing in the true Enlightenment
tradition that ideas are to be analyzed into their simpler
components until primitive ideas are arrived at, he
comments
:
"But the primitive ideas are those whose
possibility is indemonstrable, and which in effect
are none other than the attributes of God."
(Erdmann, v.I,p.l37.)
Thus the attributes of God, which are all perfections, are
the irreducible primary components of all other attributes.
Later
,
in the preface to his Theodicy
. he asserts that:
"[t]he perfections of God are those of our souls,
but He possesses them without limits." (Erdmann,
V. II, p. 469. )
Although at first this seems to have a demystifying effect,
since arguably there is nothing that each of us has better
access to than his own soul, still it is no easy task to list
the attributes of the human soul; we are in much the same
boat as before.
Maybe the best revelation of Leibniz's view of the
divine perfections comes from the Monadology . Having just
concluded, as cited above, that God exists, he continues:
"40. One can also deem that this supreme substance
which is unique, universal, and necessary, not
having anything outside of it which is in itself
independent, and being a simple consequence of
possible being, must be incapable of limits and
contain as much reality as is possible.
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"41. Whence it follows that God is absolutely
perfect, perfection being none other than the
magnitude of positive reality in the strict sensederived by setting aside the limits or confines inthe things that have them. And where there are nolimitations, that is to say in God, perfection is
absolutely infinite." (Erdmann, v.ll, p. 708.)
Here is expressed that the divine perfections are entailed by
His being infinite, with strong suggestions that His being
necessary entails being infinite, and that His having any
perfection "without limitation" entails being infinite. It
should be noted that Leibniz used the term 'perfection' in a
sense weak enough to allow that we have perfections too, but
only in a limited way. That is why he speaks of God having
perfections in an unlimited way, which would be redundant
according to ordinary usage.
In short, I think Leibniz took the possession of any
perfection without limit to entail infiniteness, and
infiniteness to entail all perfections. I suspect this was
perceived by him, and I think correctly so, to be in accord
with Scholastic tradition.
The two entailments sound plausible, at any rate.
Arguably nothing finite can possess any quality in an
unlimited manner, such that anything that did would have to
be non-finite. Just as arguably to fail to have a quality to
any degree entails some limitation or finiteness, such that
lacking limitation i.e. being infinite entails not failing to
have any quality to any degree, i.e. having all perfections.
Lest it be retorted that thus God must be infinitely
red-haired, we should recall that for Leibniz red-hairedness
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as a physical quality would be an imperfectible quality, and
thus not iinputable to God. But this response causes to arise
a new problem: how can God be responsible for creating things
to have qualities He does not possess?
If we retrack our steps, we see that Leibniz claimed all
positive reality is contained in God. That means that all of
the positive reality of being red-haired must be contained
within God. But what is there in being red-haired that God
lacks in virtue of which it is absurd to say God is red-
haired? The only option we have would be negative reality.
Negative reality is just the limitation of positive reality.
So we may say that red-hairedness, like other physical
qualities, is a composite of positive and negative reality,
the positive coming from God. But where does the negative
come from? Leibniz tells us in the following portion of the
Monadoloqy :
"42. It also follows that creatures have their
perfections from the influence of God, but they
have their imperfections from their own natures,
incapable of being without limits. For it is in
this respect that they are distinguished from God.
(Erdmann, v. II, p. 708.)
Negative reality is inherent in finite being by nature; God
is only responsible for the positive reality in things; as we
shall see. He brings the maximum amount of compossible
reality into existence. Whatever limitations there are were
logically unavoidable given the execution of His marvelous
creative task.
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Like so much metaphysical speculation, this way of
thinking somehow fails to clarify what it is supposed to
f namely how God can create the physical universe when
He lacks in His own essence one of the latter's main
ingredients: limitation. Before creation, there is just God;
He creates the universe by contributing its positive reality.
But unless this positive reality is delimited by the natures
or forms of finite being, creation cannot result. Yet God is
not claimed to be responsible for creating the limitations of
finite being. So where do they come from? The answer is that
they were always in being, as ideas or possibilities.
Creation is just enlivened possibility. Possibility is the
Leibnizean prime matter. This is witnessed to by the
following passage, which is in response to the contention
that essences are not real before creation:
"[Tjhose essences [of finite things]... do exist,
so to speak, in some region of ideas, namely in
God himself, who is the source of all essences and
of the existence of all that exists outside
himself." (On the Origination of the Universe .
1697. Schrecker and Schrecker, p. 89.)
This explains how God could have access to negative
reality in creating: negative reality has its reality in the
form of ideas, which God, being omniscient, naturally
possesses in His mind. Ideas allow the cognitive possession
of content not possessed in one's essence.
A remarkable by-product of this reasoning is that all of
the positive reality of the physical universe must be
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spiritual, as God is spiritual, while physicality is reduced
to idea. Here are the roots of Leibnizean idealism.
Consideration of Proofs for God's Existence
claimed that "almost all the ways that have been
used to prove the existence of God are good and could be of
use if perfected." (N^ Essays
. Book IV, Ch. 10, § 7; p.
438; Erdmann, v. I, p. 375.) In this he is distinguished from
many of his famous Enlightenment collegues, who offered their
proofs as an antidote to bad proofs. (Locke is one example:
Erdmann, v. I, p. 374.) One might expect, then, for Leibniz
to have defended in the course of his lifetime not one but
several proofs for God's existence. In accordance with
Jalabert (p. 438), I count four main proofs in Leibniz: three
a posteriori proofs - from movement, from pre-established
harmony, and from contingency or sufficient reason - and one
a priori proof, which is a version of the ontological proof.
Jalabert mentions also a fifth proof from eternal truths, but
thought it to be incidental (Jalabert, pp. 119-22). Whether
incidental or not, Leibniz's presentation and defense of it
provide key insights into his metaphysical thought, which is
why I include discussion of it in the present section.
Proof from Motion - The proof from movement on the
surface appears to be a rehashing of the Thomistic proof
known by the same name. According to Leibniz:
"[t]he maxim that there is no motion that doesn't
have its origin in another motion according to the
laws of mechanics leads us again to the first
mover, because matter, being in itself indifferent
to any motion or rest, and yet always possessing
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all Its motion i.e. force and direction, cannothave been set in motion except by the author of
motion himself." (Gerhardt, v. VI, p. 542)
As the argument goes, according to the laws of physics of
Leibniz's time, the same amount of motion or force is always
conserved in the universe, and the scientific assumption of
the uniformity of nature requires us to say thus it has
^®®h
,
or at least since the outset of the universe.
Since physics did not allow a natural increase in motion or
force, there was no natural explanation to be had for the
causation of motion or force; but reason requires an
explanation, thus we must conclude that there is a
supernatural cause for motion, which ultimately requires us
to admit God's existence.
It must be kept in mind that Leibniz's view of mechanics
or physics does not entail the existence of transeunt causes
in the world - the direct influence of one substance on
another. Rather, it is because the "author of matter" has
preestablished a harmony among things that they obey the laws
of physics. Thus this proof is in effect subordinate to the
proof from preestablished harmony.
A problem with Leibniz's motion argument shared by the
original Thomistic argument is that it seems not to
countenance the possibility of a beginningless world.
Aquinas acknowledged this shortcoming, conceding that "that
the world did not always exist is held by faith alone and
cannot be proved demonstratively" (Summa of Theology , I, 46,
2; see Bourke, p. 284). Although Leibniz addresses the
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problem in his argument from sufficient reason, he does not
do so here; thus we can say that this argument is doubly
subordinate: not only to the proof from preestablished
harmony, but to the proof from sufficient reason.
Incidentally, Leibniz rejected a proof by Locke on the
same grounds. Locke had argued that if anything exists
something has always existed; but I exist, therefore
something has always existed, which entails that God exists.
Leibniz noted that the proper conclusion would be the
disjunction: either God exists, or a beginningless chain of
beings exists. Both satisfy the assertion that something has
always existed (N^ Essays . Bk. IV, Ch
. 10, §§ 1-6, pp.
435-6 ) .
All these considerations lead to the conclusion that the
motion argument was not intended by Leibniz to be decisive on
its own merits.
Proof from Preestablished Harmony - Leibniz once
presented his argument from preestablished harmony
to Clarke, one of his more illustrious correspondents, as
follows
:
"Each simple substance in virtue of its own nature
is, so to say, a concentration and living mirror
of the whole universe according to its point of
view. This again is one of the most beautiful and
incontestable proofs of the existence of God,
since there is nothing but God, that is to say,
the universal cause, who could fashion this
harmony of things." (fifth - and last - letter,
§ 87, 1716; Erdmann, v. II, p. 773. See also
Leibniz's letter to Arnauld, 1687, in Gerhardt,
V. II
,
p. 115
.
)
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An appreciation of this argument is not possible without a
sufficient familiarity with the peculiarities of Leibnizean
metaphysics. As such, one might justly fault it as a case of
reasoning per obscurius
.
Leibniz believed to have successfully argued that there
are no transeunt or intersubstantial causes in the world.
The one real transeunt cause for him was God, whereas the
only causes in the world were intrasubstantial
:
preceding
states of a substance cause latter states of the same. Now if
Leibniz was correct, then it surely is remarkable that all
the events in the universe hold together so regularly as to
almost if not indeed perfectly suggest the existence of
intramundane transeunt cause-effect relationships. Such a
harmony would seem practically to require the existence of a
being capable of arranging it.
Although to the contemporary eye this argument seems to
be an argument of high probability for the existence of God,
the alternate of sheer luck having negligible probability,
yet Leibniz considered it to be one of metaphysical necessity
( New Essays . IV, 10, §10, p. 440). Why he thought so is an
interesting question. Perhaps it is because Leibniz had a
general disregard for the option of random chance as an
explanation, so much so as to allow an argument of eminent
probability to be considered of metaphysical necessity.
Contemporary philosophers tend to take the option of random
chance to be at least non-absurd, but Leibniz seems to have
considered it an absurdity. Sheer chance clearly does not
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provide sufficient reason, whereas Leibniz was convinced that
an adequate explanation had to do so, and that everything has
an adequate explanation. Chance is an explanation which does
not explain; put thus, it surely does sound like an
absurdity, not to mention an inconsistency.
There tends to be a lingering suspicion of circularity
regarding this argument; whether it is circular or not
depends on how Leibniz argues for non-transeuncy in
metaphysics. Clearly, if his reasoning there depends on
theological premises, then the present argument is implicitly
circular, since it in turn depends on the assumption of non-
transeuncy. The gist of the present work entails the argument
from preestablished harmony does in fact entail circularity.
I take this not as an indication of poor reasoning on
Leibniz's part, but rather as evidence that it was not for
him a basic or foundational argument.
Proof from Contingency or Sufficient Reason - The last
of the a posteriori arguments in my order of presentation is
perhaps his most famous and, according to Leonard Loemker,
the "most enduring" proof (p. 88), the argument from
contingency. Based on a commitment to his famed principle of
sufficient reason, Leibniz expressed it in an early essay
("Pe Existentia"
,
1676. Grua , p. 267) as follows:
"For the existence of a thing it is necessary
for the aggregate of all its requisites to be
present. A requisite is that without which the
thing cannot exist; the aggregate of all requisites
is the full cause of the thing (when the aggregate
of all requisites is present). Nothing exists
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without reason, because nothing exists without theaggregate of all requisites. The reason for theexistence of bodies is not contained in them asIS simple to demonstrate. For even if you regressin infinitum, you will be multiplying bodies as
well, and you will not get to the reason why they
exist rather than not. The aggregate of all
requisites of any given body is outside the body.Moreover the aggregate of requisites of one body
and the aggregate of all requisites of another isin the same thing
. That one thing whatever it isis the ultimate reason of things. For that which
is true likewise of all bodies whatsoever is that
they don't exist necessarily, that is, the reason
existing is not contained in them.
Necessary being has to be one only. Necessarybeing contains in itself all of the requisites of
things .
"
As just alluded, this argument has everything to do
with the principle of sufficient reason, expressed above as:
"Nothing exists without reason, because nothing
exists without the aggregate of all requisites."
The argument expressed above can be presented as follows:
1. A thing existing entails that all of its
"requisites" are "present", (i.e. all its
necessary conditions obtain in existence.)
2. No contingent thing "contains" all its own
requisites, i.e. it does not possess within
itself the full reason for or cause of its own
existence - for it is not impossible for it not
to exist.
C3. The whole series of contingent things even if
infinite does not contain all of its requisites.
C4. Some of the requisites of contingent being as a
whole obtain in existence outside of contingent
being
.
5. To obtain in existence, a requisite must be
contained within an existing thing or substance.
6. If necessary being exists, it is one.
C. The one necessary being, that is, God, exists.
Premise 1 holds as a logical truth. If something exists,
it follows that all of what is required for its existence
obtains
.
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2 seems to hold by definition of 'contingent being':
that which can both fail to exist or exist. It cannot be
deduced from the nature or essence alone of something that
can both fail to exist or exist that it exists; otherwise its
nonexistence which by stipulation is possible would
contradict its nature, meaning that its nature is impossible,
i.e. that it can't exist, which again contradicts what has
been stipulated.
C3 seems to hold as a logical consequence of 2. If each
item of a series or set is contingent, then it seems the
series or set must itself be contingent, since its existence
is a function of the existence of each of its components or
elements. Even if by the employing of some "bootstrapping"
method of explanation whereby each element of the set or
series is explained by a combination of other elements in the
set -remember, the set may be infinite - it remains to
explain the set or series itself. (See Leibniz's On the
Ultimate Origination of the Universe , 1697. Schrecker and
Schrecker, esp. pp. 84-5.)
C4 is a fairly straightforward consequence of 1 and 3.
Premise 5 is based on the princple that all existence
boils down to substances. If this is true, then all true
facts about existence are ultimately reducible to facts about
substances: every fact about existence entails the existence
of some substance. A special application of this is that any
fact about non-contingent being entails a non-contingent, i.e
necessary, substance.
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Premise 6 is needed to arrive validly to God's
existence, He being the unique, necessarily existent
substance. The defense of 6 would have to be that the
assumption of more than one necessary being entails
contradiction, perhaps in the following manner. The existence
of two necessary beings entails that the being of each is
limited from that of the other, hence each is finite. For if
they were mutually comprising and infinite they would be the
same substance (reminiscent of the Trinity). Now arguably
that which is finite cannot be necessary; since its being
does not exhaust all possibility, some possibility remains
compatible with its non-existence. That sounds tantamount to
saying that its non-existence is possible, i.e. that it is
contingent. Therefore it would seem that there can be at most
one necessarily existent substance, and infinite at that.
The conclusion, C, would follow from C4, 5, and 6. If
some of the requisites of contingent being obtain outside the
sphere of contingent being, and such entails the existence of
a substance, that substance would have to be non-contingent,
i.e. necessary. Moreover that substance, it seems, would have
to be unique, and, as it turns out, infinite.
The crux of this proof is Premise 3. It transfers an
intramundane se of the principle of sufficient reason to a
transcendental usage: now it is the reason for the whole
world we are searching for, not just the reason for each
thing in the world. Along these lines, Leibniz presents
another version of the contingency proof in the Theodicy
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(Part I, § 7. Erdmann, v. II, p. 5 O 6 ; see also Farrer,
p. 127.) Since everything in the world has a sufficient
reason
:
"it is important, therefore, to search for the
reason of the existence of the world
,
which isthe entire assembly of contingent things; and we
must look for it in that substance which carries
the reason for its own existence within itself,
and which consequently is necessary and eternal."
The traditional attack on the sufficient reason proof,
perhaps more associated with Bertrand Russell than with
anyone else, is that the principle of sufficient reason is an
intramundane principle only; there is no convincing evidence
that it should spply to the world as a whole, which quite
simply just may not have an explanation. This of course
creates an impasse of competing intuitions, and the argument
appears to draw a stalemate - an unacceptable outcome in
philosophy
.
If this is Leibniz's most basic proof of God's
existence, someone like Russell would tend to consider his
philosophical theology to be a failure. But I hope to make it
clear that this in fact was not Leibniz's most basic proof:
his ontological argument was. Morevoer, in Chapter 3 I shall
argue that according to the true priority of Leibniz's
thinking, the principle of sufficient reason turns out to be
more of a consequence rather than evidence of God's
existence. As mentioned above with respect to other of his
arguments, this does not necessarily entail circularity,
since he was wont to argue from different starting points
according to the mindset of his perceived audience.
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In short, none of his a posteriori proofs are basic, nor
are they intended to be. Of them, the contingency or
sufficient reason proof is the most basic, the other two -
those from motion and from preestablished harmony
-depending
on it for justification.
The Ontological Proof - In concurrence with Jalabert,
who claims that there is no doubt that Leibniz preferred the
a priori way of proving God's existence (Jalabert, p. 69), I
think Leibniz made it sufficiently clear that the ontological
argument - which is his most basic a priori proof - was for
him the fundamental argument for the existence of God.
Regarding the task of proving God's existence, Jalabert
quotes him as saying that "the better way of knowing things
is by their causes, but it is not the easiest" (p. 69; see
also Gerhardt, v. VI, p. 577). In the same citation he
relates that to know something "by its causes" is to know it
a priori. This hearkens back, but with irony (perhaps
unintended), to Aquinas's Aristotle-inspired distinction
between two kinds of demonstration (in the Summa of Theology ,
qu. 2, art. 2): demonstration "through the cause" or propter
quid, and demonstration "through the effect" or quia; the
former is demonstration which is "prior absolutely" {quoad
se)
,
whereas the latter is demonstration "prior to us" {quoad
nos). St. Thomas made this distinction as a preamble to
ruling out demonstrations propter quid of God's existence,
which are now known simply as a priori proofs. In the mind of
the Angelic Doctor, the only good proofs are those we now
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call a posteriori, the reason being that the premises
required for an a priori proof are philosophically
inaccessible to us. The irony I alluded to earlier is that
Leibniz employs the same distinction in order to argue that
Aquinas was mistaken ( New Essays . Bk. IV, ch. 10, § 7; pp
437-8 ), and that to the contrary, the a priori proof of God
is essentially superior, albeit more difficult for us to
grasp, (in fairness to Aquinas, I think Leibniz misconstrues
his objection as being that the ontological argument is
fallacious; Aquinas I think intended that the argument did
not do the work it is supposed to, namely to establish a less
clear proposition from more clear premises. He acknowledged
that God's existence is self-evident in itself, but not to us
(Summa of Theology
,
q. 1, a. 1). At any rate, this subtle
misunderstanding does not affect Leibniz's point, since it
remains a fact that Aquinas frowned on the ontological
argument whereas Leibniz made use of it.)
Although in essence he opposed it, Leibniz remained
sensitive to the Thomistic critique - in fact he seems to
have taken it as a valid criticism of previous versions of
the ontological argument. This sensitivity led him to develop
a version and treatment of the ontological argument that
avoided the flaws of earlier attempts. Understanding not just
the argument but Leibniz's ingenious treatment or manner of
defense of it is key to understanding how he does in fact
avoid the Thomistic objection.
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Leibniz intends his version to be a simple expression of
the essence of the ontological argument. He sees this as:
If God is possible, He exists.
God is possible.
Therefore He exists.
(See e.g., New Essays
. pp. 437-8.)
The idea is that since God is allegedly the being whose
existence is contained in its essence, if such an essence is
possible, and possibility or logical consistency is the
criterion of realness for essences, then the essence of God
is real. If the essence of God is real then God's existence
is real, since it is contained in His real essence. Now real
existence amounts to existence. Therefore God has existence;
God exists.
At first glance the argument looks like a fallacious
attempt to present God's existence as a tautology. But it is
really more than that, as I hope to show.
Since Leibniz's discussion of his ontological proof is
so much in conjunction with his consideration of and
reaction to earlier versions of it - especially those
authored by Anselm and Descartes, but also Bonaventure ' s -it
is necessary to discuss these earlier proofs to set the stage
for understanding Leibniz's.
Anselm's proof, from Chapter II of his Proslogion . can
be expressed as follows:
1. God is the being than whom none greater can be
thought
.
2. We can conceive of God as defined; therefore He
exists at least as an object of our thought.
3. If (!) God exists only as an object of our
thought, then ( ! !
)
He is not the greatest
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conceivable being; for objects of thought are
not as great as actually existing things.
4. !! is not the case, since it contradicts what
is stipulated in 1.
5. ! is not the case; for it is refuted by the
negation of ! ! according to modus tollens.
C. God exists actually. (Follows from 2 and 3:
that He exists at least, but not merely, as an
object of thought entails that He exists
actually as well
.
)
The argument turns on the application of a presumedly
conceded definition of God to yield His existence. Now in
itself a definition does not entail existence. A definition
only permits us to conclude that whatever satisfies the
definiendum satisfies the definiens and vice-versa. In
existential proofs, therefore, we must establish the
existence of something satisfying either the definiendum or
the definiens in order to conclude that something exists that
satisifes the other. The long-standing objection to Anselm's
argument is that it fails to do this, as noted by Aquinas
( Summa of Theology
.
q. 2, a. 2, response to second
objection): "It cannot be argued that [God] actually exists
unless it be admitted that there actually exists something
than which nothing greater can be thought". Still, Anselm
does not appear to have been entirely ignorant of this rule
regarding the use of definitions: his strategy is first to
establish the existence of God as object of thought, then
apply the definition to yield God's actual existence. The
question is whether existence-as-ob ject-of-thought is
existence; Anselm thought so; Aquinas apparently thought not.
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Throughout the medieval era of philosophy, a distinction
had gradually been emerging between objective and subjective
being. Objective being was being as object of thought,
subjective being was being as a subject independently of
being thought. When Anselm developed his proof, therefore,
the metaphys ic ical machinery was there to support him.
But the presence of the machinery didn't make Anselm's
proof go over smoothly even in his own time. I suspect no one
was quite sure how helpful the distinction could be. There
was and I think rightly so a strong suspicion that the
objective being or "existence" of an object was not a kind of
existence for it at all, and that only the subjective being
of a worldly object could correspond to existence for it.
An alternate way of attacking this distinction was to
consider them such mutually unrelated modes of being that
existence or being of a thing in the objective mode could
simply never be taken as evidence supportive of the thing's
existence in the subjective mode, thus thwarting Anselm.
However controversial or deceiving we may now take this
distinction to be, it was the very one Descartes depended so
heavily on in the proof he is most famous for - the one
Leibniz calls Descartes's "other" proof: the proof from the
innate idea of God in our minds. Whether Leibniz recognized
this connection between Anselm and Descartes is unclear,
given most of his interest was in Descartes more simple
ontological argument, with respect to which he did see an
Anselm connection.
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Leibniz considered the Cartesian version to be
"borrowed" from Anselm ( New Essays
. Bk. IV, Ch. 10, § 7; p.
437). For this reason his comments on one should count for
the other, though he drops Descartes's name far more often,
since his version was still recent.
To avoid a possible source of confusion it should be
noted that the Cartesian argument most usually in question
for Leibniz was not the one which has received the most
attention generally, i.e. the one that Descartes himself
considered to be his principle argument - which appears in
his Third Meditation and is to the effect that I have a clear
and distinct idea of God in my mind that can only have been
caused by God. Ironically Leibniz calls this "M. Descartes's
other argument" ( New Essays , ibid., p. 438). Rather, the
argument Leibniz is most occupied with appears in the Fifth
Meditation and is referred to by Descartes as "a new proof",
expressed by him as follows:
"Certainly, I discover within me an idea of God,
that is of a supremely perfect being.... And I
understand clearly and distinctly that it pertains
to his nature that he always exists.... Thus, even
if everything I have meditated upon during these
last few days were not true [thus, by inference,
even if the proof in the Third Meditation were not
sound] I ought to be at least as certain of the
existence of God as I have hitherto been about the
truths of mathematics."
Shortly thereafter he continues:
"From the fact that I cannot think of God except
as existing, it follows that existence is
inseparable from God; for this reason he truly
exists". (Cress, p. 42.)
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A classic criticism of Descartes has been that his
reasoning to establish God's existence is circular (see
Jalabert
,
p. 80 and Aune
,
p. 26). This criticism, generally
in reference to the argument in the Thrird Meditation, can be
extended to the argument in the Fifth Meditation. In the
first case scholars have noted that Descartes attempts to
prove God's existence in order to refute the evil genius
hypothesis and thus establish the veracity of our intuitions
and memories. Unfortunately the proof itself tacitly
presupposes the veracity of both and thus is implicitly
circular. Now in the Fifth Meditation he presents an argument
which he suggests is autonomous from the first, and ranks its
degree of certainty at least as high as that in the truths of
mathematics. Yet in Descartes's own reasoning our
justification for believing mathematical truths is contingent
upon the success of the first proof; so it is hard to see how
the same would not be true of our justification for believing
the second proof. Until we have refuted the evil-genius
hypothesis, it would seem that we simply cannot establish
that our idea of God is fallacious to start with.
It is interesting to note that if the second proof is
indeed autonomous from the first, then Descartes's philosophy
could be defended against the accusation of vicious
circularity. The second could be seen as the pure statement
of the first, which had been imperfectly presented earlier.
After all, the Meditations are presented according to a
discovery format.
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On the other hand, the very fact that, after having
apparently thought to have given a definitive proof of God's
existence, Descartes would return to offer another proof as
autonomous from the first, might be taken as an indication
that Descartes did not have complete confidence in the first,
and perhaps had a suspicion that it was flawed in the way
scholars later pointed out. Yet the second argument lacks the
air of epistemological rigour in which the first had been
draped
.
In spite of these several curiosities, Leibniz held the
second in more esteem than he did the first. I think it
rather obvious that he did so because the second is closer to
what he took to be the pure ontological argument, and is put
in a manner very similar to how Anselm had originally put it.
As mentioned above, for Leibniz the essence of the
ontological proof is that God's existence follows from His
possibility. For the proof to go through it would have to be
established that God, the being whose essence includes
existence, is possible. Leibniz credits Descartes and Anselm
for having noted this way of proof, but faulted them for not
recognizing that God's possibility is something that needs to
be established; it is not, in Aquinas's terms, something
"self-evident to us". In this respect Leibniz accepted
Aquinas's critique of the ontological argument, insofar as
its proponents had routinely assumed God's possibility as
self-evident
.
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In another respect, of course, Leibniz politely differed
with the great Dominican teacher. Leibniz thought that the
possibility of God could be established in natural reason -
at least in a manner sufficient to justify the use of the
ontological argument
.
To be sure, Leibniz opposed attempts to depict the proof
as complete or comprehensively defensible by natural reason.
His correspondence with one J. G. Eckhardt in 1677 consisted
in Leibniz's qualified rejection of a series of presentations
by his correspondent of the ontological argument. The main
sticking points were whether existence can be shown to be a
perfection, such that a perfect being could be inferred to
have it
,
and whether the idea of God can be proven to be
simple, such that it could be inferred not to contain
contradictory components which alone would exclude it from
being possible (see especially in Gerhardt
,
v. 1, pp. 214-
24). Leibniz was not prepared to admit that one could
concede these things. On the other hand he did express hope
that one day "able people would establish the proof in the
rigour of mathematical evidence" and believed to have
contributed toward that end ( New Essays . Bk. IV, Ch . 10, §7,
p. 438).
In short, Leibniz felt that as yet, no rigorous version
of the ontological argument was given nor imminently
forthcoming. This might lead one to conclude that Leibniz
thought that at present there was no use for it in
philosophy; this inference, however, would be mistaken, and
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here is where Leibniz's ingenuity comes into play. The fact
IS that, quite apart from the prospects of the proof being
rigorously established, Leibniz considered the ontological
argument to already yield a "demonstrative moral conclusion"
that "we ought to judge that God exists", for "it is
justified to assume the possibility of any being, and above
all of God, until someone proves the contrary" (Ibid.). For
Leibniz, the burden of proof regarding possibility was on the
skeptic, and this allowed into metaphysics the presumption of
the possibility of anything until it is proven not possible.
Since God's possibility entails His existence, our
justification in assuming His possibility extends to assuming
His existence. (See Leibniz to Jacquelot, 11-20-1702.
Gerhardt, v. Ill, pp . 434-4.)
At first blush, such a move seems quite liberal for a
man who defended the principle of metaphysical economy we now
call "Ockham's Razor": that "beings are not to be multiplied
without necessity" ( Dissertatio de Stilo Philosophico Marii
Nizoli 1670; XVIII, pp. 113-4. Erdmann, v. I, p. 64).
Shouldn't the responsibly economical metaphysician withhold
assent to any affirmation of possibility until it has been
positively established? Leibniz answered that he should not,
and his reasoning is aptly characterized by Jalabert as
follows ( p . 81 ) :
"Possibility is established by the complete
analysis of notions; if, broken down into its
simple elements, the notion does not permit the
occurrence in it of any contradiction, one
concludes that it is possible. Thus, possibility
is established in a negative way, by the
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ascertainment of a non-contradiction.... That ispossible which has not been able to be
demonstrated impossible. It is impossibility
which, in fact, is demonstrable, it is therefore
for the partisan of impossibility to come up with
a proof of it, if he is able. In his failure
consists the probability, in a word, the
presumption, that the thing is possible."
Two qualifications are immediately in order. First, the
issue here is limited to a priori proofs. Clearly, a direct a
posteriori proof for the possibility of something would be
that it exists, if that can be established. Secondly, that
the burden of proof is on the proponent of impossibility does
not entail that the proponent of possibility is absolved of
critical responsibility. It means rather that the only way to
defend or oppose the possibility of something is by looking
for demonstrations of its impossibility: the persistent
failure to come up with one given all honest effort is the
only evidence of a thing's possibility. Sometimes it is
evident from the start that there is or is not such a proof;
other times it is not.
After the dust settles, there are two arguments for the
existence of God that are candidates for being foundational
with respect to Leibniz's metaphysics: the contingency or
sufficient-reason proof, and the ontological proof. I have
already given a reason against considering the contingency
argument as such: its transcendental application is
questionable. I have also alluded, and later bear out in
Chapter 3, that it would lead to the depiction of Leibniz's
metaphysics as viciously circular, in that the principl© of
sufficient reason itself appears to be in rigour a
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consequence of God's existence in Leibniz's thought. Such a
depiction should only be accepted in the face of sure
evidence or at least in the absence of a better explanation.
Sure evidence is definitely lacking, whereas I think a better
explanation is that the ontological argument alone was the
foundation for Leibniz's metaphysical assertion of God's
existence
.
Lest it be thought that this move leads to an
excessively de-rigourized depiction of Leibniz's metaphysics,
I refer to the evidence presented in the first section of
Chapter 3: "Evidence of Priority of Intent in General" -
that Leibniz thought himself to be giving only a provisional
sketch of a metaphysics that could be made sufficiently
rigorous by others in the course of time. Consider also the
doggedness of Leibniz's defense of the as yet embarrassingly
non-rigorous ontological argument in opposition to Aquinas,
whom he and many others important to Leibniz highly
respected; it seems unlikely that he would have gone out on
such a limb with little at stake, which would have been the
case if the contingency argument were his basic one.
Proof from Eternal Truths - Leibniz occasionally sported
another proof for the existence of God, one which
leads to the revelation of a very important feature of
Leibnizean metaphysics, suggested also by his ontological
proof, which I call metaphysical essentialism: that essence
precedes existence in the order of being. The proof is that
from eternal truths, expressed in the following:
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If there were no eternal substance, there would be
no eternal truths" {"Specimen inventorum de
admirandis Naturae Generalis arcanis"
,
no date
Gerhardt, v. VII, p. 311).
The argument, fully expressed, would go on to affirm that
there are eternal truths, therefore there is an eternal
substance. Something similar is expressed in the Monadology
§44:
"Now, it is quite necessary that if there is a
reality in Essences or possibilities, or even in
the eternal truths, this reality be founded in
something existent and actual, and consequently in
the existence of the necessary Being, whose essence
contains its existence, or for whom it suffices to
be possible in order to be actual."
(Erdmann, v. II, p. 708.)
What Leibniz seems to be getting at is that possibility
itself has a certain evident reality of itself which
separates it from mere figment or whim, and this reality
demands something substantial on which to base itself. The
first part of this is expressed in a remarkable passage of a
1676 letter (to Foucher; see Gerhardt, v. I, p. 370):
"[a possibility] is not a vain imagination which we
fashion, for all we do is recognize it, despite
ourselves and in a consistent manner. So of all the
things that actually are, possibility or
impossibility of being is first."
One startling thing about this passage is that it puts
possibility before existence in the order of being. Another
startling thing is that it appears to infer such from the
fact that we recognize and not fashion possibility.
The idea is that since possibilities are real and not
fashioned, they are real independently of existence, since
only fashionable (creatable) realities are dependent on
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existence for their reality. If this is so, the reality of
possibles is established before even considering existence.
But from what is said in the first two passages, real
possibility entails something existent. A real possibility is
something that can be brought into existence, and for
something to be able to be brought into existence there is
required an existent able to bring it into existence.
The last two paragraphs might seem to contradict, but
they don't. The first says possibilities are real
independently of existence, i.e. they are not made real by
any existent. The second says the fact that possibilities are
real entails an existent. In short, possibility entails or
contains existence, and is not produced by existence. This
may not be tantamount to saying essence precedes existence in
the order of being, but one can see how it could be
interpreted as suggesting that. Using possibility as our
starting point we can deduce existence, whereas existence
always presupposes a possibility. If we try to begin with
existence, we are puzzled as to how existence exists. But
beginning with possibility and seeing that existence is
contained in possibility, keeping in mind that logic is the
study of possibility, we have a "logical" proof of existence.
This is metaphysical essentialism
.
Metaphysical essentialism has universal metaphysical
application; the possibility of anything precedes its
existence "in the order of being"; that is to say, in the
order of "logic" in the sense just described. Most notably.
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how©v©r
,
it appli©s to God: God's possibility or ess©nc©
accounts for, contains. His ©xist©nc©. Th© ©xplanation for
God's ©xist©nc© is His ©ss©nc© and not vic©-v©rsa; th©
©xplanation for His ©ss©nc© is possibility its©lf, and th©
buck stops th©r©. Possibility ©ntails ©xist©nc© not as
som©thing outsid© its©lf but as som©thing within.
This account of God's ©xist©nc© in t©rins of His essenc©,
call©d "positiv© as©itism" by Jalab©rt ( s©© Chapt©r VIII), is
oppos©d to th© Thomistic "n©gativ© as©itism", that God's
©xist©nc© is primary and n©©ding no account, wh©r©as His
possibility - and all possibility - is account©d
for by His ©xist©nc©, which is ©xist©nce, simpliciter.
In short, th© proof from ©t©rnal truths or r©al
possibiliti©s s©©s an ©xist©nc© contain©d in possibility that
can only b© God, that is can only b© pr©s©nt in th© form of
an ©ss©nc© that contains ©xist©nc©, or a s©lf -actuating
©ss©nc©. Th© proof r©quir©s that possibility b© acc©pt©d as
primitiv© in ord©r that ©xist©nc© may b© d©riv©d from it. We
shall se© Leibniz make much of this ©ssentialism in his
account of creation.
Proposition 2 - The Eucharistic Doctrine of Real Presence Is
True
Background
One of the central doctrines of Catholic, Anglican,
Lutheran, and Eastern Orthodox Christianity is that th© body
and blood of Jesus Christ are really - not just symbolically,
nor just "virtually" - present in th© elements of bread and
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wine after they are formally consecrated in the rite of the
Eucharist, also called "Communion" or "the Lord's Supper".
Leibniz was clearly a subscriber to this doctrine, and, I
shall argue in Chapter 3, this commitment had a major
formative impact on his metaphysics.
Early in his intellectual career, Leibniz showed an
interest in defending the possibility of Transubstantiation,
the Roman Catholic account (not exclusively) of Real
Presence, notably in apparent opposition to the account of
the Lutherans. (See especially De Transsubstantiatione"
,
1668. SSB
,
series VI, v. 1, pp. 508-13. Translation in
Loemker, pp . 178-85.) According to Transubstantiation, the
bread and wine are substantially terminated in the
Eucharistic consecration and the substantial ality of the
elements becomes solely the body and blood of Christ, despite
the remaining "species" or appearance of bread and wine.
Instead of Transubstantiation, Lutherans subscribe to what
they call the "Sacramental Union": after consecration the
bread and wine substantially remain alongside the
substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ.
Outside Lutheran circles this view is better known as
"Consubstantiation" (a term not so much despised by Lutherans
as taken to refer to yet another theory of Real Presence,
historically of little consequence, that the bread and wine
together with the body and blood of Christ form a third,
hybrid substance ( The Lutheran Cyclopedia , pp. 198, 345,
691 ) .
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'
it might seem ironic that Leibniz would have
chosen to defend Transubstant iat ion
,
since he formally
characterized himself as on the Lutheran side. But in fact,
as will be discussed more in Chapter 3, Leibniz confessed
both to being a subscriber to the Augsburg Confession ( SSB ,
ibid., p. 516), i.e. a "Lutheran", though Leibniz eschewed
the term in favor of referring to the followers of Luther as
"Evangelical" (Eisenkopf, pp. 38-9. His evidence is Leibniz's
remarks on a letter between of his correspondents, Pellisson
and Marie de Brinon, Dec, 1690. S^, I, 6, p. 149) and a
Catholic at heart (letter to de Brinon, Jul . 16, 1691. SSB .
I, 6, p. 235.). Although he correctly understood that to be a
Catholic does not in rigour entail being a member of "the
Roman church", yet he had enough of a sense of affinity to
the latter to confess to a correspondent that, had he been
born a Roman Catholic but grown to have the same convictions
he actually had come to have, he would in good conscience
remain Roman Catholic (letter to Landgraf Ernst von Kassell,
Jan. 1684. SSB
.
I, 4, p. 321). Against the appearance that
Leibniz had Roman Catholic sympathies, it might be contended
that Leibniz made such confessions to Roman Catholic
correspondents and perhaps was exaggerating if not
dissimulating. Moreover, it might be noted that a careful
reading of his writings on Transubstantiation reveals a
commitment only to its metaphysical possibility, not to its
actuality. Summing up his work in "De Transsubstantiatione" ,
he writes:
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"we have undertaken to show the possibility of the
transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body
[and blood] of Christ...."
The above does not entail a commitment to the doctrine, and
it would be unwise in the case of such a meticulous
philosopher as Leibniz to disregard this observation as
trifling. Simply put we cannot take the work as a sure
indication that Leibniz subscribed to the Catholic view. In
fact we shall soon see (Proposition 3) that Leibniz's own
account of how the Real Presence is effectuated virtually
defies being classified either as exclusively Catholic or
exclusively Lutheran. To that extent both Lutherans and
Catholics who operate on the assumption that the respective
teachings of Consubstantiation and Transubstantiation are in
essence mutually exclusive would have to consider Leibniz an
outsider
.
The question of dissimulation has been addressed in the
Introduction (pp. 9-10) and is addressed again in Chapter
3 (pp. 174-7). Apart from that suspicion, which, I am
convinced, turns out unwarranted, I think it can safely be
conceded that Leibniz's denominational loyalties were indeed
ultimately Lutheran. Nonetheless it is perhaps more
important to note, and I hope the present work will make
clear, that his deeper doctrinal loyalties were irenic: his
conception of Christian and religious doctrine was driven by
a conviction that many apparent doctrinal differences are in
fact reconcilable. Nowhere else is this more evident than
with respect to the Eucharist. From very early on he argued
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that there was essential agreement between Lutherans and
Catholics regarding the Eucharist, and later on he even
considered reconciling with the Calvinist view. All of this
can be taken as an introduction to the discussion of
Proposition 3 of the present Chapter.
Yet it is important as an introduction to the discussion
of Proposition 2 as well. For before gaining a meaningful
philosophical approach to the irenic question, the Real
Presence, which is the common bond between the Lutherans and
Catholic view of the Eucharist, needed to be defended. In
this case Leibniz's defense does reveal an unmistakable
commitment to what he is defending.
Evidence of Commitment
In an early letter to Antoine Arnauld (1671; see
Appendix A, p. 342) Leibniz makes a statement which in effect
commits him to Real Presence:
"Discussing these things soon, as it happened, we
slipped into discussing your works on the
Eucharist, in which the truth of the mystery, and,
may I say, its reality, is asserted, in opposition
to the symbolists. And we rejoiced in the Church's
having finally obtained victory...."
In the same letter he goes on to disparagingly allude to five
arguments for the impossibility of the Eucharist, which can
be construed more specifically as arguments for the
impossibility of Real Presence. These would be that Real
Presence is impossible because:
i. substantial change entails qualitative change;
ii. for an individual to change into a certain
substance entails that the latter retain some of
the matter of the former;
iii. trans-individual change is impossible;
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iv. the change of something into an already existing
substance is impossible; and
V. the change of many different things each on its
own into the same substance is impossible.
In the first case, Real Presence entails that the bread
and wine become the body and blood of Christ with no change
in appearance; i.e. sensible qualities. This seems to
suggest that substantial change happens without qualitative
change. In the second case, according to Real Presence the
bread and wine change into the body and blood of Jesus Christ
without the latter retaining any of the matter of the former,
thus violating the stated principle. In the third case. Real
Presence entails that the bread which is an extended
individual, changes into the body of Christ, which is another
extended individual; this seems to imply change from one
individual to another, violating the principle that change is
something that an individual undergoes and endures. In the
fourth case. Real Presence entails the change of the bread
into something already existing, namely the body of Christ,
thus violating the stated principle. Finally, in the fifth
case. Real Presence entails that every duly consecrated piece
of bread is changed into one and the same substance, the body
of Christ, which violates the stated principle.
The manner in which Leibniz so uncharitably refers to
these arguments, not even dignifying them with direct
rebuttals albeit acknowledging their difficulty, is a strong
indication that he subscribes to what the arguments attempt
to show impossible (Appendix A, p. 342):
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"they are putting forth arguments of impossibility
which solely on account of whose failing acuity
of meanings they think themselves able to sustain
against all the centuries of consensus among
Christian peoples, and which they claim ought to
held everywhere as common sense rather than as
absurdities .
"
Of course, Leibniz is depicting these opponents of Real
Presence to be claiming that the crucial premises of each
argument is universally received, not each argument as a
whole, so that anyone who subscribes to Real Presence
unknowingly contradicts his own principles.
In the same letter Leibniz claims these arguments of
impossibility to be flawed based on their dependence on two
materialist tenets, the first being that if a body is present
in many "places" or extensions, its extension is the union of
all the places in which it is present, and the second being
the Cartesian tenet that the essence of body consists in
extension (Appendix A, p. 342). But he gives no indication
for how the arguments are derived from these tenets, nor why
he thinks the tenets to be false. Yet later in the letter he
suggests that his desire to "explain the possibility of the
mysteries of the Eucharist" in some way led him to the
insight that the essence of body consists not in extension,
but in motion (Ibid. p. 346). Does this new insight about
the essence of body result from a faith conviction in the
Eucharist, or does his conviction in the possibility of the
Eucharist result from the new insight, gained independently
of the inspiration of faith commitments? To answer such a
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question we need to take a look at Leibniz's explication of
the doctrine of Real Presence.
Significance of Commitment
Leibniz asserts his understanding of Real Presence as
the proposition that:
"the one and same Body of Christ (which suffered
for us on the Cross) is really present in its
substance, wherever the host of the Eucharist is
present" {"De Demons tratione Possibilitatis
Mysteriorum Eucharistiae”
,
1671. SSB , VI, 1,
pp. 515-16).
Many years later, he wrote to Des Bosses that:
" [m] ult ipresence of the same body doesn't take
place by replication or penetration of dimensions
[by one body into another], but is to be explained
by a kind of presence having no relation to
dimensions. And in fact, if God made it to be such
that something acted upon a distant thing
immediately, by that very act its multipresence
would come about without any penetration or
replication. According to us [Lutherans, as made
clear by context] it is not said that the body of
Christ is included in the bread, but taken with
it; so no connection to dimensions is necessary"
(1710. Gerhardt, v. II, p. 399).
Now it is no mystery why a materialist would wince at these
two passages. The first claims that one body - Christ's -
shares the same extension with other bodies - the hosts or
bread-elements - and yet there is no identity between the two
nor is one part of the other. This sounds impossible to
someone who accepts extension as the essence of body. The
second passage argues that Christ's body is present in the
elements not by penetration or replication. This explains the
first passage in a way that avoids the conclusion that the
first tenet presses for, namely that the hosts have to be
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part of Christ's body. Yet whatever explaining it does is in
terms that for a materialist are just as inconceivable. If
one body is wholly present in another how could it be
otherwise than by penetration? If it is wholly in many
places, how can this not entail replication and how can
replication of the same body, the same extension, be
conceived as possible? The answer is that in a materialist
framework it can't - not without the excessive torture of
concepts
.
The upshot is that Leibniz had a non-materialist
conception of bodies which allowed him to overcome the
materialist arguments and envision the Eucharist as possible.
The first argument depends upon the supposition that
qualities are only those apparent physically, whereas a
non-materialist notion allows us to admit that Real Presence
brings new qualities to the substantially changed host that
are no apparent. The second argument limits the notion of
change to material change, whereas a non-materialist notion
of bodies admits the possibility of purely formal change:
e.g. change of the principle or "form" governing the bodies'
extension. The third argument assumes that the individual
extension undergoing change is considered by itself a body.
In a non-materialist framework there is room for saying that
the principle that for every change there must be an
individual or a thing which undergoes it is not violated on
the grounds that the "individual" may be an extension which
is not considered by itself a body; that "individual" may be
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conceived as passing from one substantial state to another.
The fourth and fifth arguments are conceivably rebutted if we
admit that being wholly the body of x just means being an
extension governed as an autonomous entity - i.e. not just
as a "body-part" - by the substance or "soul" of x. This
allows for the possibility of the appropriation of several
extensions by the same soul, hence allowing what the fifth
argument would rule out, multipresence of a substance without
multiplying the substance itself. It also allows what the
fourth argument would rule out: the changing of a thing into
an already existing substance; for it is now conceivable for
a substance to take on and shed differing extensions here and
there
.
Defense of Real Presence - Refutation of Materialism
The question remains why Leibniz was opposed to a
materialist conception of body. I think his basic motivation,
yet one he had to be careful about revealing, was that such
materialism would render the Eucharist impossible. He had to
be careful about revealing this, since to opponents it would
appear as question-begging; they would demand that if his
non-materialism is his defense of Real Presence and the
Eucharist, that the latter not be his defense of the former.
And in fact it wasn't; it was his motivation, not his
defense. As we shall see, his defense, which he only
gradually developed - whereas his motivation was clear from
the start - was that materialism regarding bodies, whether
Cartesianism or atomism, failed to yield distinctly knowable
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substances, and this failure would impinge upon the greatness
of God. (E.g. "Specimen Demonstrationum Catholicarum seu
Apologia Fidei ex Ratione"
,
1683-6?, in Grua
,
p. 29: "No body
can be understood as a unity... unless it is contained by
some substantial form, which is somewhat analogous to a
soul....") I hope these points will become more clear in the
following chapters.
Proposition 3 - The Lutheran, Catholic, and Perhaps Even
Calvinist Accounts of the Eucharist Are Essentially
Compatible
Evidence of Commitment
In "De Demonstratione Possibilitatis Mysteriorum
Eucharistiae" ( SSB , VI, 1, p. 516), Leibniz writes:
'*1, who am an adherent of the Augsburg Confession,
in trying to demonstrate the possibility of Real
Presence, began the same project beyond my own
expectation with a defense of Transubstant iation
,
and remarkably I found that Transubstantiation and
Real Presence contain one another in the final
analysis; and therefore the dispute in the Church
is just on account of the fact that one side
doesn't understand the other.
"I assert therefore that Transubstantiation
properly understood, as conceived by the [Roman
Catholic] Council of Trent and as explained by
me largely from the principles of Doctor Thomas
[Aquinas], is in no way opposed to the Augsburg
Confession, but to the contrary follows from it."
He expresses the same point in his letter to Arnauld of the
same year (1671) almost verbatim (Appendix A, p. 350).
More than twenty years later (January, 1692. SSB I, 7,
p. 249) he confided in a letter to Paul Pellisson-Fontanier
the following, which suggests that the Calvinist doctrine of
Virtual Presence may be reconcilable with Real presence:
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"It is true in the meantime that substance in
concrete is something other than force; it is the
subject taken with this force. In such a manner is
the subject itself present, and its presence is
real, because it comes forth immediately from the
essence [of the subject] according as God
determines its application to space. A virtual
presence, as opposed to a real presence, must be
one without this immediate application of the
essence i.e. primitive force, and is not realized
except by actions at a distance or by mediated
actions. But there is no distance to speak of in
this case [i.e. between the essence of Christ and
the host]
.
Those who follow Calvin admit of a
real distance and the virtue of which they speak
[in speaking of Virtual Presence] seems to me to
be a spiritual one which has relevance only to
faith. This sense [of virtue] has nothing to do
with the force about which we are speaking. I
would even say that it is not only in the
Eucharist but everywhere that bodies are only
present by this application of primitive force to
space . "
These remarkable passages reflect at once a marvelous
dexterity of thought and an almost overwhelming motivation to
reconcile the differences between the several hostile
Christian factions that had formed during the Reformation.
The three major factions Leibniz occupied himself with the
most were the Roman Catholics, the Evangelical Christians
(Lutherans), and the Reformed Christians (Calvin and
company). In the passages just cited he alludes to and
partially explains one of his most remarkable feats:
the outlining of a quite plausible theoretical reconciliation
between Transubstant iat ion , Consubstant iat ion (both of which
entail Real Presence), and Virtual Presence.
Significance of Commitment
Leibniz saw that a good defense of the Eucharist
includes the envisionment or demonstration of the possibility
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of the Eucharist, which in turn, requires an understanding of
what it is to be a body. He also saw, as mentioned above,
that a materialist conception of body blocks the envisionment
of the possibility of the Eucharist and is arguably
incompatible with it. Descartes ran into severe problems
along these lines, being a Catholic with a materialist
conception of body; he was forced to resort to odd notions
like "apparent species" in his defense, ("On True Method in
Philosophy and Theology", c. 1686. Wiener, p. 63), as opposed
to real, but not apparent species, I suppose. He ultimately
excused himself, according to Leibniz, on the grounds that
he was "pursuing philosophy, not theology" (ibid.). Leibniz
did not see this as a fitting excuse; it seemed to him to
suggest that there are two sets of truths which are permitted
to contradict one another. At the very least it suggests that
it is up to theologians to square doctrine with philosophy
and not vice-versa, to which Leibniz, as we'll see, was also
opposed
.
In short, it seems that a non-materialist conception of
body is required for defending the Eucharist. The notion
Leibniz developed was that of an immaterial "primitive force"
or organizing principle acting directly upon a physical
extension. In this case the identity of the body is supplied
by the primitive force, not the extension; the latter is just
the primitive force's instrument of being physically present.
As Leibniz notes, this is in accord with Thomistic (and
Aristotelian) metaphysics. Leibniz in fact saw "primitive
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force" as the Aristotelian "entelechy"
,
the scholastic "form"
returned to its active status originally granted to it by
Aristotle: an organizing, immaterial principle of activity,
of motion (ibid., Wiener, p. 64; and "What is Nature?", in
Schrecker and Schrecker, p. 106).
What results, not uncharacteristic of Leibniz, is an
irony: the reconciliation Leibniz envisions between the three
views of the Eucharist traditionally thought to differ is
actually carried out by a notion already present in
tradition: the (immaterial) substantial form!
Envisionment or Defense of Possibility
Here is how his reconciling envisionment works. The body
of Christ is really present in the host insofar as the
substantial form of Christ acts immediately upon the host, in
a manner largely similar to how, so say the non-materialists,
my soul, an immaterial principle itself, acts upon a physical
extension, resulting in my bodily presence. If my soul is
suddenly separated from this relation with the same physical
extension, what is left is an accidental aggregate of cells,
which may well go on living for a time - perhaps
indefinitely, if they are sustained artificially by medical
procedures. Now according to the same way of thinking, we
ought to admit that each of those cells considered by itself
is a body in the same manner as I with my soul related to the
physical extension in the above manner was a body. But
whereas before the complete substantial account for the
extension was that it was a (living) human body, in
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particular mine, now its complete substantial account is that
it is an aggregate of smaller bodies, namely the cells.
Before these same cells did not "count" in a substantial
account, since they had been in the state of being
appropriated by a single, organizing principle, my soul:
indeed their very coming into being and being sustained, etc.
had been ordered by my soul. So it is in appropriate to sat
that my living body is an aggregate of microscopic bodies
"plus" my body. Having said that, it is just as inappropriate
to deny that those microscopic bodies i.e. cells exist in my
body
.
Now suppose for some heavenly purpose God chooses to
allow my soul to reappropriate the very same extension from
which He had just separated it. Then the substantial status
of the physical extension would go from being an aggregate of
bodies to being one body, period. This is analogous to what
allegedly happens in the Eucharist. The bread is an aggregate
of smaller bodies, each having an organizing principle. In
consecration the substantial form or soul of Christ
appropriates it and it becomes His body, period. Yet the
smaller bodies which had comprised the bread have not been
annihilated; they simply don't enter into the substantial
account of the consecrated host.
In this manner we see how Consubstant iat ion and
Transubstant iation are reconcilable. We satisfy the latter by
insisting that the complete substantial account of the
consecrated host is the body of Christ, period. We satisfy
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the former by acknowledging that the bodies comprising the
bread are still present within the host; no material
srin ih i 1 a t ion has taken place. Yet in a way we can speak of
annihilation in a formal sense, since the bread is
substantially no longer there; it is there, but not
substantially; in manner not entirely unlike how, when we
consume bread and digest it and its matter is appropriated
into our body, it is still in a sense in our body, but not
substantially: substantially it is now only our body.
It also becomes evident how Real Presence entails
Transubstantiation
,
thus committing Lutherans to the latter.
If this is the mannwer in which a body is really present: by
a soul's appropriation of a physical extension: then it is
clear that the soul is the identity of the body, such that
all previous identifications of the extension no longer
apply. It is as if one central government takes over several
smaller nations within its own nationhood: the previous
smaller nations no longer exist as nations.
So far the analogies I've used have ignored the issue of
appropriation of discontiguous extensions by the same soul.
As an immaterial principle, it is not metaphysically limited
in space by its nature, so it is hard to see an argument for
why multiple appropriations should not be possible.
Nonetheless, consider a living, active sperm cell. It is, in
essence, discontiguous with the rest of the body's extension,
yet even ejected from our body in coitus, continues to
perform its function as a body part, which is to attempt to
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effectuate reproduction. As such it is still easily
envisioned as subjugated to the body's organizing principle,
at least as long as the body exists. If the body expires and
the sperm is conserved in life, then it could be seen as a
body on its own merits, just as with the other body parts.
Contiguity is not an issue according to an immaterialist
conception of body.
As for the reconciliation of Virtual with Real
Presence, the task is only tentatively accomplished, as
Leibniz's hedging suggests. If subscribers to Virtual
Presence are firmly committed to saying that the real body of
Christ exists somewhere in space and that the soul of Christ
only acts upon the consecrated host through Christ's real
body from a distance, then there is no reconciliation to be
had. But if Christ is said to act upon the host from a
distance only in a metaphorical sense, then the door is open
for agreement. For according to Leibniz, a body is really
present in virtue of an immaterial principle - which because
of its immateriality is indistant to all physical extension,
in principle disposed to act immediately on any physical
extension - acting immediately upon a physical extension.
The soul of Christ is immaterial, therefore it is disposed to
act immediately upon any physical extension; although we say
that He is in heaven and heaven is "somewhere else", a
"different place". This, Leibniz aptly notes, may be
metaphorical faith-talk. If it is so for adherents of
Virtual Presence, and if they don't insist that the soul of
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Christ acts upon the consecrated host only indirectly,
through Christ's own heavenly body, the, the difference
between Virtual and Real Presence is only semantic.
Proposition 4 - The Doctrine of Original Sin Is True.
Evidence of Commitment
We have already seen that Leibniz from early on
confessed to be a subscriber to the Augsburg Confession .
hence, Lutheran; and continued to identify with that stance,
as indicated, for example, by his identifying the Lutherans
as "us", as he did in the above passage (p. 56) from a 1710
letter to Des Bosses. As the second article of the Confession
professes adherence to the traditional dogma of Original Sin,
I think we may safely surmise that Leibniz subscribed to the
doctrine
.
In his 1710 work entitled A Vindication of God ' s Justice
Reconciled with His other Perfections (Schrecker and
Schrecker, pp. 114-147) - the more rigorous companion to his
popular Theodicy of the same year - Leibniz expounds at
length on Original Sin. His first statement on the doctrine
comes at § 75:
"As to the corruption of man.... [i]t has its
origin in the fall of our first parents and in the
hereditary transmission of the contagion."
We pick him back up at § 79:
"The true root of the fall. .
.
lies in the
aboriginal and weakness of the creatures, which is
the reason why sin has its place in the best
possible series of events."
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Again, at § 81:
"We must now deal with the hereditary
transmission of the contagion, engendered by the
fall of our first parents and passing from them
into the souls of their posterity. There does not
seem to be any more suitable explanation for this
than to state that the souls of his posterity were
already infected in him. . .
.
[B]y virtue of the
primeval divine benediction some organized
rudiments of all living beings... and even their
souls, in a certain way, were already existent in
the first specimen of every genus to evolve in the
course of time. But the souls and the principles
of life which are in the seeds destined to be
human bodies are supposed to run through a special
process. They remain at the stage of sensitive
nature, just as do the other seminal animalcules
which have not that destination, until the time
when an ultimate conception singles them out from
the other animalcules. At the same time the
organized body receives the shape of the human body
and his soul is elevated to the degree of
rationality .
"
Finally, at §§ 83-84:
"Thus we may overcome the philosophical
difficulties engendered by the origin of forms and
souls.... and at the same time we overcome the
theological difficulties concerning the corruption
of souls."
I think the above passages to be representative of
Leibniz's convictions. The work in which they appear has a
mature, straightforward and rigourous quality, such that we
have no real reason to suspect a smokescreen.
Significance of Commitment
Accepting them as such, we can identify three major
aspects of Leibniz's thinking on Original Sin. The first is
that it was inevitable: that due to the inherent finiteness
of creation, imperfection is entailed therein. Even the best
possible creation, which is "moral" in that it contains
creatures possessed of moral faculties, is imperfectly moral.
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since the exercise of moral faculties by finite creatures is
bound to be finite or limited, i.e. sinful, m short, the
best possible world entails sin.
A second aspect of Leibniz's view of Original Sin is
that its transmission to all humans is explained by the fact
that we were all, in a subtle but literal sense present in
Adam when he sinned. (It is interesting but typical of the
time that no mention of Eve is made. It is not hard to see
how her inclusion would put Leibniz's explanation in
jeopardy
.
)
A third aspect is that his deliberation on Original Sin
is intertwined with the treatment of the philosophical
problem of the origin of souls, in such a manner that it is
difficult to say which precedes which. If anything, it seems
that a commitment to Original Sin is used as the key to
developing the philosophical position, namely that all
substances are created at once.
Defense
Metaphysical Evil - The first aspect is reminiscent of
what Thomas Aquinas thought:
"defects of this kind... are not penalties, but
natural defects necessarily consequent upon
matter." ( Summa Against the Gentiles . IV, Ch. 52,
reply to second objection. Tr. from Bourke
,
p. 345.)
However, Aquinas does not thereby draw the conclusion that
original sin was inevitable:
"As long as man's reason was subject to God, not
only did the inferior powers serve reason without
obstacle, but the body also could not be impeded
in subjection to reason by any bodily obstacle -
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God and His grace supplying, because nature had
too little for perfecting this establishment."
(Ibid., reply to third objection. Bourke, 346.)
It is important to compare Leibniz to Aquinas here not so
much to highlight their similarity as to highlight their
difference. It is rather clear that Leibniz had an unsinkably
reconciliatory spirit and stuck to "tradition" - that is,
especially, to Aquinas and Aristotle - wherever he felt he
could. Moreover, driven by that same spirit, he was well-read
in tradition. So the finding of a significant difference is
evidence of a strong, compelling commitment, not of whimsical
creativity. The difference here is that Leibniz did not allow
that God could, by His grace, fill in where nature was
lacking to allow humans to remain in their state of
primordial bliss. In other words, the "Fall" was
metaphysically necessary.
To be sure, Aquinas's position is not without problems.
If God was able to fill in where human nature was lacking,
why did the Fall occur? The answer Aquinas provides in the
same Chapter is that God's grace filled in only to allow
humans to act on their rational choice, not to ensure the
correct choice. As long as humans made truthful moral
judgments, their sinlessness was insured by God's grace,
such that no other passion would make them act contrary to
judgment, as might happen in an uninsured natural state. The
problem with this response is that it raises the issue
whether our reason by its own power , even without the
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obstacles of other passions and "inferior faculties", was
bound to fail, if it was not, why did it?
Leibniz was convinced that even our reason on its own is
finite, and thus bound to failures. This admitted, Aquinas's
reasoning is no longer of consequence, since it would still
yield that original sin was bound to occur. Leibniz's
reasoning is difficult to withstand if we accept the
traditonal premise that evil is privation along with the
assertion that to be finite entails suffering privation. This
latter assertion cannot uncontroversially be excluded from
the status of being traditional, given the above admission by
Aquinas that human nature on its own is inherently lacking. A
way out would be to assert that the human faculty of reason
is not finite in itself; but that leaves us with another
problem, namely how a non-finite faculty can fail, especially
when insured against all external interference. In the end,
neither this "way out" nor the rejection of the assertion
that being finite entails privation seem plausible unless
there is some way of being non-finite - where finite entails
having privatory limits -without being infinite in the
traditionally accepted sense. Leibniz chose the negative
horn of this dilemma, and this led to his deterministic
envisionment of Original Sin. The positive horn, which would
be that the human soul/mind/reason is "openly" or
"plastically" finite, i.e. in a sense not entailing fixed,
privatory limits, is an option he rarely acknowledged. On one
occasion he did argue against "plastic natures" on the
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grounds that both i. in"it is roasonable to say" -
accordance with physical laws Leibniz claimed to have
demonstrated regarding the conservation of the quantity of
direction and force in the physical world - that souls have
no effect on the physical world; and ii. souls, analogously
to physical things, "follow their laws" ("Considerations on
the Principles of Life, and on Plastic Natures...", published
in Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants . 1705. Wiener, pp. 191-
2). Not only does this reasoning lack rigour, but Leibniz
indicates his awareness of such by framing it a persuasive
rather than demonstrative format. The ground that the soul
"has its own [i.e. deterministic] laws" would be patently
circular in a rigourous context, since at issue is not
whether souls are governed by laws, but whether those laws
are deterministic. Moreover, to argue that physical laws of
conservation entail that souls have no effect on the physical
world is as weak as is our grasp of the range of physical
laws: e.g. do they completely govern our body movements?
Some physicists have thought so, but I don't think there has
ever been consensus on this point. In short, this publication
does little more regarding the present discussion than
indicate Leibniz's opposition to open or plastic natures.
Our Presence in Adam - The second aspect of Leibniz's
view of Original Sin is again, and not surprisingly,
reminiscent of a view expressed by Thomas Aquinas. Again, for
reasons mentioned it will be the difference and not the
similarity that we will key on:
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"Other men were present in Adam, however not in
act, but only virtually, as in an original
principle. Nor are they said to have sinned in
him by exercising any act, but insofar as they
belong to Adam's nature, which was corrupted by
sin." (Summa Against the Gentiles
. IV, Ch. 52,
reply to seventh objection.
)
The difference lies in how we are supposed to have been
present in Adam. Leibniz thought that our yet-to-become-
rational souls were actually present within the organizing
influence of Adam's soul. Every soul on its own governs a
physical extension, according to Leibniz, and that physical
extension is itself an aggregate of soul-governed physical
extensions, or bodies. We were present within that aggregate
governed by Adam's soul, i.e. much as cells, little bodies
or "animalcules" within Adam's body. Our souls later take on
the faculty of reason as an acquired trait, retaining
substantial identity through that transition.
Aquinas's view is more difficult to characterize; his
subtle difference with Leibniz lies in his refusal to admit
our actual, substantial presence in Adam, admitting rather
our virtual presence within him, insofar as his original
principle (nature) and ours is the same. Adam did something
to alter the common nature's status before we, instantiations
of the same nature, came to be. Not that the nature itself
was affected; natures are eternal and unchanging. Rather, the
change is in the grace-insured status of the nature, the
insurance plan connected to the nature and applicable to
every instantiation. This is how the defective alteration was
passed on to us; much in the manner in which it would happen
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if thG first battGir that a cooki©-cutt©r cuts b©nds it,
futur© cooki©s cut by it will r©c©iv© a d©f©ctiv© shap©
.
Both of th©s© vi©ws rais© furth©r probl©ms which w©
should consid©r. Th© probl©m with Aquinas's vi©w is that it
is difficult to s©© how an action by an individual substanc©
can alt©r th© pristin© status of th© natur© it instantiat©s
rath©r than just th© individual substanc© its©lf. Aft©r
Adam, nothing anybody do©s furth©r alt©rs th© status of th©
natur©, but just alt©rs th© status of th© individual
substanc©. Ev©n th© salvation of Christ is not th©
r©pristinization of human natur©, but of instanc©s of that
natur©, i.©. of individual humans. That und©rstood, it is
quit© puzzling how Adam could hav© b©©n in a position to do
what not ©v©n Christ do©s: alt©r th© status of th© g©n©ric
human natur©. To b© sur©
,
it is not claim©d to be Adam, but
God who, in response to th© first sin - a sin of reason,
according to Aquinas - deprived human natur© of th© graces
insuring th© harmonious sovereignty of reason in th© soul.
An answer to why H© would do so would probably hav© to do
with th© inevitability of th© proliferation of sin against
reason in human culture one© it had been introduced therein,
th© counterproductiveness of empowering by grace corrupted
reason, and th© impossibility of directly cleansing corrupt
rational faculties without violating the dignity of creation.
In order to preserve such dignity, a remedy would hav© to be
sought which could be freely chosen by reason, i.e. by each
individual in rational deliberation. Just how these things
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would be established seems to me beyond the scope of "reason
alone"
.
The problem with Leibniz's version of original-sin
transmission is how being present as "animalcules" in Adam's
body manages to infect us with the privation of original sin.
Original sin is a moral ailment, not a physical one; moreover
we are only present in Adam in a premoral state, a kind of
presence which does not seem capable of participation in
Adam's moral state, and which thus seems not to merit the
reception of a moral privation.
By Leibniz's own admission, none of the other
animalcules in Adam's body which are not destined to be human
receive any defect because of original sin. How can we bear
a defect which pertains to disorder between soul-elements:
reason, the passions, the bodily desires, not all of which we
possess? On this score Leibniz notes that strictly speaking,
original sin causes disorderliness in the passions and
sensations alone, which animalcules already possess. Reason
is only infected indirectly, by the disorderliness of the
other parts. So one could see how original sin could be
carried by a not-yet-rational human "spore" in its faculties,
taking on its intended moral significance only when the soul
takes on rationality.
So ultimately the question is: what is the justice of
punishing us for being in Adam in a pre-rat ional , pre-moral
state? It seems inappropriate to depict the transmission of
original sin as a physical transmission, as if it were a
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bact©rial contagion - although Leibniz was not unigue in
doing so.
Why Leibniz chose physical transmission over the
Thomistic formal transmission has to do with the difference
between these two philosophers on what natures are: Leibniz
considered natures to be individual substances themselves, so
the deprived-common-nature option was not open to him.
(Leibniz's view of natures is discussed in Chapter 2,
Proposition 8
. )
The Origin of Souls - The third aspect of Leibniz's
understanding of Original Sin is its peculiar juxtaposition
with a metaphysical proposition he seemed anxious to work
into his metaphysics: that creation of substances happened
all at once. He had a difficult time coming up with a
definitive argument for it philosophically, and its appeal
to him seems rationally unjustified - that is, unless it
arises from his commitment to Original Sin - and I shall
argue that it does.
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CHAPTER 2
SIX TENETS OF LEIBNIZ'S METAPHYSICS
In this chapter six metaphysical propositions argued for
by Leibniz will be presented and discussed, with an eye to
later (Chapter 3) indicating their motivational dependence on
the theological propositions discussed in the previous
chapter. All but one of them (Proposition 10) can be
uncontroversially classified as key tenets of his philosophy.
The six propositions are as follows:
Proposition 5 - The actual world is the best
possible world.
Proposition 6 - Teleological reasoning is a
virtually indispensable key for
science and understanding.
Proposition 7 - The essence of a body is not its
extension, but its principle of activity.
Proposition 8 - The active principle or nature of an
individual substance is its
actualized complete concept.
Corollary to this are both that
individual substances are naturally
indestructible and that, divine
action excepted, there are no
transeunt causes.
Proposition 9 - There are no material atoms.
Proposition 10 - Substances are created all at once.
Proposition 5 - The Actual World Is the Best Possible World
Overview
Of the major tenets of Leibnizean philosophy some were
less openly defended by him than others, for prudential
reasons. In the case of this proposition, Leibniz defended it
most openly, as much so as he did any other. Discussion of
it appears in most of his major works, including the
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Monadoloqy
,
the Discourse
. Vindication
. the Theodicy
. and On
the Ultimate Origination of the Universe
.
In general, the claim that the actual world is the best
possible arises in one of two contexts: either as a direct
consequence of the existence of God, the perfect being; or as
the consequence of the competition between possibles for
existence - a competition which still ultimately depends on
God's existence. Those cases of the occurrence of
Proposition 5 in the first context can be subdivided into
straightforward cases, i.e. those which are not expressly
apologetic - that is, not in the context of expressly
defending God's justice in the face of existing evils, and
those which are. This distinction should become more clear by
the examples provided.
Proposition 5 as Direct Consequence of God's Existence
In §§ 53-55 of the Monadoloqy . Leibniz writes:
"Now, as there is an infinity of possible
universes in the ideas of God and only one of them
can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for
the choice of God of one over the others.
"And this reason cannot be found but... in the
degrees of perfection to which these worlds
attain ....
"And this this is the cause of the existence of
the Best: that his wisdom makes it known to God,
that his goodness makes him choose it, and that
his power makes him produce it." (Erdmann, v. II,
p. 709.)
Early in the Discourse (§ III) he vehemently states his
point
:
"I can no more approve of the opinion of some
modern thinkers who heartily sustain that that
which God has created is not the ultimate
perfection, and that he could well have done
better. For it seems to me that the consequences
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of this sentiment are in all fact contrary to the glory
of God." (Erdmann, v. II, p. 819.)
In Vindication
. §§ 40-1:
"Up to this point we have spoken of [God's]
greatness and goodness separately.
. . now let us
proceed to what pertains to the two jointly. The
things common to both his greatness and goodness
are those which proceed not only from his goodness,
but from his greatness (i.e. wisdom and power) as
well: greatness makes it such that goodness obtains
its own goal ....
"Since the [divine] wisdom directs the
universal expression of the goodness of God in
created things, it follows that divine providence
extends itself to the whole series of the
universe, and that it is to be asserted that from
the infinite number of possible series of things
God chose the best; and therefore this latter is
the one that actually exists." (Erdmann, v. II,
pp . 6 5 5-6 . )
The argument expressed in these citations is that, given
that God exists, His omnibenevolence coupled with his
omniscience and omnipotence allows us plainly to deduce that
the actual world is the best possible. There is simply no
"excuse" for him not to create the best. He is aware of what
is best, he is able to produce what is best, and he chooses
to produce the best. The existence of the best possible world
thus follows a priori from the existence of God.
Against the contention that since God acts freely in
creating, this entails that his perfection did not compel him
to create, or to create anything in particular, or that
there is no "best", Leibniz responds that this suggests
God's creative act was an indifferent choice, and that this
in turn suggests imperfection on God's part:
"[T]his is an error. They believe in this manner to
safeguard the liberty of God, as if it weren't the
highest liberty to act in perfection according to
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sovereign reason. For to believe that God acts on
some matter without having any reason for his
choice... such is a sentiment which conforms
his glory. For example, let us suppose
that God chose between A and B and that he takes A
without having any reason to prefer it to B; I
claim that this action of God at least would not be
praiseworthy; for all praise must be founded in
some reason, which by hypothesis is lacking here.
Yet I hold that God does nothing for which he does
not merit being glorified." (Erdmann, v. II,
pp. 817-8. )
God's perfection entails that He acts according to reason,
that He makes no arbitrary choices. God would only have
chosen not to create if not creating were best;
paradoxically, had there been more than one best choice, God,
as perfectly rational, would not have made a choice, and
hence, again, not created. More on this in Chapter 3
(p. 212 ff
. )
Proposition 5 as Apologetic Instrument
Leibniz used Proposition 5 as a way of defending God in
the face of worldly evils. Such a use is recorded in §§193-4
of the Theodicy ;
"Alfonso maintained that better could have been
done, and his opinion was censured by everyone.
"Yet philosophers and theologians dare to
support dogmatically such a belief; and I have
many times wondered that gifted and pious persons
should have been capable of setting bounds to the
goodness and perfection of God. For to assert that
he knows what is best, that he can do it and that
he does it not, is to avow that it is rested with
his will only to make the world better than it is;
but that is what one calls lacking goodness.... If
some adduce experience to prove that God could have
done better, they set themselves up as ridiculous
critics of his works. To such will be given the
answer given to all those who criticize God's
course of action, and who from this same
assumption, that is, the alleged defects of the
world, would infer that ther- is an evil God, or
at least a God neutral between good and evil....
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You have known the world only since the day before
yesterday.
. . and you carp at the world. Wait until
you know more of the world and consider therein
especially the parts which present a complete
whole. . . and you will find there a contrivance and
a beauty transcending all imagination." (Farrer
p. 248).
The above is a challenge to those who would reject
God's existence on the following argument:
If God exists, the actual world would be the best
possible
.
The actual world is not the best possible.
God doesn't exist.
Use of this argument against God tacitly assumes that whether
the actual world is the best possible world is more readily
ascertainable by consideration of evidence than whether God
exists. Leibniz's apologetic discourse above argues the
opposite: we do not have sufficient evidence to directly
decide whether this world is the best possible, whereas the
evidence/reasons available to our rational faculties are
decisively in favor of God's existence. Given God's
existence, we can then justifiably conclude by this indirect
route that this is the best possible world.
The challenge this poses to the no-God argument is to
suggest that it is backward-thinking . Arguments are intended
to proceed from more directly ascertainable premises to more
remote conclusions. The denial of God on account of actual
evil is "ridiculous" in the sense that actual evil is in
itself no evidence for non-bestness of the actual world:
maybe all possible worlds have evil in them; or maybe some
have no evil, but a lesser overall balance of good. Humans
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are not in the position to evaluate the world on its own
merits in comparison to other possible worlds. Worlds are
simply to much for us to comprehend them, which is what we'd
have to do to make a justified evaluation. On the other hand,
our belief in God may be justified without comprehending Him,
for reasons discussed in Chapter 1
. Therefore it is an
improper way of arguing that leads to this kind of denial of
God.
As the Theodicy is a work intended for popular
consumption, Leibniz stops short therein of driving home the
challenge from its proper logical angle. Instead he suggests
that those who would deny God's existence in this manner are
hasty in their judgment, and should suspend it until they've
experienced more of life. But clearly this is tongue-in-
cheek: even an old man has not lived enough of life to
perceive experientially the "big picture". In fact, such a
synoptic view is the unique privilege of the omniscient mind,
since the actual world is infinitely detailed.
Proposition 5 as Resulting from the Competition among
Possibles for Existence
Leibniz employed a more curious way of supporting his
best-possible-world theory, one based on the idea that
"possibles" or essences competed for existence, each having a
claim to exist proportionate to its "quantity" of essence.
It comes up in On the Ultimate Origination of the Universe
(1697. Schrecker and Schrecker, p. 88):
"just as, in the case of weights, that motion
results which produces the greatest possible
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descent of weight, so also, in the case of the
possible, that world emerges through which the
maximum of possibles is produced into existence....
And just as possibility is the principle of
essence, so perfection or degree of essence
(through which the greatest number is made
compossible) is the principle of existence."
In a passage entered under the heading "General Notations"
in Grua (1683-86?; p. 324) he writes:
"every essence or reality presses for existence.
. .
.
And every possible involves not only possibility,
but also an exertion toward existing in act...."
His clearest expression of this idea comes in an undated,
untitled early writing (entered in Gerhardt
,
v. 7, pp. 289-
90. Partial translation in Wiener, p. 91 ff.):
"It can be said that each possible is-for-existing
,
just because it is founded in the necessary being
existing in act, without which there is no way by
which any possible could become actual.
"But from this it does not follow that all
possibles exist; such would properly follow if all
possibles were compossible.
"But since some are incompatible with others,
it follows that some possibles don't make it to
existence.... "In the meantime from the conflict
of all possibles vying for existence this at once
results, that that series of things exists by
which the most exists, that is the maximum series
of all possibles."
The actual world is directly the result of competing
possibles, where there is not room for all - since some
possibles are incompatible. The impetus for creation is
intrinsic within the possibles themselves, which get their
reality-charge from being founded in the necessary existent,
God. Thus, creation is by automatic remote control, so to
speak. But it still depends ultimately on God's existence.
It is an odd bit of reasoning; odd because it grants a
certain sort of activity to non-existents . Yet those non-
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©xistents are real, being founded in the divine nature.
Ultimately their ’’activity'* may be construed as God’s
activity upon them as objects, but given that Leibniz stuck
so heartily with the active image, one is left to wonder
whether it was intended as more than metaphor.
In short, the proposition that the actual world is the
best possible is either an immediate or mediate inference
from God’s existence. It gets used as an apologetic
instrument, and is depicted as the outcome of an odd
sort of "physic" of struggling interaction between possibles,
which, despite the struggling, ends up in the form of a
perfectly harmonious system of actual beings.
Proposition 6 - Teleological Reasoning Is a Virtually
Indispensable Key for Science and Understanding
Background
The pro-teleological position is another Leibniz did not
hesitate to argue vehemently for, although he
occasionally was subtle about it. He did so in notable
contrast to the formalist and materialist trends of his time,
which disparaged teleology for its association with that
Scholastic/Aristotelian tradition which philosophers and
scientists, inspired by the spirit of the age, struggled to
transcend. This fact about Leibniz is another stumbling
block for those who would depict Leibniz as a philosopher
typical of the Enlightenment era. Teleology had been out of
style since the Renaissance, when the work of Francis Bacon,
Thomas Hobbes and others, coupled with the advent of the new
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sci©nc6 and th© Roman Catholic ©stablishm©nt
' s
stubborn r©sistanc© to it, coll©ctiv©ly d©alt it a blow from
which, in t©rms of popularity, it has n©v©r r©cov©r©d. Yet
Leibniz remained a most staunch proponent of it.
Teleology is the method of investigating into the nature
of things using evidence or knowledge of their purpose, or
"final cause", as a key. Regardless of what philosophers and
scientists might say about it, it has never really been
abandoned, but has suffered a loss in reputation. Biologists
cannot avoid being aided in their study of parts of animals
by knowledge of their organic purpose or "function": the
teeth are for chewing, etc. Archeologists are thrilled to
discover an ancient grinding tool, for they take it as a
virtually conclusive indication not only the presence of
humans during the same time period, but as strong evidence
for the practice of agriculture as well. Without knowledge
or evidence of purpose, we arguably would not recognize a
certain stone object as the tool that it may be.
To be sure, the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods
did serve to purge science and philosophy of misuses of
teleological reasoning. Aristotle had explained the
movements of the celestial bodies as "caused" by their desire
to imitate th© divinity, assuming that circular motion is
"perfect"; this explanation, to us absurd, enjoyed long-
lasting currency in astronomy. I suppose one can safely say
that teleology is scarcely if at all appropriate to some
fields of inquiry.
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There are actually several modes of reasoning, not
mutually exclusive, that were typically turned to instead of
teleology. One can be labelled formal explanation, according
to which a scientific explanation for an event or phenomenon
is thought to consist in a formal law which covers or
explains it. Usually no further inquiry is launched into why
this law and not some other holds sway, as might be done in
teleological reasoning.
Another way of reasoning is efficient-cause explanation,
whereby an explanation for a phenomenon is thought to consist
in the identification of the action or actions of a physical
substance or substances which produced it. In the normal
course of scientific inquiry, efficient-cause explanation
leads to formal explanation: discovery of efficient causes
for things leads to a search for laws governing those causes.
Leibniz often refers to this whole method of inquiry as
efficient-cause explanation.
A third way of doing science was mechanistic
explanation, which is much like formalism with the added task
of understanding all things as machines and breaking them
down to their simple parts, discovering the laws governing
how the parts work together. This last carries with it some
controversial ontological commitments.
The proposition that science is properly limited to one
of these three methods is an expression of anti-teleology,
and in Leibniz's time was surely associated with either
Cartesian dualism or materialism. The modernist conviction
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that it is not the business of science to investigate into
the full reality of its objects, but just to systemize
observations, was not yet a recognized option, although it
too is arguably a by-product of anti-teleological skepticism.
I've said all this to give an image of who Leibniz's
opposition was: mostly anti-teleological dualists or
materialists of either a mechanist or at least formalist
bent
.
Teleology as employed in a general reflection on things
virtually always is connected to a commitment to the
existence of God. Granting His existence enables one to make
the inference from the fact that something happens to serve a
purpose that it was created or came into being in order to
fulfill that purpose. If it is really true that something
exists to fulfill a certain purpose, then certainly knowledge
of its purpose is the key to understanding it. That is the
case with human artifacts, and if God as conceived in the
Judeo-Christian tradition exists, that is the case with many
other things as well: the sun, perhaps the moon, animals,
plants, the earth's geology and meteorology, and so forth.
Perhaps even the laws of physics, which are not generally
considered as metaphysically necessary, have been
purposefully chosen.
Leibniz's view was that every actual contingent thing
exists for a purpose, and that therefore understanding the
purpose of a thing as well as understanding the thing
according to its purpose are essential to knowledge about the
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world. Although he also believed in the value of formal
reason, he thought that even therein teleological reasoning
is valuable as an advance scout, identifying positions still
remote to formalist or efficient-cause reasoning which the
latter should strive to establish. For these reasons he
disparaged the anti-teleological dualism and materialism of
his time.
The Appropriateness of Teleological Reasoning to All
Contingent Things
As a consequence of his best-possible-world theory of
actual existence, Leibniz had to be convinced that in
principle, every detail of the world was subject to
teleological analysis. In fact he held that nature has "the
greatest imaginable abundance, order, and adornment"
( New Essays . Bk. IV, Ch. xvii, § 21, p. 490). The point is
that every single detail of the actual world is required for
it to be the best possible, and therefore every detail is
purposefully chosen.
The advocacy of teleology or final-cause explanation is
particularly controversial with respect to the sciences. Yet
in the Discourse . § 19 Leibniz asserts:
"I hold... that it is precisely therein [in final
causes] where the principles of all existents and
of the laws of nature must be sought, because God
always proposes the best and most perfect....
[Tjhere is nothing in the universe which... does
not accommodate itself to... the [teleological]
principles mentioned above. Therefore when we see
some good effect or some perfection which happens
or which follows from the works of God we are able
to say assuredly that God has purposed it, for he
does nothing by chance...." (Erdmann, v. II,
p . 825 .
)
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Thus he argues for the use of final causes in physics.
Whatever the laws of nature are, they were chosen by God from
among other possible laws on account of their eminent
suitability, their compatibility with the best world. In fact
this is true not only the laws of physics, but everything in
the universe.
Leibniz's Critique of Anti-Teleology
In an intriguing dialogue entitled Dialogue Between an
Astute Politician and an Ecclesiastic of Recognized Piety
(1679, in Foucher de Careil, v. 2, pp. 512-46), Leibniz
defends teleology against the Lucretian theory of random
evolution or what we would call "natural selection";
"Politician: ... You sustain that it is
Providence that forms, for example, all that is
found so fortunately united in animals. That would
be reasonable, if it were only a matter of a
particular cause. When we see a poem, we don't
doubt that a man has composed it; but when it is a
matter of nature as a whole, one must reason
otherwise. Lucretius, after Epicurus, issued some
challenges which do great damage to your argument
based on the order of things. 'For', he says, 'feet
aren't made for walking, but men walk because they
have feet." And if you ask how it results that
everything accords so well in the machine of the
animal, as if it were made that way on purpose,
Lucretius would tell you that by necessity things
badly made perish, while things well made are
conserved... thus, even if there had been an
infinity of badly made things, they would not be
able to maintain themselves among the others.
"Ecclesiastic: These people truly are mistaken,
for after all we see nothing made half-way. How
would poorly made things disappear so quickly, and
how would they escape our eyes equipped with the
microscope? ...Besides, there are beauties which
don't aid the survival of one species over another.
For example, the admirable structure of the eyes
will not give one species an existence-advantage
over another. Why is it that all animals with wings
possess as well an intricate mechanical adjustment
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for them? ...Nature makes nothing that is not
marvelous." (pp. 528-9)
In this fictional exchange Leibniz, through the voice of the
ecclesiastic, addresses what today is the main challenger to
teleological reasoning in biology: a blind-natural-selection
evolutionary process. Leibniz's response to the challenge is
had it been so he probably would have retorted
that the blind-evolution theory is lacking in sufficient
reason. My intention in citing it is to note that he had a
concern to propagate the teleological view and defended it.
In Apologia Fidei ex Rations (1683-6? in Grua
,
p. 28)
Leibniz goes so far as to suggest that the abolition of
final cause reasoning, which he was well aware was being
called for by some, leads either to atheism or to a belief in
God as a non-intelligent force. He continued in a similar
vein in the Discourse (§ XIX):
"I bring no accusation against our new philosophers
who pretend to banish final causes from physics,
but I am nevertheless obliged to avow that the
consequences of such a banishment appear to me
dangerous.... discarding final causes entirely as
though God proposed no end an no good in his
activity" (Montgomery, p. 33).
Again, what appears to be surfacing, alongside a commitment
to teleology as key to the truth about things, is the use of
it as an apologetic instrument. The banishment of final
causes from science takes God out of the picture in fields of
inquiry which otherwise could have been used, as they had
been in the past, to support His existence.
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The Usefulness of Teleological Reasoning, and Its Support ofFormal Efficient-Cause Reasoning
One of the traditional problems with the teleological
method is that to make progress in it requires gaining an
understanding of God's intentions for things. Maybe this is
too much to expect of humans; Leibniz was optimistic:
"As regards the ends which God proposed to himself,
I am convinced that we can know them and that it
is of the greatest usefulness to investigate them.
In general, whenever we realize that a certain
thing renders some eminent services we can safely
affirm that this among others was the end intended
by God when he created that thing, namely, that it
should render that service; I have elsewhere
shown. . . that the consideration of final causes
may lead to the discovery of some concealed and
very important truths in the natural sciences, the
discovery of which would not have been equally easy
by the consideration of efficient causes."
("Critical Remarks Concerning Descartes'
Principles", 1692. Schrecker and Schrecker, p. 30.)
Two points are made here. The first is that teleological
scrutiny of God's intentions for created things is not an
overwhelmingly difficult or arrogant thing to do. The second
is that teleology can scout ahead of efficient-cause
reasoning and discover some important things, serving as a
guiding clue-giver.
As to the first point, the key to understanding the
plausibility of Leibniz's claim is by example. The orange
tree yields a fruit pleasantly edible and nutritious to
humans; therefore we can be assured that God created it for
that purpose - among other purposes for which it may have
also been created. Things are by no means limited to single
purposes; acknowledging this makes Leibnizean teleology take
on a much less presumptuous air. Teleological investigations
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that seek to identify the purpose of a thing are bound to be
stumped. For not only is it probably not true that a created
thing has only one purpose, but if it is true, there doesn't
seem to be any sure way of choosing the "real" purpose from
among apparent ones, other than to assume a human bias and
take it for granted that all creation is exclusively for us.
Needless to say, this conclusion is suspect, and a typical
reaction to this bad teleology is a reversion to negative
theology: we don't know God's mind enough to say such a
thing. If, on the other hand, we don't set a limit on how
many purposes a thing can have, and we don't attempt to
establish a hierarchy of purposes, what results is a non-
presumptuous teleology. Studying a recently discovered
organ of some one-celled animal, we set out knowing that it
serves some distinct purpose, and thus our formal
investigation of it is already informed by teleology. Of
course, occasionally it doesn't work so well; sometimes an
apparent organ turns out to serve no distinct purpose, as
is said of the human appendix.
On the second point, Leibniz often reiterated that
efficient-cause reasoning would be bogged down without the
help of teleology:
"The best plan would be to join the two ways of
thinking.... [T]he method of efficient causes,
which goes much deeper. . . is also more difficult
when we come to details. . .
.
The method of final
causes, however, is easier and can be frequently
employed to find out important and useful truths
which we should have to seek for a long time, if
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we were confined to that other physical method...."
( Discourse
. § XXI. Montgomery, p. 38.)
and
"final causes are useful not only in ethics and
natural theology for the advancement of virtue
and piety, but even in physics itself for
discovering and understanding recondite truths."
( What is Nature? Schrecker and Schrecker, p. 99.)
The suggested policy seems to be that teleology is the
principle method of advancing knowledge to new frontiers of
"discovery"; whereas formal/efficient-cause reason brings up
the rear, testing and attempting to firmly establish the new
insights
.
At any rate Leibniz's commitment to teleology has an
obvious connection to his theological commitments, one that
will be explored more in Chapter 3.
Proposition 7 - The Essence of a Body Is Not Its Extension,
but Its Principle of Activity
Background
In his early intellectual career, this assertion stood
almost as the offical slogan of Leibniz's philosophy. It
stands in direct contradiction to one of the principle tenets
of Cartesian philosophy, namely that extension is the essence
of body. But it stands just as well against any materialist
conception of body, such as the material atomism of Gassendi.
The issue that this proposition addresses might be
phrased as a question: what makes a body a body? Or, what
gives a body its identity as a body? One candidate often
chosen by philosophers was impermeable extension. Bodies are
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things that take up space: they are extended; moreover they
’’monopolize" the space they occupy, such that two bodies
cannot share the same space: they are impermeable. Everyday
cases of apparent space-sharing of bodies are not genuine.
They are analogous to one filling a hole to the brim with
gravel and still being able to shovel sand into the same
hole: an aggregate of bodies may fill a space imperfectly,
thus leaving room for apparent interpenetration by smaller
bodies, which are actually just falling into empty crevices.
Real bodies occupy a volume of space perfectly; they do not
allow any interpenetration of other bodies.
This idea of body has an intuitive appeal. Being
extended seems most surely to be a necessary condition to
being a body. In addition, we observe that the more dense
something is, the more impenetrable it is. Moreover, we are
aware, as people of Leibniz's time were becoming aware, that
physical objects in our experience are composed of smaller
bodies (atoms, and more recently, subatomic particles), and
that the more intimately these smaller bodies are bonded, the
less penetrable the physical object. Water vapor is by far
more penetrable than liquid water, which in turn far more
penetrable than a block of ice. The quality of
impenetrability of physical objects seems to originate in the
smaller bodies, since it seems the degree of penetrability of
objects is a simple function of the degree of separatedness
of the smaller bodies. A physical object composed of smaller
bodies perfectly bonded together, it seems, would have
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perfect impenetrability. Moreover, although it may be beyond
direct experience, it would follow that each smaller body is
by nature perfectly impenetrable.
Leibniz's Opposition to the Materialist Conception of Body
Leibniz was opposed to this idea of bodies. The aspect
of it which he attacked most was the notion that the essence
of body is extension, which he attributed principally to
Descartes. The more elaborate view that the essence of body
is impermeable extension, which he considered an improvement
on the first, he attributed to Gassendi.
Descartes - The gist of his opposition to Descartes's
view is that:
"necessarily, vacuous space is different from body,
even though it is extended." (Leibniz to Arnauld,
1671; Appendix A, p. 346.)
If extension is the essence of body, then there is no
essential difference between bodies and vacuous space: for
space has extension, just as bodies do. But we know that
there must be an essential difference between bodies and
vacuous space.
Gassendi - Leibniz criticizes the more sophisticated
view in ^ True Method in Philosophy and Theology (Erdmann,
V. I
,
p. Ill )
:
"Those who in forming a theory of corporeal nature
add to extension a certain resistance or
impenetrability... - as Gassendi and other scholars
have done - have indeed philosophized a bit more
correctly but they have not gotten rid of the
difficulties. For the main thing that is needed in
analyzing the idea of body is some positive notion,
which impenetrability is not, since it has not yet
been proven that the penetration of bodies is not
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present in nature.... Finally the absolute
impenetrability of bodies contradicts the decrees
of our faith no less than polytopia; for the same
body in different places or several bodies in the
same place is equally difficult.... Whereas there
is no inconsistency to polytopia
,
nor indeed to
metousiasmon .
"
Leibniz's reasoning against this view is less conclusive that
against the first view. Here he indicates the plausibility of
the view he opposes, while criticizing it for not being based
on ascertained evidence and for not being in accord with the
teachings of faith -clearly a reference to the Eucharist -
and with polytopia - or the possibility of the same body
occupying different places at the same time - which Leibniz
argues is, like metousiasmon (?) - a consistent notion. The
point is that if a theory -in this case, that the essence of
bodies is impenetrable extension - results in the analysis of
a consistent notion as inconsistent, it must be false. The
Gassendian theory contradicts any notion of bodies which
allows them to interpenetrate or to be present at once in
different extensions; for Gassendi, as for Descartes - both
of whom were Catholic, Gassendi a priest - a body is
identified by its physical extension, and therefore one body
can't have two extensions.
We can further our insight into Leibniz's point of view
if we gain an understanding of what these two Greek terms -
polytopia and metousiasmon - mean; Leibniz doesn't define
them. Wiener (pp. 64-5) renders them as follows;
polytopia - "the same body in several places at the same
time"; and
metousiasmon - "several bodies in the same place".
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But I b©lieve th©y can mor© accurately b© understood as
referring to types of bodily condition and substantial
process, respectively, instances of which are contended to be
involved in the Eucharist. More specifically I take polytopia
to be the bodily condition of being in several places at
once, a special case of which. Real Multipresence, is
contended by some Christians to occur in the Eucharist. I
take metousiasmon, on the other hand, to refer to the
substantial process of a physical extension transforming from
one substance to another with no change in physical state, a
special case of which, Transubstantiation
,
is claimed to
occur in the Eucharistic consecration. In short, I think
Wiener was wrong about metousiasmon but basically right about
polytopia
.
My reasoning is that Leibniz saying that the same body
in several places and several bodies in the same place
sandwiched between references to polytopia and metousiasmon
is accidental. Surely polytopia means 'being in several
places'- its etiomology makes so much clear. But that doesn't
mean that the other option - several things in one place -
defines metousiasmon. I take it that the reason why Leibniz
remarked that the same body in different places and different
bodies in the same place are equally difficult was as a
shorthand way of saying impenetrability denies polytopia.
This is not obvious. What is obvious is that impenetrability
denies several bodies being in the same place; Leibniz
probably felt that there was an argument showing that the
96
denial of the possibility of bodies sharing the same space
ultimately entails denial of the possibility that one body
can be in many places. Not wanting to get detoured, he merely
said that the two possibilities are equally difficult to
accommodate, i.e. their accommodation requires similar
conditions
.
A real hint for what metousiasmon is is given in what
immediately follows the passage excerpted:
"For what might seem amazing is that the
Consubs tant iat ion of bodies resolves into
Transubstantiation" (Erdmann, v. I, p. 111).
In this case, Leibniz surely looks to be associating
polytopia with Consubstant iation and metousiasmon with
Transubstantiation. A closer look at the word "metousiasmon"
indicates that it is a morpheme-by-morpheme translation of
'transubstantiation':
' meta ' = ' trans
' ,
' ousia ' = ' substance
' ,
etc .
I connect polytopia to Real Multipresence through
Consubstantiation since the former is a view historically
associated with the latter and opposed by proponents of
Transubstantiation, just as they opposed Consubstantiation.
Leibniz uses the term virtually as indicating the Lutheran
conception of Real Presence, sharing that role with
'Consubstantiation'. Real Multipresence, which has apparently
fallen out of usage since Leibniz's time, evidently is the
view that in the Eucharist Christ's body is multiplied in
order to be present in many places; hence its association to
polytopia. Catholics instead insist that all consecrated
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hosts tog©th©r just amount to on© body, ©v©n though ©ach
host, and any fragm©nt of any host, is ©ntir©ly Christ's body
as w©ll. As cl©ar from th© last two passag©s and from
discussion of Proposition 3, Chapt©r 1, L©ibniz thought that
Consubstant iation
,
R©al Mult ipr©s©nc© or polytopia
,
and
Transubstantiat ion or metousiasmon are all mutually
©ntailing
.
Why did L©ibniz us© Gr©©k t©rms h©r©? I sugg©st h© did
so in ord©r to b© abl© to r©f©r to th© mor© gen©ric
m©taphysical notions b©hind th© th©ological on©s
,
to mak© it
cl©ar that his m©ntion of the theological notions was in a
philosophical context.
General Opposition - In his critique of Gassendi Leibniz
refrained from mentioning his main objection to materialist
notions of body: they don't provide an explanation for the
unity of bodies. My body is one, yet how can Descartes or
Gassendi say that? Descartes insisted that all matter was one
substance, while Gassendi that all matter was ultimately
composed of impenetrable atoms, and these were the unities,
the bodies, of matter. Leibniz puts it as follows:
"no body can be understood as a unity - indeed, it
would be nothing other than an aggregate of points,
which is impossible - unless it is contained by
some substantial form, which is somewhat like a
soul." ( Apolocria Fidei ex Ratione . 1683-6(?).
Grua
, p . 29 .
)
Elsewhere he insists that:
"the very substance of things consists in their
force to act and be acted upon." ( What is Nature?
Schrecker and Schrecker, p. 102.)
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In New Essays (Bk. IV, Ch x, § 10, p.440) he indicates that
it is
:
"a soul... or some analogous active principle,
which makes it a true unity"
.
The Non-Materialist Option
The unifying active principle of a thing cannot be
explained or derived from its extension, which is by itself
an aggregate. Conversely, however, the active principle
explains the extension:
"this active principle is the substantial and
constitutive basis of extended things themselves
or of matter" (Leibniz to De Voider, March 24,
1699. Entered under the title "On Substance as
Active Force Rather than as Mere Extension" in
Wiener
,
p . 166 ) .
All matter is composed of bodies, yet each body has an
immaterial active principle which makes it a body. It follows
that the "constitutive basis" of matter is itself immaterial!
A more clear idea of Leibniz's radically immaterial ist
conception of bodies is expressed in the following:
"all substances can be said to exist in a place
only through the operations of their active
principle" ("On True Method in Philosophy and
Theology", c. 1686. Wiener, pp. 64-5).
Bodies are present only by activity; the extension of the
body is only the delimitation of the activity. So in a way
the extension is illusory ( Discourse , XII).
In short, Leibniz considered the essence of a body to be
its soul or active principle, which he associates with the
Scholastic "substantial form" (Ibid., p. 65) and the
Aristotelian "entelechy" ( Monadology § 18), and which he
alternately called "principle of motion" (Appendix A,
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p. 350) "the principle of motion and rest" (taken from
Aristotle: see What i s Nature?
. 1698. Schrecker and
Schrecker
,
p. 97), "active force" (Leibniz to De Voider,
24
,
1699 . Wiener
,
p . 156 f f
. ) , and "monad" ( from
Augustine and Bruno: Wiener, p. xvi).
Proposition 8 - Existing Substances Are the Actualizations
of Complete Concepts (The Natures of Substances Are
Complete Concepts)
This is arguably the most famous of Leibniz's
metaphysical propositions in that it provides the basis for
what in the end became known as the theory of monads.
Interestingly, Proposition 8 is not explicitly stated in the
Monadoloqy itself, but two of its most important corollaries
are stated there in the prominent positions of 4 and 7. They
are, restated:
8a. Substances are indestructible (see Mon
. § 4); and
8b. There are no real transeunt causes (see Mon
.
§ 7).
Discussion of 8a and 8b follows the ensuing discussion of 8.
Evidence of Commitment -
Evidence supporting Leibniz's commitment to Proposition 8
comes primarily from his Discourse on Metaphysics and
related correspondence, principally with Antoine Arnauld and
Count Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels
.
Under proposition VIII of the Discourse . Leibniz asserts
that
:
i. "this is the nature of an individual substance or
of a complete being, namely to afford a
conception so complete that the concept shall be
sufficient for the understanding of it and for
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the deduction of all the predicates of which the
substance is or may become the subject."
(Montgomery, p. 13.)
Later on (p. 14) he makes the point clear by example:
ii. there was always in the soul of Alexander marks
of all that had happened to him and evidences of
all that would happen to him and traces even of
everything which occurs in the universe"
.
the text of § XIII in the same work (p. 19) Leibniz
continues to elaborate the point in even stronger terms:
iii. "As the individual concept of each person
includes once and for all everything which can
ever happen to him, in it can be seen, a priori
the evidences or the reasons for the reality of
each event".
Stronger statements follow. In § XXXIII (ibid., p. 56)
Leibniz writes:
iv. "everything which happens to a soul or to any
substance is a consequence of its concept; hence
the idea or the essence of the soul brings it
about that all of its appearances or perceptions
should be born out of its nature".
In his April 12, 1686 letter to Count Ernst, Leibniz again
elaborates by example (ibid., p. 80):
V. "by the individual concept, Adam, I mean of
course a perfect representation of a particular
Adam who has certain individual characteristics
and is thus distinguished from an infinity of
possible persons very similar to him yet for all
that different from him. . . . God has preferred
him to these others because it has pleased God
to choose precisely such an arrangement of the
universe.... [N]ow is it not true that these
possible Adams (if we may speak of them thus)
differ among themselves and that God has chosen
only one who is precisely ours? There are so
many reasons which prove the impossibility, not
to say the absurdity and even the impiety of the
contrary view"
.
Finally, in remarks on a letter from Arnauld disputing with
him on this question (ibid., p. 104), Leibniz emphasizes:
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VI . "my supposition is not merely that God wished to
create an Adam whose concept was vague and
incomplete but that God wished to create a
particular Adam sufficiently determined as an
individual. This complete individual concept, in
my opinion, involves the relation to the whole
sequence of things".
I don’t think Leibniz ever states his point more clearly
than he does in this remark (vi) on the letter from Arnauld -
written in response to a letter Leibniz had sent him and
probably the first he ever addressed to Leibniz - which
sparked a famous correspondence (see Sleigh). Using Adam as
an example representing all substances, it expresses,
corroborated by the other citations, the idea that God
creates exclusively by actualizing or instantiating complete
concepts: concepts that entail every truth about the
prospective substances' entire existence. Since the world is
made up of substances, it would then follow that when God
creates the world, he creates it in every detail - including
the heinous crimes and the natural catastrophes, not to
mention every "free" choice every human being ever makes.
Significance of Commitment
So I think it is clear that Leibniz was committed to the
proposition that substances are the actualizations of
complete concepts. This helps us to understand what he
meant by saying that individuals are the "infima species'* of
being ( Discourse , § IX. Montgomery, p. 14). If substances are
actualizations of complete concepts, then in the traditional
sense of 'nature' no two substances have an identical nature,
but each nature may be had by exactly one individual. In the
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traditional metaphysical sense a nature is that whose
instantiation without further formal specification results in
a substance. In light of this definition the Leibnizean
claim is that the things traditionally considered natures:
humanity, doghood, african-violethood - are not natures in
the strict sense, since their instantiation requires further
formal specification. Their instantiation without further
specification is, in Leibniz's terms not only an "absurdity",
but an "impossibility" (v); hence surely they would not
result in substances. The insight behind this point is that
there is no such thing in the natural world as, say, a
generic animal. If something is an animal, it also must
instantiate something more specific, say, a lion:
"The notion of animal is not [complete], for it can
be asked of it whether it is rational or brute,
quadripedal or bipedal; for some animals are
rational, others brute. Only if we believed a pure
animal can exist, that is, one in which nothing
else is to be found except that which is precisely
required for the notion of animal, could we
conclude that 'animal' names a substance.... But
whether a pure animal is possible I gravely doubt.
For not only would it lack feet, but sensation as
well. For the notion of animal doesn't express
what it must sense." ( Handschriften . Ch. IV,
V. VIII, No. 24, Bl. 86, p. 120.)
Leibniz takes this one step further by saying, e.g., that in
order for something to be a lion, it must receive further
formal specification which would define it as an individual -
say, Clarence the cross-eyed lion. To this, the traditionals
would respond that being Clarence the cross-eyed lion is not
a formal specification, and that the lowest formal
specification - the infima species - in this case is
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lionhood. For them, individuation is not a function of form,
but of matter, while for Leibniz, individuation is a function
of form. (This point should be qualified: of the two great
scholastic metaphysicians: Thomas Aquinas and John Duns
Scotus, only the former claimed that matter is the principle
of individuation for material substances. Still, Aquinas's
view was more publicized than Scotus 's.)
In a logical sense, it is non-controversially true that
substances are instantiations or actualizations of complete
concepts. Every substance turns out to completely
characterize exactly one complete concept. That is not the
issue here. The issue is whether substances are created as
the satisfactions of complete concepts, i.e. whether natures
are complete concepts. Traditional metaphysicians thought
natures to be in themselves open and incomplete, and
therefore capable of being instantiated by many individuals,
whereas Leibniz, thinking this absurd and impossible, argued
that natures must be closed and complete, capable of being
instantiated by exactly one individual. It is worth asking
why he held this position so adamantly.
In his correspondence with Count Ernst Leibniz seems
surprised that this view aroused so much controversy. He
writes in his April 12, 1686 letter to the Count:
vii. "He [Arnauld] chooses one of my theses [the
thirteenth; see iii above] to show that it is
dangerous . But either I am incapable for the
present of understanding the difficulty or else
there is none in it. This has enabled me to
recover from my surprise and has made me think
that M. Arnaud's [sic] remarks are the results
of misconceptions." (Montgomery, p. 76.)
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f3ct, th0 clsim is or Wcis controv©rsial in two ways.
First, it is controversial because it is central to the
controversiality of his famed best-possible-world theory of
creation, for it entails that God's creation has no open
variables not determined by His choice. Although the
question whether all details of creation have been determined
by God's choice has always been an unsettled point in
Christian theology, to decide so definitively on it, as
Leibniz did, was bound to cause a stir. Second, it was
controversial because some read it, as Arnauld did, as
limiting God's creative freedom; it would require us to
forfeit the notion that God first creates and then
embellishes his creation by means of various interventions
that respond to particular situations and needs of creation.
Instead we would have to say that God creates all at once,
and everything that ever exists or happens is determined in
that single creative act, in such a manner that, in
principle, all is deducible from that single act. Thus,
after creation, God would have no further freedom to
embellish His creation.
Before we go further, it should be pointed out that
Leibniz, in holding his position of divine determinism, is
not without prominent company among the ranks of Christian
theologians. Not only does it seem that Arnauld concurred
with him on this point - though not without a wrinkle (letter
to Leibniz, May 13, 1686; in Montgomery, p. 95) - but it
seems as well that St. Paul, St. Augustine, and arguably even
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St. Thomas Aquinas said some things that could be taken to
represent the determinist position that God chooses every
detail of creation.
In Chapter 3 I will argue that Leibniz's main motivation
for holding that substances are the actualizations of
complete concepts was that it is as he saw it a consequence
of certain theological premises he was firmly committed to,
namely the existence of God, the perfect being, and Original
Sin. But as this motivation should not formally be taken in
philosophy as an argument, it remains to be discussed what
supporting argument (s) Leibniz had for Proposition 8.
Defense of Proposition 8; Refutation of "Contrary"
The argument Leibniz puts forth in support of
Proposition 8 is basically that the "contrary" position is
absurd, impious, and impossible. Leibniz expresses this view
in citation v (p. 101):
viii. "[I]s it not true... that God has chosen only the
one [Adam] who is precisely ours? There are so
many reasons which prove the impossibility, not
to say the absurdity and even impiety of the
contrary view"
.
Interestingly, he does not go on to elaborate on this strong
claim in the same writing. But even so, this statement may
turn out to be an important key to his thinking.
The "contrary view" he speaks of must be that the Adam
God chose was not "precisely ours" from his creation, but
rather, as Leibniz puts it in vi: "an Adam whose concept is
vague and incomplete". As Adam here is clearly intended to
represent all substances by example, (see citations i, iii,
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and iv), the contrary position Leibniz denounces as
impossible, absurd and impious would be the view that
substances are not created with all their details determined;
in other words, that the natures of substances are incomplete
concepts. Let us examine some Leibnizean passages in which he
gives some indication as to why such a view is wrong-headed.
In his remarks on Arnauld's May 1686 letter
(Montgomery, p. Ill), Leibniz argues as follows:
ix. "I am quite convinced in regard to what St.
Thomas has taught about intelligences, that it
is not possible for two individuals to exist
wholly alike, that is, differing solo numero. We
must, therefore, not conceive of a vague Adam or
of a person to whom certain attributes of Adam
appertain when we try to determine him, if we
would hold that all human events follow from the
one presupposition, but we must attribute to him
a concept so complete that all which can be
attributed to him may be derived from his
[ concept] .
"
Later in the same remarks (Ibid., p. 113) he writes:
X. "It is not possible to find any other reason [for
my identity as a substance]
,
excepting that my
attributes of the preceding time and state, as
well as the attributes of the succeeding time
and state are predicates of the same subject....
Now, what is it to say that the predicate is in
the subject if not that the concept of the
predicate is found in some sort involved in the
concept of the subject? Since from the very
time I began to exist it could be said of me
truly that this or that would happen to me, we
must grant that these predicates were principles
involved in the subject or in my complete
concept, which constitutes the so-called me".
Impossible - I take ix as an indication that Leibniz
felt the existence of substances whose natures are incomplete
concepts to be impossible because it violates his principle
of the identity of indiscernibles . Natures are the things
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God instantiates when He creates: His blueprints, so to
speak. His creating two things of the same nature would
result in two substances with identical concepts, while it is
agreed that they are different. What could possibily
differentiate them? The Thomists said it is matter which
individuates. But a difference between two things must be
intelligible, and matter alone is not intelligible. Any
difference must be a formal difference, for form alone gives
a thing intelligibility. Therefore, I surmise, by Leibniz's
lights it is impossible for two things to differ solo in
numero, because that would be to suggest that they don't
differ formally, and thus they differ, but not in any way
that is intelligible. Perhaps philosophers of our day would
be more disposed to call this an absurdity than an
impossibility, if they called it anything at all.
Absurd - I read x as an expression of why Leibniz
thought it absurd that substances not be instantiations of
complete concepts: namely, that there is no other way of
explaining how substances constitute unities other than that
they are the instantiations of complete concepts. As such,
there would be no trouble explaining how substances are
unities despite the apparent temporal changes they go
through. If a substance comprises by nature all that ever
happens to it, then in a sense it never changes, since it is
not identified as a unity travelling through time, so to
speak, but as a unity collectively spanning over time.
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Impious - It is unclear in the immediate context of v
what exactly Leibniz means when he suggests it is impious to
say that the natures of substances may be incomplete
concepts. To start with it may be inferred from his use of
the term 'impiety' that Leibniz sees such a proposition as
conflicting somehow with the notion of God's perfection. To
understand this point requires discussion of the conceptual
dependence of Leibniz's metaphysics on his theology. Since
that is the topic of a later chapter I will save this point
for then.
In giving separate treatment to each of the three parts
of the assertion that the claim that the natures of
substances are incomplete concepts is impossible, absurd,
and impious, I am not suggesting that the three parts are in
fact conceptually independent. Indeed the upcoming discussion
of this matter in the chapter on the dependence of Leibniz's
metaphysics on his theology will, I hope, make it clear that
all three parts of the assertion are ultimately grounded on
perceived conflicts between Leibniz's theological commitments
and the claim that natures are incomplete concepts. The
strategy behind my treating the three parts of the assertion
separately in this section was simply explanatory: to gain a
preliminary understanding of the assertion's meaning, based
on other Leibnizean passages.
Two Important Corollaries of Proposition 8
Persistent Themes - To understand the full significance
of Proposition 8 to Leibniz it is important to note, as
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mentioned at the top of this section, that two of the most
famous of his metaphysical tenets are direct corollaries of
it
:
8a. Substances are indestructible.
and
8b. There are no real transeunt causes.
Both 8a and 8b are commonly occurrent themes in Leibniz's
philosophy throughout his life. Not only is each stated near
the beginning of the Monadologv (1714):
xi. "4. ... a simple substance cannot perish naturally
in any conceivable manner." (8a)
"7. It is impossible also to explain how a monad can
be altered, that is, internally changed, by any
other creature.... The monads have no windows
through which anything could come in or go out"
(8b. Schrecker and Schrecker, p. 148);
but both are expressed in the Discourse (1686) as well:
8a in § XXXIV, 8b in § XIV. In § XXXIV Leibniz writes:
xii. "Supposing that the bodies which constitute a unum
per se, as human bodies, are substances, and have
substantial forms, and supposing that animals have
souls, we are obliged to grant that these souls
and these substantial forms cannot entirely
perish, any more than can the atoms or the
ultimate elements of matter, according to the
position of other philosophers; for no substance
perishes, although it may become very different."
(Montgomery, p. 57.)
Earlier, in § XIV, Leibniz states that:
xiii. "by the intervention of God, the appropriate
nature of each substance brings it about that
what happens to one corresponds to what happens
to all the others, without, however, their
acting upon one another directly." (Ibid.,
p. 23.)
Farther along in the same he reiterates:
xiv. "[A] particular substance is never acted upon by
another particular substance nor is it acted upon
by it .
"
( Ibid.
, p . 25 .
)
110
I take it for granted that for Leibniz as for many other
philosophers, that which cannot happen in any conceivable
manner cannot happen period; and that which is impossible to
explain cannot be the case. Given this much, §§ 4 and 7 of
the Monadoloqy (in xi) read as straightforward statements of
8a and 8b, respectively. In both cases the context makes it
clear that the reason given in support of each is the same: a
simple substance or monad has no parts; as such it cannot be
externally altered, for alteration from without consists of
an adding or subtracting of parts. Similarly, natural
destruction consists in disintegration of parts. But that
which lacks parts cannot disintegrate.
Such reasoning seems respectable, but given different
notions of perishing and changing it might be possible to
deny 8a and 8b. At any rate exactly what it is to change or
perish is less than obvious. I think in fact Leibniz had a
more compelling reason for subscribing to 8a and 8b: their
deducibility from Proposition 8. We'll return to this point
shortly
.
§ XIV of the Discourse gives us both a statement
categorically denying transeunt causes (xiv) and a statement
explaining what is supposed to stand in its place as an
explanation for why things cohere as they do (xiii). The
subscriber to transeunt causes claims that what we label
"causes" and "effects" cohere in an intimate way because
something from the former is literally received by the
latter, e.g. force. Leibniz's view is that nothing at all is
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tranferred from the former to the latter, but rather the
activity of each is so tightly orchestrated to that of the
other as to suggest a transfer of something. The
orchestration had been conceived before anything ever
happened, and the happening of things is just the carrying
out of the orchestration.
In xii Leibniz reiterates the idea that substances -
souls, substantial forms, however they are called - are
imperishable because they lack parts, and that which lacks
parts cannot perish. (One wonders whether talk of
imperishability by Leibniz is merely talk of natural
imperishability, as he put it explicitly in Monadology
. § 4,
or whether perhaps it is more. For Leibniz subscribed to
God's being omnipotent, and by the definition of
'omnipotence' anything that is possible - that "doesn't imply
contradiction" (Grua, 429) - can be brought about by God.
Further, by the definition of ' contingence ' the non-existence
of any contingent substance is possible. So God can bring
about the non-existence of any contingent substance. Since
for Leibniz all substances besides God are contingent - cf
.
Monadology
. §§ 41, 47 - God can make anything but Himself
fail to exist. But making fail to exist is not necessarily
causing to perish. Failure to exist can be the result of not
having been created. Perishing entails having once existed.
This question is explored in the following paragraphs.) This
imperishability would extend even to material atoms if they
existed - indeed it was claimed of them by the atomists. For
112
they are the alleged partless components of matter. Still,
to rephrase a point made two paragraphs above it is far from
clear that partlessness entails natural imperishability,
since it is not obvious that to perish naturally always
involves disintegration of some sort. Perhaps there are
simple beings coming into and going out of existence
according to some intelligible law. In such a case it would
be difficult to say how such regularity were not natural.
Entailment of Two Corollaries From Proposition 8 - This
brings the discussion back to whether Leibniz had better
reasons than those presented in the Monadology for believing
8a and 8b. As I mentioned, the thesis I'm defending is that
he does: their deducibility from Proposition 8: the nature of
a substance is its complete concept. We can restate this to
bring out its theological underpinnings: the creation of a
substance is the actualization of its complete concept. In
other words, a substance is created to have exactly that
sequence of states (of perception) which it will have
throughout its existence. For this to happen without
impinging upon substantial unity requires that each state be
perfectly connected to the adjoining ones: the first state
causes the second, and so on.
It is not difficult to see how this rules out real
transeunt causes, thus entailing 8b. Although things go on
seeming to affect one another originally - two boxers
slugging it out in a title bout, as a brutal example - each
of them has already been created to perceive what it will
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perceive independently of whether anything else existed. One
boxer does not really make the other feel pain in his jaw by
means of an upper cut. The apparent recipient of the blow
experiences the blow as the direct result of his own
preceding state. The story is similar for the other boxer.
The only confidence one can have that the other exists comes
from his confidence in God's perfection. The only real
causality, then, is substance-immanent: worldly causation is
limited to one state of a substance causing the next state of
the same substance.
As for the imperishability of substances (8a), there are
three conceivable ways (short of uncaused perishing, which
I'm not sure is conceivable anyway) for annihilation to
happen, if it ever does: God does it, another substance does
it, or the substance annihilates itself. Proposition 8 rules
out annihilation of one created substance by another, via its
entailment of 8b. So if a substance perishes, either it is
annihilated by God or by itself. If a substance causes itself
to perish, then following 8, it would have to be that its
created sequence of states led up to a state which directly
caused its own annihilation. This thought leads to a
predicament. If a state of my existence directly causes my
annihilation, that makes it the last state of my existence.
But by definition something must have an effect in order to
be a cause. In the absence of transeunt causation, I cannot
claim that any of my states causes any effect except the next
state of my existence. But if I have a last state, then there
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is no nsxt stat©, so my last stat©, lacking an ©ff©ct, cannot
b© a caus©. H©nc© in light of Proposition 8, assuming that a
substanc© can caus© its own p©rishing loads to contradiction.
I suggost this is what Loibniz int©nd©d by donying th©
possibility of natural porishability
. Somothing happons
naturally wh©n it happons through th© dir©ct causation of a
cr©at©d substanc©. Th© only way for natural occur©nc©s in
Loibniz is ultimatoly substanc©-imman©nt
. Substanc© immanont
annihilation cannot b©, sine© to admit it loads to
contradiction
.
This roasoning is supportod, though porhaps cryptically,
by th© following passagos from lottors to Loibniz’s most
woll-known corrospondont on this mattor, Antoin© Arnauld:
XV. "Th© proposition which was th© occasion of all this
discussion [so© ©arlior in sam© lottor, Montgomory,
p.120: "That th© individual concopt of ©ach porson
involvos one© and for all, all that will ©vor
happon to him."] is vory important... for from it
follows... that a succ©©ding condition is a
cons©qu©nc© . . . of its pr©c©ding stat© as though
only God and its©lf w©r© in th© world. Thus ©v©ry
individual substanc©... is, as it w©r©, a world
apart, ind©p©nd©nt of ©v©rything ©Is© ©xc©pting
God. Th©r© is no argum©nt so cog©nt . . . in
d©monstrat ing th© ind©structability of th© soul."
(L©ibniz to Arnauld, July 14, 1686. Montgomory,
p. 133.)
and
xvi. "Evorything happons to ©ach substanc© in
cons©qu©nc© of th© first stat© God gav© to it in
croating it, and putting asid© ©xtraordinary
int©rv©ntions th© ordinary agr©©m©nt consists only
in th© consorvation of th© substanc© its©lf
conformably to its pr©c©ding stat© and to th©
changos which it carrios within its©lf." (Loibniz
to Arnauld, April 30, 1687. Ibid., p. 183.)
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In short, Leibniz asserts in xv that the fact that
succeeding states of substances are consequences of directly
preceding states of the same is conclusive evidence for the
indestructability of the soul - although he doesn't sketch
out the connection - while in xvi he asserts that excepting
something extraordinary - i.e. a miraculous act of God - the
whole sequence of substance-states of any substance follows
in a strict consequential manner from the first state created
by God and is always according to the rule of substance-
conservation. These citations thus agree with with what has
just been argued in ruling out annihilation via substance-
immanent causation.
Whether God Can Annihilate a Created Substance - The
only remaining candidate for causing a substance to perish is
God. Regarding this option I will present and discuss two
arguments, both of which rely on the assumption of
Proposition 8. Of them, one is integrally supported by a
Leibnizean text, and the other, as far as I know, is not.
First I will present and discuss the one that is not.
It has already been aued that God can make any
substance but himself fail to exist, at least by not creating
it. The further question is: can He create something then
annihilate it? At this point in the argument His hands would
be tied: He couldn't create a substance to be naturally
annihilated by the course of its existence. The only option
left is annihilation by direct supernatural intervention,
interrupting what would have been the natural sequence.
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Again, in light of Proposition 8, assuming this to be
possible puts us in a predicament. According to 8, when God
creates me, He creates my whole existence, determining it all
to causally unfold in the course of time. If he then
interrupts my unfolding existence, all of which, even the
as yet untranscursed part, has been determined by Him in
creating me, the result would be not only moral but
metaphysical contradiction. Moral contradiction I intend
here as God having incompatible intentions: e.g. both of
determining my whole existence to come to be and of
determining part of it not to be. By metaphysical
contradiction I mean two states of affairs being the case
where one’s being the case entails the other's not being the
case
.
Now those who appreciate subtleties might be happy to
declare that God has the power to commit moral contradiction
but the goodness not to. But no sublety of reasoning could
"acquit" God of metaphysical contradiction. Metaphysical
contradiction just can't happen, even at God's hands. Here's
the metaphysical contradiction I'm talking about: in
Leibniz's system annihilation of the kind we are presently
speaking entails uncreating. God would have to uncreate what
he's already created, such that it would "become true" that
he never created something he created, which is
contradictory. The reason for the contradiction is that for
Leibniz, God creates according to complete concepts:
something that is created is thereby wholly determined. Even
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though its whole actuality has to unfold in time, God, being
atemporal
,
sees a thing's whole existence and chooses that in
creating it, not just its initial state or an initial chunk
of sequence. For God to annihilate such a thing "in the
middle" would oddly be to have never created part of
what He had wholly created! Thus, unless we reject the
notion that God creates only according to complete concepts,
we are forced to conclude that a created substance cannot be
annihilated even by God.
Lacking positive verification that this is an argument
Leibniz reflectively subscribed to, it can only be submitted
as Leibnizean in a secondary sense on the merit that it is
straightforwardly deducible from his views. Of course such a
submission is vulnerable to error in that it (perhaps too)
charitably assumes consistency on the part of the author
being considered. Although in my view this kind of assumption
is normally not likely to lead to error in the case of so
thorough a thinker as Leibniz, here as it happens we do have
to grapple with texts apparently contradicting the argument
just presented. In the following five paragraphs these will
be discussed.
To start off, xv and xvi hint that God does have the
power to causally influence created substances by
extraordinary intervention. Might not God exercise this
influence to annihilate something? Afterall, He is
omnipotent . Leibniz does not take any care in these passages
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to rul© out this lino of thought. In other places he seems
more openly to suggest it:
xvii. "You will say God can reduce a body to a perfect
state of repose; I reply, however, that God can
also reduce it to nothing, and that this body,
deprived of action and passion, need not be
considered a substance; at least, it is enough
that I say that when God ever reduces a body to
perfect repose, something that can happen only by
a miracle, he would require a new miracle in
order to restore any motion to it." (Leibniz to
Arnauld, October 6, 1687. Montgomery, 217-218.)
Two comments are in order regarding xvii. First, there
is some question as to whether he is speaking in metaphysical
rigour, for two reasons. The first reason is that the comment
that apparently ascribes the power of annihilating to God is
made in passing, in a discussion about physics, and its
"punch" is clearly pulled in the following clause: "at least,
it is enough that I say, etc.". It would seem that this is
not the proper place and manner of making such a claim in
rigour. The second reason is that Leibniz is clearly
throughout his whole correspondence with Arnauld sensitive
about the fact the Arnauld was, as a Catholic, suspicious of
Leibniz's views on matters related to God, on the lookout for
heresy, as it were. Even if Leibniz believed that God cannot
annihilate his creations, he would not be likely to reveal it
to Arnauld, since it would seem to contradict God's
omnipotence, and thus be heretical-sounding. Thus even a
statement made to Arnauld such as this one could easily be
feigned, or at least not rigorous.
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The second thought is that Leibniz here is talking about
bodies qua extensions - bodies from the point of view of
physics - not qua substances. In rigour, God's only creations
are substances. The conception of a body qua extension is, as
Leibniz puts it in Discourse § XII, "in a way imaginary and
does not not constitute the substance of the body"
(Montgomery, p. 18). A body as an extension can be
annihilated by God, although perhaps His goodness would
prevent him from doing so, without eliminating any substance,
by simply discontinuing the currency of its image in
substances. For as with Berkeley, for Leibniz an extension's
esse is its percipi.
The following citation seems to contradict the notion
that God can't annihilate created substances by its
employment of the notion of divine concurrence. Every action
of a created substance requires God's active involvement
somehow
:
xviii. "[N]othing happens to the substance except out of
its own being and according to its own laws,
provided that we add the concurrence of God."
(Leibniz to Arnauld, Oct. 6, 1687. Montgomery,
p. 233.)
This seems to suggest that God could, despite the
substance-immanent causality of created substances, cause the
succession of substance-states of any one of them to come to
a halt, thus annihilating it, simply by not concurring.
God's concurrence is suggested to be part of the causal
recipe for any created substance, one that needs to be
120
"added” to the intrinsic "being" and "laws" of the substance
itself in order to result in the next substance-state.
It appears that Leibniz highlights the notion of divine
concurrence in order to distinguish possible substances from
actual ones, not to suggest the possibility of annihilation
of a created substance, which, again, would lead to
contradiction. A non-actual substance according to Leibniz
is still a complete substance each of whose successive states
is the direct consequence of the preceding one. Yet it isn't
actual precisely because it wasn't chosen by God. God's
active involvement in an actual substance is carried out in
His creating it. Since for Leibniz God creates according to
complete concepts God's concurrence extends equally to each
successive substance-state of a substance upon His creating
it. For Him later to revoke this concurrence at some stage of
the substance's existence, thus annihilating it, entails at
least moral if not metaphysical contradiction. For it would
then be the case that God has both concurred and not
concurred with a substance. This would mean that God has
waffled on His values and contradicted Himself morally, which
is incompatible with His omnibenevolence. It might also be
impossible on the grounds that God is perfect, and a perfect
being can't change, since change is supposed to entail
imperfection. At any rate, there is no doubt that Leibniz
concurred with this reasoning. In the words of Jacques
Jalabert describing Leibniz's view of God: "In Him, there is
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nothing virtual, no change, no time" (p. 134). Leibniz had
no quarrel with traditional metaphysics here.
Another Argument against God's Power to Annihilate -
There is, as mentioned above, another argument to the effect
that God can't annihilate what he has created, one which is
clearly supported by Leibniz, specifically by Discourse XVI.
Like the previous argument, this one depends upon Proposition
8, that substances are created according to complete
concepts. Lest it be wondered why, if the preceding argument
is so Leibnizean, it was never even hinted at by Leibniz, it
may very well be that it is superfluous in light of the
following one. The argument, in fact, relies on the argument
against annihilation via substance-immanent causality
presented earlier, and simply stated, is this: God cannot
annihilate by extraordinary intervention because even God's
intervention is ultimately part of the natural order,
included in the concept of the substance. Since God creates
by complete concepts, even miraculous interventions are
included in the natural sequence, respecting the rule that
succeeding states are consequences of preceding ones. So if
God were to annihilate, it would have to be via substance-
immanent causality, which has been argued above to be
impossible
.
The following is the text I am referring to:
xix. "The extraordinary intervention of God is not
excluded in that which our particular essences
express, because their expression includes
everything. Such intervention, however, goes
beyond the power of our natural being or of our
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distinct expression, because these are finite, and
follow certain subordinate regulations."
( Discourse
. § XVI. Montgomery, p. 27.)
"That which our particular essences express" is, as Leibniz
elsewhere reminds us, according to a regular sequence of
substance-states wherein each causes the next. In this
sequence and indeed in each substance-state everything is
expressed, including the reception of divine influences
by substances. The conclusion we are compelled to come to is
that what one perceives as a divine intervention is really
caused by one's previous state. God is vindicated only by the
fact that He created the whole sequence, so ultimately the
"intervention" is His; He intended for the person to perceive
the intervention at that time, and made it happen through the
causality of the natural sequence. It is not a deception, for
all other substances are harmonized to somehow more vaguely
perceive that intervention, and God Himself, being timeless,
cannot be truly said to act at one time instead of another.
Moreover, it is still supernatural for Leibniz in that it
cannot be scientifically grasped. For Leibniz, the only
difference between a supernatural cause and a natural one is
epistemological: finite minds can scientifically grasp
natural but not supernatural causality.
Still it can't be denied that Leibniz's writings are
sprinkled with statements which to all appearances ascribe to
God the power of annihilating substances. (See: Leibniz to
Burnett, Dec. 29, 1707 in Gerhardt v. 3, p.307: "I believe
it is certain that the soul cannot be extinguished except by
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miracle"; Bodemann’s Handschriften
. Ch. IV, v. Ill, No. 5a.,
Bl. 8, p. 69: "Thus it is to be said that souls cannot
originate except by creation, that is, by miracle, and
nothing impedes their immortality except for that they may be
destroyed by annihilation, that is, by miracle, if God
willed"; and the following excerpt from "Primary Truths", in
Parkinson, p. 92: "A corporeal substance can neither arise
nor perish except by creation or annihilation".) In light of
the above discussion, does this point to an inconsistency in
Leibniz? I wouldn't say so. References to annihilation as a
power of God are made without the typical meticulous
supportive arguments accorded to propositions Leibniz is
sincerely committed to. Moreover, Leibniz almost always was
writing to people whom he could not take into complete
confidence regarding the more controversial consequences of
his philosophy. To deny God the power of annihilating what he
created sounded like heresy to the Christian ear. At any
rate, to concede that power to God is not much of a loss to
Leibniz, for on grounds of His moral perfection Leibniz could
argue that God never does annihilate.
Another possibility is that Leibniz conceded to God the
power of annihilating on the assumption that what he
annihilates is not a complete substance, i.e. is not a
substance created according to a complete concept. In this
case, again, Leibniz could then recover by saying that God in
fact, on account of His goodness, never creates such things,
and that with respect to the world He did create He cannot
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now annihilate anything in it. If Leibniz granted this
possibility, annihilation would be possible by his lights,
since God could create a substance undetermined as to its
future; annihilation would not contradict some endless future
created for it. But that Leibniz conceded God the power to
create a substance according to an incomplete concept does
not seem more likely than that he granted Him the power of
annihilation. There is no evidence that he did the former,
whereas there is some that he did the latter. This leads to
the relating of what is to me one of the chief puzzles of
Leibniz's thought. Why is the best world for him necessarily
one completely determined from the outset? He never mentions
even as mere candidates for creation anything that is not
already completely determined. My suspicion is that there is
a prescience-to-predetermination assumption operative here:
since God knows exactly how each world will turn out, in
creating He cannot fail to create exactly according to such
knowledge. This will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Proposition 9 - There Are No Material Atoms
Deducibility from Propositions 7 and 8
Let it be noted before we go to the texts that this
proposition, about which Leibniz throughout his written work
remained adamant, is conceivably entailed by Propositions 7
and 8, in the following manner. First Proposition 7:
1. If the substance of a body is not its extension,
but its active principle, then the unity of bodies
is not to be found in extension.
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2. If unity is not to be found in extension, then
there are no material atoms. For a material atom
is supposed to be, among other things, a unity of
extension
.
3. The substance of a body is not its extension, but
its active principle (Proposition 7).
C. There are no material atoms.
Now Proposition 8:
1. If the active principle or nature of a substance is
its complete concept, then no two substances are
alike in nature (see discussion of vi, below). For
the complete concept of a thing distinguishes it
from every other possible thing.
2. If no two substances are alike in nature, then
supposing there are material atoms, each material
atom has a nature of its own, and thus differs in
some particular respect from all other atoms.
3. Now material atoms are by definition simple
material extensions, without parts. So if they
differ, they must differ with respect to extension;
and since they are without parts, they would have
to differ entirely if they differ at all. For
extensions that only partly differ cannot both be
simple: at least one must have a part or quantity
of extension that the other lacks.
4. But if one atom differs entirely from all the
others, no mind can ever have general (scientific)
knowledge about material atoms, and hence
ultimately about the world composed of them, since
there will be no commonality between the atoms upon
which one could base a generalization.
C. This is reason to reject material atomism,
considering that material atomism is presented as a
theory that would provide general knowledge of the
world
.
My purpose here is just to highlight the internal
coherence between various tenets of Leibniz's philosophy from
Leibniz's own perspective. For the time I shall assume that
the two arguments represent Leibniz's thought; afterward I'll
try to indicate that textually. Lest my discussion of a and b
before a presentation of the relevant Leibnizean texts be
criticized as putting the cart before the horse, let the
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ir©ad.©r b© 3ssur‘©d that th© hors© will ind©©d wind up in front
and pulling. Som©tim©s car©ful ©xamination of th© cart
b©for©hand mak©s for b©tt©r pulling lat©r on.
Comments on the First Deduction - Th© first argum©nt is
v©ry simpl© and transpar©ntly L©ibniz©an. It hing©s on an
und©rs tanding of what L©ibniz tak©s a substanc© to b©: a
unifying principl©; that which giv©s unity to a thing. If
what giv©s unity to an ©xt©nd©d substanc© is immat©rial, as
Leibniz always argued, then there is simply no room for
material unifying principles. If a corporeal thing had two
unifying principles, on© material and on© immaterial, it
would be two things, i.e. two substances, not one. But a
corporeal substance is unified and therefore can only have
one unifying principle. Moreover, besides there being no
room for material or extended unifying principles, the very
notion is impossible, for reasons given in the discussion of
Proposition 7 above, in particular because there is no unity
in mere extension.
Comments on the Second Deduction - The second argument
in short is an attempt at indirect, separation-of-cases
refutation of material atomism:
1. If material atomism is true, atoms are either
exactly alike (except in number) or they differ (in
some additional respect than number).
2. But:
a. no pair of them can be exactly alike, for
that would violate the principle of the
identity of indiscernibles ; and
127
b. they cannot differ, since, as simple, to differ
they would have to differ entirely, thus
precluding the possibility of scientific
knowledge of them and the world by any mind.
C. Thus, material atomism is false.
Framed thus, the argument seems valid. Whether it is
sound hinges on the truth of three conditions: first, the
famed principle of the identity of indiscernibles
; second,
the proposition that a partial difference between two things
with respect to extension implies the non-simplicity of one
of the things with respect to extension; and third, the
proposition that general (scientific) knowledge of the world
- and its simple components, if it has such - is possible.
The first condition bears upon a, the first case, while the
second and third conditions bear upon b, the second case.
The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles - One of
the things Leibniz's metaphysics is most famous for, this
principle is often treated as a curiosity, while at other
times it is mistaken for an uncontroversial logical
principle. In virtue of the latter a logical principle
analogous to it has been named after Leibniz, but students of
metaphysics know well that the principle as Leibniz used it
was far from a tautology. Put briefly, it is that no two
things can have the same nature, that is, be different only
accidentally. The curiosity of this principle is why he would
hold such a thing. In fact, as will be discussed in Chapter 3
(p. 244 ff.), he saw it as a necessary insurance of God's
omniscience, God understanding things by their natures. At
any rate, the principle of indiscernibles is a direct
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consequence of Proposition 8 (see also p. 99 ff. and
156 ff. for related discussions).
It should be noticed that if the second and third
conditions are true, then case b is true as well. The second
condition requires that any difference between material
atoms, if they exist, be complete, not merely partial. The
third condition requires that material atoms, if they exist,
have something in common by which they might be classified in
order to be known or at least knowable scientifically. Hence,
if the second and third conditions are true, allowing the
existence of material atoms yields a contradiction: they
differ completely and they don't differ completely.
The plausibility of the second condition depends on a
recognition that we are speaking of simple extensions, that
is, extensions not divisible into extended parts. Given two
such things, they clearly could only be identical or wholly
different; any partial difference would have to be a partial
difference in extension, which in turn would entail that at
least one of them is divisible into extended parts.
The plausibility of the third condition depends on the
traditional teleological conviction that the world and man
have been created such that man can have scientific
knowledge of the world. Leibniz made it clear that he
subscribed to this vision (Propositions 5 and 6).
Three Lines of Reasoning against Material Atomism
I take the above two arguments to be representative of
three separate lines of reasoning present in Leibniz's
129
thought in opposition to the existence of material atoms.
The first line, reminiscent of Proposition 7, is that there
is no unity in extension. The second line, a follow-up of
Proposition 8, is that even if material atoms are not
outright impossible, there is no sense in their existence;
admitting their existence does no explaining and makes
explanation of the world impossible. Finally, the third
line, which turns out to depend on Leibnizean teleology and
best-world theory (Propositions 5 and 6), is that the
existence of material atoms is refuted by the axiom that
nature does not act by leaps.
Citations Representing the First Line of Reasoning -
i. ”In the beginning... I had taken to the void and to
atoms, for they best fill the imagination; but on
recovering from that, after many reflections, I
realized that it is impossible to find the
principles of a true unity in matter alone,...
since everything in it is only a collection or mass
of parts to infinity. Now multitude can only get
its reality from true unities which come from
elsewhere.... Therefore to find these unities I
was compelled to have recourse to a formal atom,
since a material being cannot be both material and
perfectly indivisible or endowed with a true
unity." (From: "New System of Nature and of the
Communication of Substances, as Well as of the
Union of Soul and Body", No. 3; Journal des Savans .
June 27, 1695. Wiener, p.l07.)
ii. "For although there are atoms of substance, namely
our Monads which lack parts, there are no atoms of
minimum extension as the ultimate elements, since
the continuum is not composed of points." (From:
"What is Nature? Reflections on the Force Inherent
in Created Things and on Their Actions", § 11.
Schrecker & Schrecker, p. 106)
iii. "Matter is actually divided into infinite parts....
All bodies form a coherent whole. All are
separable by force from the others, but not
without resistance. There are no atoms, or bodies
whose parts are never separable by force." (From:
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fragment, c. 1671, entitled by editor: "On
Aristotle's and Descartes' Theories of Matter".
Wiener, p. 91)
Citations Representing the Second Line of Reasoning —
iv. "I call possible that which can be supposed or
conceived of without contradiction. For example,
that in all the world there are nothing but
globular material atoms {globulos) or [simple]
round bodies in itself contains nothing that
includes a contradiction." (From: Handschriften .
Ch. IV, V. VIII, No. 2, Bl. 21, pp . 103-4.)
V. "(14) ...[T]hat series has prevailed by which the
greatest possible amount of distinct cogitability
comes into being.
"(15) Distinct cogitability in turn yields order in
the thing and beauty in the thinker. Order is
nothing other than distinct relation of a plurality
of things. And confusion is when a plurality of
things is present, but no reason exists for
distinguishing one thing from another.
"(16) Hence are excluded from existence atoms and
whatever bodies in the universe in which there is
no reason that would distinguish one part of one
such body from any other part." (From: untitled and
undated work concerning the principles of Leibniz's
philosophy. Gerhardt
,
v. 7, VIII; pp. 289-90. See
translation in Wiener, pp. 91-3, entitled: "The
Exigency to Exist in Essences; The Principle of
Plenitude"
.
)
vi . "[Imagine] two concentric perfect spheres, perfectly
similar to each other in all their parts and the
one enclosed in the other in such a way that there
is not the least space between them. If, then, we
suppose either that the enclosed sphere rotates or
that it is at rest, it will be impossible even for
an angel, not to say more, to notice any difference
in the states of this system at different times, or
to find a means of deciding whether the enclosed
sphere moves or is at rest, and if moving,
according to what law. What is more, it would even
be impossible to determine the limit of the
spheres, since there is neither any interval nor
any difference between them. Consequently, the
very fact that that any difference is lacking will
make it impossible in this case to recognize any
motion. This is why it must be recognized as
certain... that such doctrines [that allow or call
for indiscernible pairs of individuals] are alien
to the nature and order of the universe and that
never and nowhere is any perfect similarity to be
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found.
. .
. Hence it follows also that in nature
there are neither corpuscles of perfect hardness...
nor those ultimate elements which are adopted by
some under the name of first or second elements....
Those who adopt the theory of atoms and the void
introduce, of course, some diversity into matter,
assuming it to be divisible at one point and
indivisible at another.... But once I had shed the
prejudices of my youth [see i, above]
,
I found out long
ago that the theory of atoms and the void has to be
rejected.” (From: "What is Nature?”. Wiener, pp. 109-
Citations Representing the Third Line of Reasoning -
vii. "From the fact that all things have been created in
the most ordered fashion, it follows that there is
no change by leaps (per saltum), but rather change
always takes place by degree. For a hiatus or leap
is a defect in order. Variety is greatly
distributed so that more intelligibility will be
present. Order is the rational disposition of
diverse things. (From: Handschriften
. Ch. IV,
V. Ill
,
No. 5a, B1.8, p. 69.
)
viii. "My axiom that nature never acts by a leap has a
great use in physics. It destroys atoms, small
lapses of motion... and other similar chimeras."
(From: A letter to Canon Foucher, Journal des
Savans , 1692. Wiener, p.71, under the
editor's title: "On Some Philosophical Axioms and
Mathematical Fictions".)
Discussion of the First Line against Material Atomism
These citations together represent the line that
material atomism is false on the grounds that there is no
unity in extension, i argues the point on metaphysical
grounds, and ii on geometric grounds, iii, although not
really presenting an argument, expresses an opposition to
atomism on physical grounds.
Citation i: No Unity in Extension - I interpret i as
expressing the following argument (Ai):
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1. All that is real gets its reality from true
unities
.
2. Extended matter is real.
C3. Extended matter gets its reality from true
unities ( 1 , 2 )
.
4. If there are such true unities, they are either
themselves in matter (material), or they are
immaterial
.
5. Everything in matter is a "mass of parts to
infinity", i.e. is itself made up of parts ad
infini turn.
C6. There are no ultimate unities in matter, i.e. that
are material ( 5 )
.
C. Extended matter gets its reality from true unities
which are themselves immaterial (C3, 4, C6 )
.
It should be seen right off that Ai is really an
argument for the existence of formal atoms which contains in
5 and C6 a mini-argument against material atomism. But the
first part of Ai - 1-4 - tacitly issues the challenge to
develop a plausible metaphysics of formal atomism. Ai is only
as good an argument as formal atomism is plausible. I say
that because otherwise, assuming the soundness of the first
part, the convincingness of Ai hinges entirely on 5,
which as we will discuss, borders upon being question-
begging .
Ai is a triply metaphysical argument since the three
premises it hinges on - 1, 2, and 5 - are metaphysical, and
each is independent from the other two. (We may consider 4
true by logic, since it is a disjunction between
complementaries . C3 and C6 are subordinate conclusions from
previous lines, as indicated. ) What's more, each is in its
own right controversial. But if each is true, then it seems
we have no choice but to agree with Leibniz's conclusion.
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It is difficult to say how Loibniz would dofend 1 exc©pt
by saying that on this point he agreed with the Scholastics,
that whatever exists is intelligible in principle, and
whatever is intelligible in principle has to be reducible to
unities. To say that the unintelligible exists or can
exist is like saying that there exists or can exist
irreducible or primitive multiplicity, for that which is not
understood is such because it has not been envisioned in a
unified manner. But the idea of an irreducible or primitive
multiplicity is arguably self-contradictory, in the
square-circle family; for multiplicity implies a combination
or collection of unities, whereas primitiveness or
irreducibility implies basicness, non-derivedness
.
Irreducible multiplicity is not to be confused with the trait
Leibniz ascribes to matter in 5. The trait he ascribes to
matter in 5 is not irreducible multiplicity but infinitely
reducible multiplicity. The former and not the latter is
arguably self-contradictory . It remains, of course to be
said whether the latter is not impossible on other grounds.
Premise 2 in the context of Leibnizean thought is not
stating as much as it might be taken to state. Specifically,
it is not saying that matter is irreducibly or primitively
real. In fact, Ai itself suggests that what is primitively
real - what reality "boils down to" - is immaterial. What 2
expresses is that what we know as matter is a proper function
of really existing things. If we understand the things that
reality boils down to: the "true unities" - which it turns
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out are not material - then we will see the material world as
a true feature of reality. Moreover - and perhaps more
importantly - we will never understand what reality
ultimately boils down to unless we accept the material world
as real. I can hardly overemphasize that this comes with a
warning: for Leibniz, dreams, rainbows and shadows are all
real, although their true realities are other than they
appear. So, too, is the true reality of matter other than it
appears
.
I mentioned two paragraphs above that 5 ascribes to
matter the trait of ’’infinitely reducible multiplicity”. I
should rephrase the trait as: "multiplicity infinitely
reducible to material parts”. In other words there are no
simple parts of matter. This leads directly to C6 as a
virtual paraphrase. The next question we need to ask is
whether 5 presents a reason to reject material atomism or
rather simply consists in a statement against atomism. If it
is the latter it is question-begging, if not with respect to
Ai itself, at least with respect to the conclusion that
material atomism is false. But whether it is the former or
the latter depends upon whether we interpret it
metaphysically or physically, respectively. Metaphysically
interpreted, 5 is almost if not entirely undeniably true, as
long as we retain the traditional notion of matter. Who can
conceive of something extended not having parts in a
topological sense, i.e. not being divisible in principle?
Anything extended takes up space, and the space it takes up
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is infinitely divisible. And unless an atom is extended, it
is not material. Moreover, if the claim is that atoms are not
extended, but are as points (whether of energy or of matter)
then, since points cannot compose a continuum (see ii), a
void will have to exist, which Leibniz opposes on grounds
presented in vi, vii, and viii.
If 5 is to be interpreted metaphysically, then one
wonders whether it really has any force against material
atomism. Does material atomism really insist upon the
existence of topologically indivisible material extensions
and thereby result in contradiction, or does it merely assert
the existence of physically indivisible material extensions?
Undoubtedly Leibniz was opposed to material atomism of the
latter (see iii) as well as the former kind, but 5 is far
from obvious interpreted as physical. Perhaps there are
physically simple material extensions: extensions not
divisible by physical force. Leibniz's opposition to such a
view is found in iii.
In short, Ai is an argument based on two metaphysical
premises (1 and 2) that are not so controversial, and a third
premise (5) that is controversial both for being ambiguous
and for relying so heavily on other arguments. I should note,
however, that although a premise may be rhetorically bad
because it is controversial, whether it is true or false is a
separate consideration. Whether 5 is true or false depends on
the soundness of other arguments we have yet to consider. If
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5 turns out to be true, then given its truth I don't think Ai
looks bad at all.
Citation ii: No Atoms of Minimum Extension - I take ii
to express the following argument (Aii):
1. A material atom is defined as a minimum extension.
C2. If material atoms exist, then minimum extensions
exist ( 1 ) .
3. Smallness of extension approaches the limit of a
point
.
C4. If there are minimum extensions, they must be
things as close as possible to being points (3).
5. If there are minimum extensions, they must compose
a continuum.
6. Points don't compose a continuum.
7. Things as close as possible to being points must be
so much like points that if points don't compose a
continuum, neither do they.
C8. If material atoms exist, they must be as close as
possible to being points (C2, C4).
C9. If material atoms exist, they must compose a
continuum (C2, 5).
CIO. If material atoms exist, they don't compose a
continuum (6, 7, C8).
C. Material atoms don't exist (C9, CIO).
Aii is a case of reductio ad absurdam: the conclusion
follows since its negation is shown to entail a
contradiction. In this case, the contradiction is implicitly
expressed in the conjunction of C9 and CIO. Assuming that
material atoms exist - the negation of the conclusion and
that which we are trying to disprove - the contradiction
follows that material atoms at once do and don't compose a
continuum.
Aii hinges on its basic premises, 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7. If
they are true and Aii is valid, then we have no choice but
to accept that there are no material atoms.
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The most serious challenge to Aii's validity is the
inference of C4 from 3. But I think it is a valid inference.
3 expresses that extensions can range from larger to smaller
approaching only the minimum limit of a point. So much is
uncontroversial
. It follows that if there is a minimum, that
is to say, smallest extension, it would have to be such that
nothing - i.e. no extension - is closer to being a point than
it. C4 is simply a paraphrase of this last inference.
5 is really a special case of a general statement about
extensions that any collection of them by their very nature
of being extensions can in principle compose or be used to
compose a continuum, that is, a continuous stretch of matter
of volume greater than zero. This is essential to being an
extension, so it would have to be true of minimum extensions
no less than other kinds of extension.
6 is a straightforward geometric statement about points
that follows from their being dimensionless. Any continuum
has dimensions and that which has dimensions cannot be
composed of dimensionless objects.
7 is clearly a fill-in intended to relate 6 to C4. In
fact the imagination (at least mine!) is deficient in
supplying an insight once we get into the murky area of
feigned possibility. It is all too clear that there is no
such thing as an extension as close as possible to being a
point; the only thing as close as possible to being a point
is a point! Minimum extensions belong in the sguare-circle
club, as surely as does the notion of the closest real number
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to zero. Such notions are really pseudo-notions because they
refer to no logically possible object.
With that said, the suspicion arises whether Aii should
be taken as a serious argument against material atomism.
Sure, it rules out one version of the theory, but one no
serious-minded person is likely to choose. It may very well
be a "straw man"; at best it does the work of explicitly
confining the field of remaining plausible versions of
material atomism. But as with Ai, it leaves one with the
impression that the real material atomists have yet to be
seriously challenged. That challenge is made in citation iii.
Citation iii: Matter Infinitely Divisible - Unlike i
and ii, iii does not express anything that can be extracted
in the form of an argument replete with conclusion and
supporting premises. It consists, rather, in four
independent statements of primarily physical import. These
statements bear witness to the fact that Leibniz's opposition
to material atomism was not merely pointed at more esoteric
metaphysical or far-fetched geometric versions of it, but at
the down-to-earth versions of it expressed in terms of
physics
.
Although he gives no supporting reasons in this citation
to bolster the views he expresses, I am confident and aim to
show that they are drawn as consequences from his
metaphysics. If this is true then iii represents Leibniz s
doing something philosophers rarely do or perhaps even have
occasion to do: put a philosophical theory to an empirical
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test
.
True, the outcomes of such empirical testing were not
available in his time, although much of the scientific
observation of his time may have been seen by some as
pointing suggestively in favor of the views he expresses
here. And true, perhaps contemporary empirical science tends
to point if not conclusively at least suggestively against
these same views. But perhaps also the fact that he boldly
drew consequences from his philosophy which were in principle
empirically testable is a sign that he was not an "armchair
metaphysician", but was really convinced of the truth of his
philosophy
.
Let us label the four statements of iii accordingly:
51. Matter is actually divided into infinite parts.
52. All bodies form a coherent whole.
53. All are separable by force from the others, but not
without resistence.
54. There are no atoms, or bodies whose parts are never
separable by force.
S3 is in turn analyzable into two parts:
S3a. All bodies are separable by force from the others.
S3b. All bodies give a certain resistence to being
separated into parts.
S2 can be understood as following from the definition of
body: a body is a physical extension endowed with some
unifying principle, that is, something that makes of the
matter a coherent whole, a "natural automaton" (see
Monadoloqy
. §§ 63, 64). In this usage we are opposing bodies
to aggregates, which are mere collections of bodies.
SI and S4 bear an interesting relation to each other in
that they are both direct negations of material atomism. But
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while SI is a negation of metaphysical versions, S4 is a
negation of physical versions.
SI goes beyond mere geometry by adding that matter is
actually divided, not just divisible, into infinite parts.
Unless Leibniz went this far, he would not be ruling out the
possibility that there are in fact atoms, which are in
geometric principle divisible into further ’’parts" but in act
have no parts, i.e. are simple. But Leibniz says elsewhere
that matter is not divided in all possible ways, but only
according to a "certain infinite progression" (from: "Primary
Truths", c. 1686. Parkinson, p. 91). Obviously, all
geometric possibility cannot be actualized at once with
respect to division, since not all groups of different
possible divisions are compossible.
We can see, then, that Leibniz’s opposition to material
atomism is thorough: enough so to bring him to go against a
basic tenet of traditional Aristotelian metaphysics. As the
reader may recall, Aristotle, in response to Zeno's paradox,
concluded that extension in space - hence, matter - is
infinitely divisible but not infinitely divided. (Zeno’s
paradox: that motion in space is inexplicable based on the
fact that to traverse any distance requires first to traverse
its half, but to traverse its half requires first traversing
the half of the half, and so on. Thus, it would seem that we
could traverse no distance at all in a finite time, since by
this reasoning traversing any distance seems to entail
tjfaversing an infinite distance or at least an infinity of
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distances one by one in time, which would seemingly take
forever and still not be completed. See Aristotle's Physics .
233a, 21-29; 239b, 5-9.)
Now it should be remarked that in many respects Leibniz
considered the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition an important
ally (see Discourse
. § XI, for example). He tried his best to
reconcile his views as much as possible with it and I would
venture to say he only went against it when he felt he had
to. Usually his criticism was aimed at its lack of clarity.
With all this in mind, it is remarkable to see Leibniz
directly oppose a basic tenet of this tradition. I don't
think it would be wrong to surmise that he must have had a
powerful motivation to do this here. We will discuss this
question more definitively in Chapter 3, but for now we may
just note that SI can be seen as a consequence of Proposition
5, that the actual world is the best possible world. The best
possible world by definition includes the greatest amount of
being compossible. If in the actual world something is
further divisible into smaller intelligible entities as parts
but it is not actually so divided, that would entail in the
actual world an unrealized possibility for more being, which
in turn would entail that the actual world is not the best.
S4 by itself would seem to belong more to empirical
science than to philosophy. For it goes completely beyond the
metaphysical notion of material atom - simple matter without
parts - to say that there are no material things that are
142
atomic in the practical sense that their parts cannot be
separated
.
S4 can be seen as a consequence of S3a if we read in the
hidden premise:
S5. Every body is completely divisible into parts which
are also bodies.
It is common knowledge to any student of Leibniz that he held
S5. In his own words: "In every particle of the universe
there is contained a world of creatures" (from: "Primary
Truths". Parkinson, p. 91), such that "we shall always arrive
at smaller bodies without end" (from: "Necessary and
Contingent Truths", c. 1686. Parkinson, p.98). In fact, like
SI, it is arguably deducible from his best-possible-world
theory, and is needed as a support for SI as well. If matter
is infinitely divided into parts, but there is no complete
division of matter into nothing but parts which are also
bodies, then some matter comes under no unifying principle,
for a body is an extension of matter which has a unifying
principle. This is a reductio argument if we read in a
further unstated premise:
S6. All matter comes under some unifying principle.
Again, Leibniz most assuredly held S6. (See i: "multitudes
can only get their reality from true unities", and matter is
a "mass of parts to infinity".) Perhaps v reveals his
reasoning best: the best possible world must have distinct
cogitability; it must be perfectly intelligible. The notion
of ununified matter is not intelligible, and therefore
ununified matter cannot exist in this world. In fact, the
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case against ununified matter may be even stronger than that
in Leibniz's eyes. For that is possible which can be thought
by God. But that which is unintelligible in principle is not
thinkable by God, and therefore impossible. (This reasoning
is suggested by §§ 51 and 53 in the Monadology . as well as in
the following, contained in his remarks upon a letter from
Arnauld, in Montgomery, p. 115: "I agree that there is no
other reality in pure possibilities than what they have in
the divine understanding".) Is ununified matter
unintelligible in principle? I can only refer back to the
discussion of citation i, where it is suggested that the
notion of irreducible multiplicity is unintelligible in
principle. It seems to me that ununified matter is a pretty
good candidate for an irreducible multiplicity: a non-unity
that cannot be broken down into unities. But there are some
who would regard this as meaningless talk.
Understanding S4 as a special case of S3a, it remains
that we discuss S3a. I consider the following as a clue to
Leibniz's reasons for holding S3a as well as S3b:
"[T]here is no body which is hard or fluid to a
supreme degree; that is to say, no atom can be
found of insurmountable hardness, nor any mass
entirely indifferent to division" (Preface to New
Essays
.
pp. 59-60. Erdmann, v. I, p. 199).
If there are no absolutely hard bodies, then there are no
bodies "entirely indifferent to division", i.e. there are no
bodies not naturally divisible. Likewise, contrasting
fluidity with hardness, if there are no absolutely fluid
bodies, then there are no bodies completely lacking in
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resistence. The obvious next question is: on what grounds
does Leibniz conclude that there are no bodies that are
either absolutely hard or absolutely fluid? The answer to
this question must have something to do with his
understanding of what hardness and fluidity are.
Hardness and Fluidity - In Leibniz's first letter to
Arnauld - a letter which, apparently unanswered, precedes
the famous correspondence between these two men by about
fifteen years (1671-1686)
-Leibniz gives the following
definitions for 'solid' and 'liquid':
"[T]hat is a solid whose parts move in conspiring
motion. A liquid is an aggregate of smaller
solids." (Appendix A, p. 353.)
Now if we agree that hardness is solidity: the quality of
being solid, and fluidity is liquidity: the quality of being
liquid, the above definitions may help us to see why Leibniz
thought there is no such thing as absolutely hard or
absolutely fluid bodies. According to Leibniz, an object is
hard not because its parts hold rigidly or motionlessly
together, but because its parts move in conspiring motion.
Since even an exceedingly hard solid has moving parts by
definition, it seems reasonable to conclude that its parts
are separable: they are not "stuck together; they are moving
in relation to each other. For this conspiring motion is, as
he describes a few lines down from the previous citation, "a
conspiring inner motion" (emphasis mine). Any fixedness of
some of its parts with respect to each other would imply an
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indivisibility Leibniz leaves no room for in his definition
of a solid.
Likewise, since even a most fluid liquid must still meet
the definition of being an aggregate of smaller solids, it
follows that there does not exist an absolutely fluid body,
one which would have no resistance to penetration. For the
smaller solids within it do offer resistance, and their
collective resistance is the resistance of the liquid.
Clearly this whole line of reasoning hinges on the
appropriateness of the above-given definitions of solid and
liquid, which are far from self-evident. Given the caliber of
Leibniz as a philosopher, it would be quite a surprise if we
could find no further support for them.
In fact, we are confronted by a surprise at this point,
but not the one just mentioned. Leibniz does give his
supporting reasons for the definitions mentioned above, but
in giving them as related in the citation below, he suggests
that though they can't exist in bodies, if they could,
perfect hardness or rigidity and perfect fluidity or
non-resistance would be the same thing:
"[T]here is no cohesion or consistency to a resting
thing. . . consequently, whatever is at rest can be
divided and moved by any motion however small. I
followed up the consequences of this proposition a
long way, and found that a body at rest is nothing;
it does not differ from vacuous space."
(Appendix A, p. 346.)
This text should be understood in conjunction with what
comes in the following paragraph:
"The essence of body, rather than in extension,
consists in motion." (Ibid.)
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First it should be noted that perfect hardness and
perfect fluidity are not even permitted as concepts by
Leibniz's definitions. For solidity by Leibniz's definition
is motion-dependent. Motion has no theoretical maximum in
terms of velocity or force. Even if contemporary physics is
correct in saying that the speed of light is the maximum
physical speed, faster speeds are conceivable. As well as the
motions of a body's parts conspire, the hardness of the body
owing to this conspiration can always be in principle outdone
by equal conspiration at greater force of motion. Regarding
fluidity, any liquid has solid parts, so no matter how fluid
something is, higher fluidity is in principle achievable by
separating the parts of those solids it contains. This is
conceivable ad infinitum.
Of course, even though Leibniz's definitions rule out
absolute hardness and fluidity, until one finds justification
for such definitions one cannot reason conclusively from
them. The justification needed here is for why there can't
be perfect hardness as in rigidity and why there cannot be
perfect fluidity as in non-resistance. For seemingly,
perfect rigidity is the limit hard objects approach as they
get harder, and perfect non-resistance is the limit fluids
approach as they get more fluid.
I think we may safely define a rigid body as one whose
parts are and remain motionless with respect to one another.
A rigid body lacks inner motion; if it moves, it moves as a
whole, without changing its internal configuration of parts.
147
It is with respect to itself at rest. In this sense we may
consider it as being and remaining a "resting thing". But
Leibniz as read above argues that "there is no cohesion or
consistency to a resting thing"; it "can be divided and moved
by any motion however small". Now that which can be divided
and moved by any motion however small must by that very fact
lack any resistance. Hence, a perfectly rigid thing, as a
resting thing, turns out to be a perfectly non-resistant or
fluid thing as well! In short, a perfectly hard (rigid) body
is one at rest, but a body at rest is the same as a perfectly
fluid (non-resistant) body. So oddly, a perfectly hard
(rigid) body would have to be at the same time and in the
same respect a perfectly fluid (non-resistant) body.
This reductio-type argument: there are no rigid bodies
because if there were they would be fluid, whereas fluidity
is the opposite of rigidness - is only implicit. His main
point is that both perfect rigidity and perfect fluidity are
impossible, on the following grounds:
57 . There is no coherence or consistency to a resting
thing; it can be divided and moved by any object
however small.
and
58. That which has no coherence or consistency is
nothing, not differing from vacuous space.
(S8 is not stated by Leibniz, but is clearly alluded to in
the claim that from S7 it follows that a thing at rest is
nothing: it follows only if we assume S8 as a hidden
premise.) To summarize: a perfectly rigid object is a resting
148
thing, and so by S7 has no consistency; having no
consistency, by S8 it is nothing. A perfectly fluid thing
has no resistance, and as such "it can be divided and moved
by any object, however small". This is tantamount to saying
it has no consistency, and as such is nothing by the same
reasoning as that just shown.
Why was Leibniz committed to S7 and S8? The answer to
this question is key to understanding Leibniz's opposition-
on-grounds-of-metaphysical-impossibility to material atomism
and other forms of passive materialism as well - such as
Descartes's. Unfortunately, in the Arnauld letter he provides
no further clues as to why he held these propositions. But
he does provide such a clue in a work entitled "On
Transubstantiation" ( De Transsubstantiatione)
,
which
antedates the letter by about three years (circa 1668). This
work consists mainly in the presentation and discussion of a
30-line argument to the effect that "the Substance of the
glorious Body of Christ can be present in the species of
bread and wine wherever [these species are present]." It is
in the defense of 3 where we get our clue. Premise 3, which
is immaterial in itself to our discussion, asserts that any
body which has a principle of action has a principle of
motion. In defense of this Leibniz writes as follows:
"[E]very action is variation of essence. Thereby
every action of a body is variation of the body's
essence. The essence or definition of Body is being
in space. Thereby variation of a body's essence is
variation of existence in space. Variation of
existence in space is motion." ( SSB , VI, 1,
p. 508.)
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From this passage it follows that a body's action is
variation of existence in space. If we read this to mean, as
I m convinced Leibniz did, that all variation of existence in
space is bodily action, it then follows that where action is
lacking, there is no variation of existence in space. Now a
resting body is one lacking in action, so in such a body
there would by the present reasoning be no variation of
spatial being. But spatial being is bodily being, so a body
with no variation of spatial being is a body with no
variation period. This reasoning may be elaborated in two
directions
.
First, although a body with no variation might upon
initial consideration seem to be "consistent and coherent",
it is actually incoherent and inconsistent, assuming SI to be
true, i.e. that matter is actually divided into infinite
parts. For though such a body provides no differentiating
criteria for its parts, it still has parts. Not only can
Leibniz oppose the existence of such a body in that admitting
its possibility contradicts the principle that no two things
differ only in number, but ironically we can also call such a
body "incoherent" or "inconsistent", in that there is nothing
in it to bind its infinite parts into a unity. We argue this
way for the following reason. A thing can be considered
according to its being or according to its action. Since
matter or spatial being considered alone has no unity, it
follows that if a body has unity at all, only action i.e.
variation of spatial being, can provide it. An infinity of
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parts can be properly conceived as a unity if they are all
participants in a harmonious pattern of variation i.e. of
action. Without such unity, a body would be just an infinite
collection of parts with no ultimate minimum of size, since
there would be no ultimate elements to the collection, each
exhaustive partition divided into a more fine-grained one, ad
infinitum. Such a collection at rest could offer no
resistance, however small, since it has no ultimate elements
of determinate mass and there is no force of motion within
it
.
Second, not only is a body which lacks variation
inconsistent or incoherent, but also it lacks anything that
would distinguish it positively (it could only be
distinguished negatively from every body possessing some
variation). That body which has no positive distinction is
indistinguishable in principle from vacuous space. That
which is indistinguishable in principle from vacuous space is
nothing
.
From these two considerations we can see the basis for
S7 and S8. S7 follows from the first consideration, while S8
follows from the second.
In short, although primarily of physical import, the
ultimate reasons behind Leibniz's assertions in iii are
metaphysical. With these assertions Leibniz goes out on a
limb more than usual, and because of this they give us the
opportunity to peer more deeply, albeit not without
difficulty, into his basic convictions.
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Discussion of the Second Line against Atomism
Whereas the first three citations represent the line of
reasoning that material atomism is false on the grounds that
there is no unity in extension alone, the next three
represent the line that material atomism is false because
admitting the existence of material atoms fails to explain
anything
.
Citation iv: Atoms Metaphysically Possible - This
excerpt serves to establish the fact that Leibniz conceded
material atoms to be possible in a restricted sense, namely
in that their notion does not entail contradiction. In light
of this concession, it is plain that his geometric arguments
against atomism - that the continuum is not composed of
points, etc. - must be just a warm-up, a stage-setter for the
real discussion. I say this because his geometric arguments
are exactly to the effect that material atoms are impossible
in the same sense as they are conceded possible in iv. This
apparent contradiction is too obvious, and it only seems
reasonable to search out a reconciling explanation. In fact
there is one, already touched upon above: the material atoms
argued against in the geometric arguments are of a different
kind than those conceded as possible here. The former kind
are metaphysically indivisible extensions, while the latter
are physically undivided extensions. This latter kind of atom
is the kind whose existence most material atomists advocated.
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Of course to acknowledge something as possible in this
one sense does not tie one's hands from decrying it as
impossible in another sense. In fact, having been handed this
concession, one almost expects Leibniz to proceed to do so;
he is well-known for that sort of thing. In fact he doesn't
take occasion to do so - and for good reason, I think. The
fact is, Leibniz simply recognizes that physically undivided
extensions are possible per se. The only question that
remains is whether are compatible with the existence of the
best possible world. The answer he gives to this, as will
will see below, is that they are not. This distinction
between possibility per se and possibility in the sense of
being compatible with a possible world, particularly the
best, are, when all is accounted for, Leibniz's two basic
notions of possibility. The first is known as absolute
possibility, the second as hypothetical possibility (where
the world being referred to, usually the best, is given. See
Mates
, pp . 71-72 . )
Citation v: But Atoms Contradict Perfect Order - In this
selection material atoms are rejected on the grounds that to
admit them would be to admit confusion into existence, and
confusion contradicts the order of actual being. Thus Leibniz
does not rule them out as impossible, i.e. entailing
contradiction in themselves, but as contradicting in
principle the order of actual being. This subtle distinction
points to a notorious problem in Leibniz, namely that he
allows some things as possible which cannot in principle be
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actual. This sounds wrongheaded to many. After all, isn't
saying that something is possible the same as saying it can
be, i.e. can be actual? In order to sort this out, the
argument in v needs to be explained in more depth.
What is confusion according to Leibniz, such that it
contradicts the order of actual being? As expressed in v,
confusion is the presence of a plurality of things, where "no
reason exists for distinguishing one thing from another".
This definition can be read to cover two kinds of situation.
The first is the by-now-well-known case of the coexistence of
things, particularly atoms, which differ only in number.
Although Leibniz had other ways of ruling out such a
situation - ultimately they may all turn out to be various
elaborations of the same reasoning - here he gives another
way: to admit the coexistence of indiscernibles would be to
admit confusion into the actual world, which is contrary to
the latter's order.
The second kind of situation this definition of
confusion can be read to cover is the case of the coexistence
of things, particularly atoms, which differ significantly but
it is impossible in principle to say in what respect they
differ. Material atoms are typically made recourse to as the
ultimate line of explanation of material being. Any
difference - or at least any material difference - between
two things is supposed to ultimately come down to some atomic
explanation. So how do we explain differences between atoms?
We cannot compare them by their parts, for even if it is
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admitted they have them geometrically, the notion of an atom
precedes the notion of any of its parts, just as the notion
circle precedes semi-circle; the latter is intelligible only
in reference to the former. Each atom is an ultimate element
of explanation whose intelligibility precedes the
intelligibility of its parts - if it is admitted to have
parts in any sense. The consequence of all this is that
differences between material atoms so conceived are
unexplainable
.
This is not to say that it is impossible for someone to
look in a very powerful microscope some day and discover a
pair of material-atom candidates, i.e. material extensions
apparently indivisible by force, which differ in that, say,
one is square and the other is circular. What is really being
challenged in v is the notion of material atoms as elements
of explanation. In this case, we distinguish between the two
alleged atoms by means of a difference in notions: squareness
vs. roundness; if we don't allow these to be contained in the
being of the alleged atoms then we have to conclude that
there is no reason in the atoms to explain their difference.
Only if we allow squareness and roundness to be included in
the being of these two things can we say they contain within
themselves a reason for distinguishing them. But in neither
case can there exist a material reason for distinguishing
them, since they themselves are supposed to be the ultimate
elements of explanation from a material perspective. If
there are to exist things like material atoms without
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confusion, they must also have formal content to their being.
Form cannot be derived ultimately as merely an emergent
feature of matter; the ultimate explanation of material being
depends on form; excluding form as a basic feature of being
results in confusion.
Confusion in being is not metaphysically impossible:
confusion is not the same as inconsistency, which is
impossible. Leibniz rules confusion out of actual being
because of a commitment he has to the actual world's optimal
distinct cogitability. This commitment can be thus
articulated: the actual world is such that it contains within
it the most amount of variety that it is possible for a world
to have within a single order, i.e. under one principle which
distinctly relates all the variety into a unity. Material
atomism as a comprehensive theory of the world cannot be true
because it leaves the variety of its own elements
unexplained, ununified. Only a theory that includes form in
being - in every being - can be true.
Citation vi: Identity of Indiscernibles (Revisited) -
This selection represents one of Leibniz's most oft-repeated
arguments: indiscernible pairs of things cannot exist,
because if they did, they would be indistinguishable in
principle. (See also discussion at p. 128 ff.) Thus even an
angel, not to say more (God), would be unable to distinguish
them. We are supposed to accept this as a reductio against
indiscernible pairs on the grounds that it is impossible for
purely spiritual beings, especially God, not to be able to
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tell two things apart. What reasons are there that might
lead us to concede this supposition?
i^^tially, the supposition seems difficult to concede,
for the following reason: one would think that although two
things are indistinguishable in principle, i.e. separately
from their circumstances, yet their mere difference entails
that they do have different histories, i.e. different
circumstances. Even the most similar of physical objects
don't share the same space. Therefore it would seem that an
omniscient being - if not an angel then surely God - could
distinguish any two objects by the different histories each
would actualize. God may not be able to distinguish them in
principle, by their mere concepts or natures, but he can
still distinguish them by foreknowledge of their histories.
Such reasoning obviously does not countenance the
alleged case of indiscernibles with identical histories as
well. For such a case, the reductio argument definitely
seems to work. If we read history as including inner events,
and if in principle no set of outer or inner observations
throughout the entire existence of two things suffices to
distinguish them, then it seems safe to say that not even God
could distinguish them. In fact Leibniz's principle of
indiscernibles has traditionally been applied in this sort of
uncontroversial way and in part owes it fames to such. That
notwithstanding it is important to note that Leibniz's chief
application of the principle is more controversial.
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For Leibniz, the principle is applied chiefly to yield
the conclusion that no two things have the same nature. On
the surface this opposes the scholastic teaching that members
of the same species have the same nature. Leibniz opposed the
scholastic teaching because it entails that members of the
same species are in principle (in concet) identical, only
distinguishable per accidens
.
The scholastics would be content in saying God
distinguishes two members of the same species by his
foreknowledge of their different futures and not by any
difference in their concepts. But if the concept of a thing
is that by which it is understood, shouldn't the concepts of
two different things account for their difference? If God
distinguishes two similar thin-s by their histories,
shouldn't their histories be part of their concept?
In order to even recognize that there are two things,
there must be a recognizeable difference between them. When
God creates two members of the same species, he creates them
with full knowledge of the difference between them. Does it
make sense then to say he only creates them according to
their similarity, their "nature"? Likening the scholastic
notion of nature to a blueprint, if God actualizes the
blueprint of humanness under one set of circumstances and
gets me, then under another set and gets you, in full
knowledge of the outcomes, then isn't it arbitrary to exclude
the circumstances which in conjunction with the human
blueprint resulted in me or you from my or your concept?
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God's thought of me or you obviously includes the
circumstances that distinguish me from you. Isn't God's
thought of me the proper standard for my concept rather than
the mere blueprint of humanness? What difference is there
between considering my concept as a further specification of
humanness, a view that the Thomists reject, and considering
humanness as a further specification of animality, which the
Thomists accept? Leibniz thought there was no real
difference, and that any attempt to distinguish them was
arbitrary
.
This whole question comes down to how God thinks and how
God creates, and the relation between the two. These issues
are discussed in Chapter 4.
The application of the principle that indiscernible
pairs don't exist to anti-atomism is the following. Material
atoms were often alleged to be extensions of perfect
simplicity which completely filled space. Being of perfect
simplicity would presumably entail that they were all as
small as can be; that they completely fill space would mean
that they could fit together contiguously with no leftover
space. The first of these two constraints presumably
requires that they be of equal (equally perfect) smallness,
while the first together with the second virtually insures
that at least some of them, if not all of them, are the same
shape as well. Since shape and size is all there is to a
material atom by many accounts, such accounts would be
refuted by the indiscernibility principle. Accounts of
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material atomism which add any other commonly held trait to
atoms, such as perfect hardness, are equally well refuted.
Discussion of the Third Line against Atomism
The only versions of material atomism left still
standing by the reductio we've been considering are those
that accept the existence of a void. These versions are
rejected by Leibniz on other grounds, among the most
important of which is presented in vii and viii, and
expressed rather cryptically by the slogan: "nature does not
act by leaps".
Citations vii and viii: No Change by Leaps, hence No
Atoms - The argument expressed jointly by vii and viii may
be presented as follows:
1. The world is governed by a principle of maximum
order. Whatever is in the world is part of that
order
.
2. Maximum order is incompatible with "change by
leaps"
.
3. The existence of material atoms entails "change by
leaps"
C. Material atoms don't exist in the world (i.e. they
don ' t exist )
.
The argument is valid by a double application of modus
ponens followed by an application of modus tollens: If the
world exists, then maximum order exists. If maximum order
exists, then no change by leap exists. If material atoms
exist, then change by leap exists. But the world exists,
therefore no change by leap exists, from which it follows
that material atoms don't exist.
1 rests partly on a tautology that the world exists.
The world is by definition that which actually exists, and
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whatever exists exists. But this line mainly expresses a very
controversial notion: that what is actual is maximally
ordered. This is the generating notion of the argument. What
is actual fits into a unified system and there is no part of
what is actual with any lack of ordered content which it
could have compatibly with the rest of its content.
2 can be defended by arguing that change by leap entails
an unexploited opportunity to have change by gradation. Any
unexploited opportunity to fit more being into actual
existence, such as a void, or a change by leap, entails lack
of maximum order.
3 may be defended by suggesting that Leibniz uses the
expression "change by leap" to cryptically refer to any
unexploited opportunity to fit more being into actual
existence, such as a void. Some of the most well-known
theories advocating material atoms suggest that a void exists
in which the atoms move. Taking into account Leibniz's
arguments against non-void-entailing versions of material
atomism we may view the present argument as the second part
of an attempted extensive separation-of-cases refutation. As
such this part countenances only versions of atomism which do
entail a void. Thus qualified and in light of the suggested
broad reading of "change by leaps" , it would seem reasonable
to concede 3.
In short, the attack on atomism found in vii and viii
rests on the proposition that the world - the actual world
is maximally ordered, in the sense defined above. It is
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impossible for us to discuss Leibniz's motivation for
believing such a proposition without discussing his theology.
Summary of Proposition 9
In our treatment of Proposition 9 we have examined
several reasons why Leibniz was opposed to material atomism.
In retrospect his reasons might alternately be labelled as:
physical, metaphysical, geometrical, anti-skeptical, and even
in a sense moral - the world's goodness is incompatible with
the existence of material atoms. Among his various reasons,
some of them only applied to some versions of atomism, such
as his geometrical reasons. But this is not to say his
opposition lacked unity. I think that there is conceptual
unity to be found in his anti-atomism, and that such lies in
its connection to his theological commitments discussed in
Chapter 1. This connection will be explored in Chapter 3.
Proposition 10 - Substances Were All Created at Once
Strictly speaking it is perhaps a misrepresentation to
suggest Leibniz held this, if by 'hold' is meant 'was
thoroughly committed to'. But it is no less clear that he
believed it, though he seemed to sense that he lacked
metaphysically compelling proof for it.
Evidence of Commitment
I think the following four excerpts together adequately
reveal the nature of Leibniz's advocacy of Proposition 10.
i. "[Alnimals and souls begin from the very
commencement of the world. ..." ( Monadology , § 82.
Montgomery, pp. 269-70.
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ii. "If souls had a natural origin, then they could
also be naturally extinguished, since nothing is
more in conformity to reason than that anything can
be dissolved or destroyed in the same manner in
which it is put together or constituted. Thus it
must be said that souls cannot be originated except
by creation, i.e. by a miracle, and that their
immortality alone does not rule out that they might
be taken out of existence by annihilation, that is
by miracle, if God so willed. Hence either souls
are created daily, or, as I prefer, they are
coetaneous with the world." ( Handschriften . Ch.IV,
V. Ill
,
No. 5a, Bl.ll, p. 69. )
iii. "There are many difficulties concerning the origin
of souls.... If they were created all at once from
the beginning and began with the world, it is to
be said as well that the animal soul called 'man'
existed from the beginning and that all rational
souls preexisted already in act, in or with
Adam.... If you say that souls are created daily
by God, it is to be feared lest so much infer it
on the other hand to be equally probable that they
are annihilated daily by God with the dying of the
animal. If such annihilation is so ordinary and
frequent, then by the same token all argument for
the immortality of the human soul will come to
nothing which relies on the premise that the soul
cannot perish unless it is annihilated." (Ibid.,
Ch. IV, V. VIII, No. 24, B1.93, pp . 122-3.)
iv. "I saw that these forms and these souls should be
indivisible, as our mind is.... But this truth
renewed the great difficulties of the origin and
duration of souls and forms. For every substance,
being a true unity and not capable of beginning or
ceasing to exist without a miracle, it follows that
they can only begin by creation and end only by
annihilation. Thus, except the souls God wishes
still to create expressly, I was obliged to
recognize that it is necessary that the forms
constitutive of substances should have been created
with the world and that they should subsist
forever. . . . And that should not appear
extraordinary, since we are only giving to forms
the duration which the Gassendists give to their
atoms." (from New System of Nature, § 4, 1695.
Wiener
,
p . 108 .
)
Significance of Commitment
These four texts serve to establish two things: first,
that Leibniz believed in Proposition 10 consistently
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throughout his intellectual career, and second, that he was
aware of being unable to prove it. To be sure, he
occasionally does seem to convey an air of certainty:
"Thus, except the souls that God wishes still to
create expressly, I was obliged to recognize that
it is necessary that the forms constitutive of
substances should have been created with the
world..." ( New System of Nature . Wiener, p. 108.
Emphasis mine.)
But a closer inspection reveals that he still leaves room for
the possibility that God might see it best to create
substances at different times. Nonetheless he prefers the
notion that creation is all-at-once, and he does offer
reasons in favor of the proposition. Let's review his
reasons
.
There is an important background premise which Leibniz
refers to in ii and iv, namely that souls do not have a
natural origin. In ii he offers an indirect proof for this,
and in iv a direct proof. The indirect proof can be presented
as follows:
1. The soul has a natural origin (supposed for the
sake of disproving).
2. Anything can be destroyed according to the same
manner in which it is originated (principle of
metaphysics ) .
3. The soul is immortal (principle of metaphysics).
C4. If the soul has a natural origin, i.e. is
originated naturally, then it can be destroyed
naturally (Instantiation of 2).
C5. The soul can be destroyed naturally (1, C4, modus
ponens )
.
C6. The soul cannot be destroyed naturally
(3, definition 'immortal').
C7. C5 and C6 contradict one another (logic).
C. The soul does not have a natural origin
(C7 refutes 1, proving its negation, C).
The pivotal premises are 2 and 3. 2 is unobjectionable if
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charitably interpreted. I came into being through my
mother's womb, but it is absurd to say I can pass out of
existence in that same manner. On the other hand, if l can
identify along more general lines all the contributing
factors which in combination support my existence - air,
water, heat, genetic inheritance, possibly a creative act by
God - it seems reasonable to suppose that the
subtraction/reversal of them or even one of them might lead
to my perishing.
3 is also unobjectionable if a proof can be provided for
it which is independent of the reasoning represented by this
argument. For instance, it would be unacceptable to defend 3
by arguing that the soul has no natural origin, and that that
which has no natural origin has no natural annihilation, and
therefore is immortal. Leibniz's essential philosophical
justification for 3 is represented in the direct argument,
below
.
The direct proof in iv can be expressed as follows:
1. Souls are indivisible substances (principle of
metaphysics).
2. All cases of coming to be, and of ceasing to exist,
according to nature are by composition and
decomposition, respectively (principle of
metaphysics )
.
3. If something is indivisible it cannot be formed by
composition or destroyed by decomposition
(definition 'indivisible').
C4. Souls cannot be formed by composition nor destroyed
by decomposition (1, 3, modus ponens - 3
instantiated to souls).
C. Souls neither come to be nor are destroyed
according to nature. The soul does not have a
natural origin, nor a natural annihilation (2, 4).
The crucial premises are 1, 2, and 3. 3 is an uncontroversial
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consequence of the definition of 'indivisih a'. 2 is a widely
accepted belief based on the limitation of nature according
to the dichotomy of the natural vs. the supernatural.
According to this distinction, nature can only create and
destroy by combining and separating elements; it does not
create the elements, whatever they are, and it does not
destroy them. Nature is thus viewed as an equilibrious
system, which ultimately neither adds to or substracts from
the world. Any bottom-line addition to being would have to
have a supernatural cause.
Support for 1 might be drawn from several sources. In
fact a great portion of Leibniz's philosophy goes toward
supporting it. In Chapter 3 I argue that such support
ultimately rests on evidence of God's existence and nature.
But for now we may characterize such support by saying that
souls are immaterial unities, and immaterial unities are
indivisible
.
Only equipped with the reasons such proofs provide can
Leibniz legitimately move on to the next step, expressed in
each of ii, iii, and iv:
0. Either all souls are miraculously originated
(created) by God at the beginning of the world, or
they are created by Him piece-meal, day-by-day.
In each of these same texts as well as in i Leibniz leaves no
doubt but that he prefers the first disjunct of 0. In ii,
iii, and iv he gives reasons for this preference, making it
clear, however that the piece-meal option is not strictly
speaking ruled out by these reasons.
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Why did Leibniz prefer the first option to the second?
The only reason presented in these four texts is given in
iii. There he expresses a wariness about the possibility of
piece-meal creation of souls "lest so much infer it... to be
equally probable that they are annihilated daily by God with
the dying of the animal". In other words, once admitted that
our conception as members of the human species is
simultaneous with our inception as existing souls, the
suggestion offers itself that our dying as humans is
simultaneous with our termination as existing souls, which is
unacceptable to Leibniz in that it opposes the doctrine of
immortality. I think this reasoning warrants several
remarks
.
First, this is not intended to be an argument of
necessity, but an argument of probability in the classical
sense. In the absence of any other argument on this matter
bearing the markings of a necessity argument, the assertion
of this one carries with it an implicit admission by Leibniz
that he was not aware of any conclusive philosophical reasons
favoring the hypothesis of all-at-once creation. Second,
despite the absence of conclusive reasons Leibniz shows a
surprising degree of commitment to the hypothesis. Leibniz
was not given to leaving his important commitments without
adequate defense; perhaps his reasons for this commitment lie
in some other area. I suggest that his commitment to
defending the doctrine of Original Sin is what ultimately
motivates him in opting for all-at-once creation.
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As will be discussed in the following chapter, if all
human souls were actively present in Adam, this might explain
how when Adam was tainted by original sin, so were the rest
of us. Many would take this idea as absurd and perhaps it is,
but the philosophical acrobatics Leibniz performs in arguing
this position, along with the historical importance of
exposing the views of such a famous philosopher, make it
worth discussing.
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CHAPTER 3
THE THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF LEIBNIZ'S PHILOSOPHY
Evidence of Priority of Intent in General
To the extent that one can be sure about what a person
holds based solely on his writings, we can be sure that
Leibniz held revealed Christian theology with a full degree
of commitment; that revealed theology occupied for him a
position of primacy over philosophy and rational thought; and
that his philosophy actually results from a far-reaching
strategy of defense of Christianity. This statement warrants
a good dea.u of explanation and defending, to which the rest
of this section attends.
The Quality of Evidence of Leibniz's Writings
It has to be acknowledged that there are some
difficulties in drawing conclusions about a person's views
from his writings, especially in the era in which Leibniz was
writing. There was obviously much contention in the air.
Protestants who thought themselves to be good Christians were
dismayed to be thought of as heretics in danger of losing
their salvation. Catholics were offended by the accusation
made by militant Protestants that the Pope was the anti-
Christ. Within each denominational group the standards of
orthodoxy were high, as if to draw battle-lines. There was
some dialogue, but not much, and it was very difficult to
overcome contentiousness. For someone interested in
discussing religion in a conciliatory way, as Leibniz was, he
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had to be acutely aware of the sensitivities of his audience.
A considerable amount of waffling and circumlocution, not to
mention temporary compromises of personal vision, were to be
expected, and occurred. Indeed, with different audiences
Leibniz used different tones and censured different subjects.
Even his use of different languages leaves one suspecting
that he was protecting himself. (For example, he wrote
comparatively little in German, but much of what he did write
concerns the reconciliation of the Reformers with the
Evangelicals, two largely German-speaking Protestant
groups. One would think those intellectuals to whom he was
writing knew Latin, which was still being used as an academic
lingua franca.
)
Leibniz occasionally spoke about the
necessity to speak in different ways to different people:
"Among this kind of people nothing is persuaded by
proofs of long duration, but by consensus of the
people. Others, though, philosophize with their
own minds." (Leibniz to Arnauld, 1671. Appendix A,
p. 343.)
and
"Metaphysics should be written with accurate
definitions and demonstrations, but nothing should
be demonstrated in it that conflicts too much with
received opinions. Thus this metaphysics will be
able to be received if it is once approved; then
afterward, if any examine it more profoundly, they
will hold the consequences to be necessary"
(Lestienne, ^ Leibniz: Discourse de
me taph ys i cue , p. 14, no. 1. Taken from Mates,
p . 171 , footnote 5 )
.
These passages suggest that Leibniz, although prudent,
was a man of some intellectual courage - not an intellectual
coward, as Russell argued (Mates, p.l71). For both of them
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reveal that he is out to make changes in the way people think
about things. In the first, he is subtlely trying to persuade
Arnauld to "philosophize with his own mind", and not simply
be persuaded by "consensus of the people"; all this to
prepare him to consider some startling views on the
Eucharist. In the second his aggressiveness is less masked,
despite the prudent, non-confrontational method of persuasion
he is advocating.
His courage is perhaps due to his for years unbounded
optimism regarding the prospects of reconciling the views of
unfriendly opponents, especially on the touchy matter of
religion. As he'd revealed a few years earlier, ("De
Demonstratione Possibilitatis Eucharistiae"
,
SSB
.
VI, 1,
p. 517) he'd wished to be able to have a heart-to-heart
discussion over the compatibility between Lutheran and
Catholic views on the Eucharist with someone of "such great
moment" as Arnauld. This is a brave topic to broach across
denominations, without question; and there are many other
cases where he shows similar bravery. If intellectual
cowardice in a person is a failure to express his views based
on "audience-interference" or fear of an unreceptive
audience, then we shouldn't impute cowardice to Leibniz.
There is a manageable amount of audience-interference in his
writings; with a bit of care we can get at his views through
them
.
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Leibniz's Subscription to Christian Doctrine
Leibniz was a confessed subscriber to the Augsburg
Confession [ Confessio AuQustana 'i {"Dem. Poss. Euch.'\ SSB
.
VI, 1, p. 516) and thus was officially Lutheran. However he
not rarely identified himself as "Catholic". In a letter
to Marie de Brinon (July 16, 1691; in Gaqu^re, p.46), one of
his more frequent Roman Catholic correspondents, Leibniz
writes
:
"You are right. Madam, in judging me a Catholic at
heart; I am the same openly..."
In the latter it should be noted that Leibniz was not
confessing to be a Roman Catholic, but Catholic in the sense
that Anglicans and Episcopals apply the term to themselves
today. In another place, though, he goes further to say:
"If I had been born into the Roman Church, then
certainly I would not now leave it, even if I
believed everything I now believe." {"De Scriptura
Ecclesia Trinitate"
,
Grua, p. 178)
This indicates that Leibniz felt his beliefs to be close
enough to those of Roman Catholicism to allow him to remain
in good conscience a member of that church, under different
circumstances. In each of these citations he is declaring
himself unqualifiedly to be a Christian and to subscribe to
Christian doctrine.
Besides these three citations there is ample testimony
throughout Leibniz that he was and remained committed to the
truth of revelation and therefore not a deist (as were many
philosophers among his contemporaries). This is evident in
two of his major works: the Discourse On Metaphysics and the
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Theodicy
. Although the latter begins with an almost deist
tone
:
the outward forms of religion.
. . are of two kinds:
the one consists in ceremonial practices, and the
other in the formularies of belief....
[Flormularies are like shadows of the truth and
approach, more or less, the true light.... [The
formularies of belief] would be valid provided
there were nothing in them inconsistent with
truth unto salvation, even though the full truth
concerned were not there." (Farrer, pp . 49-50.)
in the same work he confesses his Christian theism even more
explicitly
:
"the object of faith is the truth God has revealed
in an extraordinary way" (Farrer, p. 73).
and
"For, after all, one truth cannot contradict
another, and the light of reason is no less a gift
of God than that of revelation." (Ibid. p. 91.)
The way Discourse ends gives even more poignant
testimony to Leibniz's commitment:
"XXXVII. Jesus Christ has revealed to men the
mystery and the admirable laws of the kingdom of
heaven, and the greatness of the supreme happiness
which God has prepared for those who love him."
(Montgomery, p. 62.)
In short, Leibniz's was commitment to Christian revelation -
'Revelation', for short - was as to a separate source of
knowledge alongside our natural means of knowing, but one
not irreconcilable with our natural way of knowing. We shall
return to this theme in the discussion of the primacy of
theology over philosophy which follows.
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Revealed Theology's Primacy as Goal or Standard of Thought
Some philosophers who subscribed to revealed religion
did not take much pains to set their philosophy in
subordination to it. Leibniz counted Descartes among these:
"It is amazing how much the philosophy of
Descartes confirms them [the foes of Christian
doctrine]" (Appendix A, p. 344.)
and
"He [Descartes] has also artfully evaded the
mysteries of faith by claiming to pursue
philosophy rather than theology, as though
philosophy were incompatible with religion, or
as though a religion can be true which opposes
truths demonstrated elsewhere ."( "On True Method in
Philosophy and Theology", 1686. Wiener, p. 59.)
A similar charge was made against the medieval Muslim
philosophers, such as Avicenna and Averroes, who, though
confessed Muslims, appeared to openly contradict the Koran in
their esoteric philosophies. This claim ought not be made
about Leibniz. His philosophy was motivated by concerns of
faith and theology. As a young adult (1671) he wrote to
Arnauld
:
"Amid so many distractions, I deem myself to have
dwelt more persistently on hardly another issue in
the course of this life of mine, however short,
than on what it is that will secure my well-being
in the life to come. This has certainly been for
me, I confess, the chief cause of philosophizing."
(Appendix A, p. 345.)
Since the context of the passage is a letter defending the
Eucharist, I think it clearly ought to be read as an
admission that understanding Revelation was the aim
motivating Leibniz to philosophize. He'd expressed the same
point even more emotionally two years earlier in
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"Confession of Nature Against the Atheists":
"[Alfter their attempt had met with some little
success, they proclaimed... that they could find
neither God nor immortality of the soul by natural
reason.... Unfortunately there are those who have
gone even further and who now doubt the authority
of the sacred scriptures and the truth of hstory
and the historical record, thus bringing an
unconcealed atheism into the world It seemed to me
unworthy for our mind to be blinded in this manner
by its own light, that is, by philosophy. I began
therefore myself to undertake an investigation,
and all the more vigorously as I became more
impatient at being dispossessed, by the subtleties
of these innovators, of my life's greatest good,
the certainty of an eternity after death and the
hope that the divine benevolence would sometime be
made manifest toward the good and the innocent."
("The Confession of Nature Against Atheists", 1669.
Loemker, v. 1, pp. 168-9.)
This text suggests that Leibniz's main if not only business
in philosophy was that of launching a project aimed at
supporting Christianity. More than that, it shows Leibniz's
support of the notion of the primacy of Christian theology
over philosophy, but not without granting a crucial role for
philosophy in the aid of Christianity. Leibniz faults other
philosophers for allowing their philosophizing to go astray
of Christian doctrine, yet is drawn to philosophy in order to
defend Christianity against them.
How, for Leibniz, theology can have primacy over
philosophy yet require philosophy to lay theology's
groundwork remains to be established.
It is not difficult to see that Leibniz held theology to
be the highest point of knowledge in some sense:
"theology is the highest point of the knowledge of
things regarding the mind" (Leibniz to Bouvet,
1697. Wiener, p. 105).
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In light of what we've already read, we shouldn't take him
just to be talking about natural i.e. philosophical theology,
but revealed theology This points us in the direction of
understanding the sense in which theology has priority over
philosophy: the truths of revealed theology are established
not by reason, but, prior to reason and philosophy, by faith.
These truths are justified prior to their acceptance by true
philosophy, i.e. prior to the aid of perceived facts directly
concerning them. This sets them apart from other beliefs,
which do not have the privilege of this priority. Of course,
the truths of theology are true, so they can't possibly
contradict the true philosophy, as stated in the initial
essay of Theodicy , "Preliminary Dissertation on the
Conformity of Faith with Reason" . So they are a standard for
naturally gained beliefs in that if the latter contradict
them, they are false.
It might be objected that this standard could be used
either way - e.g.: "Revelation cannot entail such-and-such
because such-and-such is contrary to reason" as well as "This
cannot be the truth because it contradicts the content of
Revelation" - and therefore does not entail the primacy of
theology. But in fact, its convertibility is a trivial matter
of logic. The claim being made by Leibniz is not that either
Revelation/faith or philosophy/reason is the primary source
of justification for our beliefs and not both. His claim is
rather the following:
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There are two primary sources of knowledge. The
first is reason aided by perceived facts. The
second is divine revelation. All our beliefs
except those of the second source must pass the
scrutiny of reason-cum-natural-perception in order
to be justified. The most important truths belong
to revealed theology.
This is witnessed to by the following:
"[T]he object of faith is the truth God has
revealed in an extraordinary way.
.
.
reason is the
linking together of truths, but especially (when
it is compared with faith) those whereto the human
mind can attain naturally without being aided by
the light of faith...." (Preface to Theodicy .
Farrer
,
p . 73
.
)
and
"The ancient philosophers knew very little of these
important [theological] truths. Jesus Christ alone
has expressed them divinely well.... His gospel
has entirely changed the face of human affairs. It
has brought us to know the kingdom of heaven, or
that perfect republic of spirits which deserves to
be called the city of God. ... He alone has made us
see how much God loves us.... [and that] God alone
can render the soul happy or unhappy." ( Discourse .
§ XXXVII, Montgomery, pp . 62-3.)
I shall take the second passage to speak for itself as
supporting the idea that Revelation gives us the most
important truths. What can be more important than our destiny
and happiness, of the perfect everlasting outcome of creation
in union with the Perfect Being? Even if the truth of these
things is doubted their eminent importance if they are true
cannot be doubted. If one believes in these things, and the
' evidence is pretty convincing that Leibniz did, it would
1 hardly make sense for them not to be, in the sense discussed,
I
the "goals" of thought - of truth-oriented thought at any
1
1
rate.
I
i
i
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In the first passage Leibniz expresses that there are
two sources of truths: revelation, or "the light of faith",
and natural human perception prescinding from faith. Reason
is normally associated with the latter, as the linking
together the truths attained by that way. In this sense,
'reason' really means, as put above, "reason-cum-natural-
perception". Along similar lines one could speak of "reason-
cum-revelation"
,
or "reason-cum-faith-perception"
. Perhaps
this is key notion of Leibniz's project of defending
Christian theology. Reason, on account of its habitual
association with natural perception, has accidentally been
opposed to faith, or the object of faith, here Revelation.
But true knowledge i.e. science of Revelation - revealed
theology - is hampered, to remain in a state of disunity -
unless it makes full use of reason to link its truths
together, and ultimately, since all truth is unified, to link
its truths to naturally attained truths.
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In short, the truths of Revelation are both the standard
and goal of thought for Leibniz. Revealed theology being the
science of these truths, it has primacy over all other
thought, particularly philosophy, in providing for it a
standard and goal. Yet, although reason- cum-percept ion
or "natural reason" is not the justifier of theology,
according to Leibniz it plays a foundational role with
respect to theology. For although items of revelation, such
as: "God is triune", are not a matter for natural reason to
decide, it is for it to decide whether the doctrine is
possible. Clearly possibility is a precondition for something
being true. On the other hand, some doctrine relies on
certain historical facts being true, such as the doctrine of
the Incarnation of God in Christ. Whether the texts
recording the life of Christ are historically reliable is a
matter for natural reason, not faith, as is the matter of
deciding facts about what accepted literary genres and
devices the writers of scripture were using. These facts have
a great impact on how Scripture should be interpreted.
Moreover, it is for reason to decide whether two candidates
for doctrine are compatible or contradict. An item of
scripture clearly committing itself to propositions
incompatible with the rest of the content of Revelation would
have to be false, if the rest of Revelation is true. Hence
it would have to be excluded as unorthodox. Finally, it is
for reason to decide whether a naturally acquired belief
contradicts Revelation. But for all these reasonings to yield
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true results, theology - the science of Revelation - must
first be properly developed, and philosophy plays prominently
therein
.
Christianity in Danger without Philosophical Support
An added motivation for working out a philosophically
centered defense of of Christian doctrine was the fear that
Christianity was in danger without it. Leibniz wrote:
"The philosophical age is dawning in which a more
acute interest in truth is being diffused even
outside the schools, among men born in the
Republic. The true propagation of religion will
be hopeless unless it satisfies these men....
Nothing works better at confirming atheism or
certainly at strengthening rationalism and
undermining from its foundation - as it has nearly
already done -the slipping faith of many. . . than
on the one hand to advocate that the mysteries of
faith are always believed by all Christians, and on
the other hand to be convinced of stupidities by
certain kinds of demonstrations of "right reason".
There are many within the Church that are more
bitter enemies of Her than the Heretics themselves.
It is to be feared lest the heresy in the end will
be, if not atheism, then a vulgarized
naturalism. ... It is set before us to do battle
with these enemies..." (Leibniz to Arnauld, 1671.
Scare-quotes mine. Appendix A, pp . 344-5.)
Leibniz saw danger for the Church - Christianity - from
within and without. In his eyes the danger from the inside
was caused by intellectual sloppiness on the part of
Christians, who by this allow many stupidities and fallacious
ways of reasoning to be associated with them, discrediting
the truth of their faith. Of course, the enemies on the
outside reason poorly by discrediting the faith on account of
"stupidities" accidentally associated with it. This being the
enemy, the bad use of reason both inside and outside the
Church, it seems clear that the battle that Leibniz calls to
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be waged is one of establishing true philosophy within and
without the Church. This leads to a more detailed look at
Leibniz's far-reaching (mostly) philosophical project to
defend his Christian faith.
Project of Defending Christianity
The claim to be a subscriber to Christian doctrine - to
Revelation - is a complicated one, especially in light of the
fact that then as before and now theologians are still
struggling to reflectively determine just what the content of
Revelation is. Yet, isn't that more or less the case for many
of the things people normally claim to subscribe to?
Consider, for example: 'My spouse loves me'. It is certainly
difficult to reflectively render the content of such a
declaration. Yet arguably this is no cause to doubt its
truth, for we have a good sense of its meaning. Of course, I
may be mistaken on other grounds that my wife loves me.
The case of revealed Christian doctrine is even more
puzzling. We can try to liken the subscription to it with the
confidence many of us have in doctors. We normally will
believe their diagnoses without being able to give a reasoned
account of them ourselves. Our confidence is based on the
doctors* professional authority. Not that we don't have some
understanding of the diagnoses; without that there would be
no sense in saying we believe them. We know what a diagnosis
means in terms of our health and how we feel , our prospects
for a long life, what we have to do to get better. So much
understanding suffices to allow us to cooperate with doctors.
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But the analogy to religion is imperfect. In the case of
doctors our confidence in their authority lies in the track
record of modern medicine, its standards, its accountability,
and on our ability to directly observe in ourselves the
symptoms which would corroborate or falsify the physicians'
diagnoses and prove their prescribed treatments to be
effective or ineffective. Although our acceptance of revealed
doctrines lies in our confidence in their source, it is far
more difficult to say what justifies the confidence. The
source of Christian revelation is supposed to be Jesus
Christ, who established his authority as a divine prophet by
making prophesies that would be seen by his followers to come
true - such as the fall of Jerusalem, by miracles of healing,
by perfect moral witness, by an expressed clarity of
spiritual vision, by rising from the dead, by reappearing in
a glorified bodily form, and finally by ascending into the
sky. His followers would add that more proof of his
authority comes from the effects of calling on his name:
conversion, peace, a sense of victory over the powers of
evil. This may be all well and good, but before it can be
accepted as justification for belief, some historical facts
need to be verified. Was there a man named Jesus? Did he do
and say, at least in substance, all the things ascribed to
him by his followers? Even if the New Testament is granted
not to be a hoax, how did its writers intend it to be
interpreted? Is there anything about the scriptures
themselves which indicate either that they are trustworthy or
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how they are supposed to be read? Even if we resolve all of
these initial problems, how shall we apply the revelation of
Jesus Christ to our lives in the modern world? More
generally, how are we to handle the actual revealed material:
are we to develop it into a conceptual whole, relating it to
the rest of our thought and each item in it to the others
harmoniously, or are we to guard it without modification or
elaboration? In the life of the Church are we to allow free
and vibrant discussion and debate over the content of
revelation, or are we to follow rules of censureship? What
means are there of deciding the truth in doctrinal disputes:
does the revelation itself indicate some guidelines of its
own - a hierarchy, a divine guarantee of infallibility to
some person or body of persons - or are people left to their
own human resources to do the best they can? In the former
case, does corruption disqualify such persons from exercising
their infallibility? In the latter, is the authority of
revelation lost? Finally, if the Church became divided, how
was it to regain its unity? When would it be proper to expel
the rebellious factions? When is tolerance appropriate? Could
both sides of a division both be in good conscience? What
steps could be taken toward reconciliation?
The issue of faith in divine revelation through Christ
is a can of worms and Leibniz knew it. But more than a
millenium and a half had passed before a situation - the
Reformation - arose that suddenly opened this can entirely,
creating a dire urgency for its contents to be sifted.
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inspected, and set in order. In the preceding centuries there
had been plenty of heterodoxies (I use this term relatively
to the Roman Catholic church), but the numbers of people
involved in them were not nearly as great, and the points of
contention for each particular heterodoxy were usually few.
There were other schisms, but these were, in retrospect, more
political than doctrinal. (Today it is hard for a layperson
to see much difference in point of doctrine between the
Catholics and the Eastern Orthodoxes or even the Anglicans.)
The writings of the great theologians and Christian
philosophers of those times occasionally reveal a sensitivity
to the set of problems we are presently discussing, but
whereas then it was an esoteric complex of puzzles not much
affecting the surface-life of Christianity, now it had
exploded to the surface to become a serious obstacle to many.
The in-house solutions occasionally provided by past thinkers
to one or another of these questions were now not acceptable,
not radical enough. Unless these problems were successfully
addressed in a manner universally satisfying to all good-
willed persons, the Church and its prospects for unity were
in jeopardy. Certainly, as Leibniz thought, it was the duty
of any good Christian who was fit to the task to attempt such
a project. Leibniz felt fit to the task, and he dutifully
undertook the project, that of "well establishing the truth
of the Christian religion" (Leibniz to Thomas Burnett, Feb.
11, 1697. Gerhardt, v. 3, p. 190).
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In the above cited passage from "The Confession of
Nature Against the Atheists", (p. 175), Leibniz left the
impression that he was initially drawn to, and continued ever
more vigorously doing philosophy, for the sake of defending
the Church and its Revelation. In fact, Leibniz over the
course of his intellectual career had conceived of and was
undertaking a project aimed at establishing revealed theology
as a complete science of Revelation. Though he had no
pretensions of completing this project, he seemed definitely
intent on establishing the project so that others might carry
on after him. The project involved also historical and
jurisprudential research as well as philosophical research;
my interest here is in the philosophical. (It should be
remarked that questions of proper methods of doing history
and of jurisprudence are philosophical questions, while case
studies of law and things like the interpretation of ancient
artifacts are more properly to be considered as
jurisprudential and historical research, respectively.)
The following long but very important citation from a
letter to Thomas Burnett (Feb. 11 , 1697. Gerhardt , 3, pp
.
193-194) testifies to Leibniz's vision of this project. It
sets in order his views on the proper rapport between matters
of faith and matters of reason. Let it serve as well to
dispell any lingering doubts that Leibniz was serious about
his commitment to Christianity. Note that he writes this
letter at the ripe age of 50; he is not writing out of
youthful frivolity.
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Thus thsrefore theological truths and consequences
are of two types: some are of metaphysical
certitude and the others are of moral certitude.
The first presuppose definitions, axioms, and
theorems taken from true philosophy and natural
theology. The second presuppose in part history
and facts, and in part the interpretation of texts.
But to gain proper access to this history and these
texts in order to establish not only the truth and
antiquity of the facts, the genuinity and divinity
of our sacred books; but also the antiquity of the
Church and finally the meaning of the texts; it is
necessary again to have recourse to true philosophy
and in part to natural jurisprudence. In short it
seems that such a work requires not only history
and ordinary theology, but also philosophy,
mathematics, and jurisprudence. Now philosophy has
two parts: theoretical and practical. Theoretical
philosophy is founded on true analysis, of which
mathemeticians give us bits and pieces, but which
one must apply to metaphysics and natural
theology, giving them good definitions and solid
axioms. But practical philosophy is founded in
true topics or dialectic, that is to say, on the
art of estimating degrees of proof, something not
yet found among logician-authors, rather of which
only jurisconsults have given scraps, which are not
to be looked down upon and can serve as a beginning
in forming the science of proofs, which is proper
for verifying historical facts and for giving the
meaning of texts. For the jurisconsults themselves
ordinarily occupy themselves with doing both in
legal proceedings. Thus before one can do theology
by 'method of establishments', as I call it, one
needs first a metaphysics, or demonstrative natural
theology, and one needs also a moral dialectic and
a natural jurisprudence, by which one might learn
demonstratively the manner of estimating degrees of
proof. For many probable arguments brought together
sometimes make a moral certitude, and sometimes
not. One needs therefore a certain method to be
able to determine such a thing. It is often said
and correctly so that reasons don't need to be
counted, but weighed; yet nobody has up to now
given us this scale which should serve to weigh the
force of reasons. It is one of the greatest defects
of our logic, one whose effects we suffer even in
the most important and serious matters of life,
regarding justice, the security and welfare of the
state, the salvation of humans, and even religion.
It has been almost thirty years since I've made
these remarks publicly, and since that time I have
done a great amount of research to lay the
foundation of such a great project. But a thousand
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distractions have impeded me from establishing with
precision these philosophical, juridical and
theological elements that I had projected to
establish. If God gives me some more life and
health, I shall accomplish my main business. I
would still not prove all that one can prove, but I
would prove at least a very important part, in
order to begin the method of establishments, and to
give others the opportunity to go farther still."
This passage shows the Nature of Leibniz ' s commitment to
the truth of Revelation: despite our imperfect grasp of it,
it is true; yet to ascertain its truth is a project requiring
philosophy and the patient consideration of naturally
accessible facts. There can hardly be any question here but
that doctrinal or revealed theology - the science of
inferring doctrines from Revelation (theology by "method of
establishments") - is the goal of Leibniz's thought, with the
eminent suggestion that it is the proper goal of thought; to
which philosophy, the study of history, jurisprudence, etc.
are, at least in the order of intentions, subordinated.
Philosophy is essential to the establishment of the content
of revelation and hence to theology and the faith community.
Philosophy may even be said to "come first" in this sense,
that a firm philosophical foundation must be laid before
theology can be fruitfully and definitively done. But this
philosophizing is done with an eye to supporting revealed
truth. It thus provides not only the goal, but a standard for
philosophy to meet up to.
Evidence That Leibniz Undertook the "Project"
Where did this project ultimately take him? One can cite
the reams of religious authors he claimed to have read, of
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which, by the age of 26 - assuming he was not exaggerating -
he had read 45 "among others", all at least in a
"sufficiently careful manner" if not "extensively" or even
exhaustively (letter to Arnauld, 1671. See Appendix A). One
can examine his correspondences and find that a preponderance
of them regard religious matters. One can cite the theistic
intent of four of his major works - the Monadoloav
. the
Discourse on Metaphysics
. Confessio Philosoohi
. and
especially the Theodicy - let alone so many of his smaller
works - of which I count well over 50 significant ones
written from 1668 to 1715, the breadth of his intellectual
career
.
Keep in mind that according to what he wrote to Burnett
in the long citation above, much of this project is not
explicitly to regard religion, but merely be ordered to it:
establishing a metaphysics, a theory of epistemic
justification, a logical calculus. Keep in mind as well that
another considerable portion of the project is to involve
only natural theology, that is the ascertainment of what we
can know about God by reason alone. So even when Leibniz is
not discussing Revelation or explicitly Christian interests,
this is not evidence that his intent is other than religious.
Finally, Leibniz's virtually lifelong obsession with
reconciling religious divisions, especially those between
Christians, (a preoccupation which dominates his
correspondences), bears further witness to the existence of a
far-reaching apologetic project. With all this in mind, it is
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hard to see how anyone could fail to classify Leibniz as
primarily a religious thinker.
A general survey of Leibniz's writings reveals that he
produced roughly three main kinds of literary works to
directly advance Christian interests in the world:
refutations of objections to, or critiques of writings of
others concerning doctrine; proofs of the possibility of
doctrines; and irenics, or works promoting reconciliation,
usually between Catholics and Protestants or between
Lutherans and Reformed Christians. In the first group belong
for example "Refutatio Hypotheseos Thomae Angli" (1668-9?),
"Defensio Trinitatis contra Wissowatium" (1669), much of his
correspondence with Thomas Burnett (1694-1714), as well as
comments on Bellarmino (1681), on Pellisson's "Reflexions sur
les differends de la Religion" (1692), on the Dutch Dominican
Thomas du Jardin's "Catholycke Bemerkungen" (1710), on
Arsenius Sophianus's "Vernunftige Religion"
,
( 1706 ), and on
Christoph Matthaeus Pfaff's " Dissertatio de Consecratione
Eucharistiae" (August, 1715). Belonging to the second class
of works would be, for example, " De Transsubstantiatione"
(1668?), "De Demonstratione Possibilitatis Mysteriorum
Eucharistiae" (1668?), " Demonstrationuiu Catholicarum
Conspectus"
,
(1668-9), "De Incarnatione"
,
(1669-70?), "De
Possibilitate Gratiae Divinae"
,
(1669-70), "Apologia Fidei
Catholicae ex Recta Rat i one"
,
(1683), "De Revelatione et
Ecclesia"
,
(1685), "De Scriptura Ecclesia Trinitate" (1683-
86?), "De Deo Trino" (? See Grua , p. 179), and "De Persona
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Christ! (? See Grua
, pp . 179-80). In the third group belong
the bulk of his correspondences with Landgraf Ernst von
Hessen-Rheinfels (1680-1693), his Roman Catholic patron;
Jacques Benigne Bossuet, bishop of Meaux (1679-1702), through
he also entered upon an emotional correspondence with
Marie de Brinon on the same topic; Gerhard Wolter Molanus
(1677-1716); Cristobal Rojas y Spinola (1683-4, 1688-95);
Bartolomaeus Des Bosses, S.J. (1706-1716); and others. Also
in this third group belong works such as ” De Religionis
Mutatione et Schismate” (1686?); ''Catalogue des trois decades
des controverses vuidees entre les Catholiques Remains et les
Protestans" (1698); " Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken iiber die
Schrifft genandt [
'
jKurtze Vorstellung der Einigkeit und des
Unterscheids im Glauben beider protestirenden Kirchen[
’
,
written by Daniel Ernst Jablonski]" (1698), which Leibniz
collaborated upon with Molanus; "Sentiment de St. Augustin
sur le purgatoire" (1694); " Tentamen expositiones irenicae
trium potissimorum inter Protestantes contraversiarum"
( 1698); "Bedencken iiber die Vereinigung der Evangelischen und
Reformirten" (1700); and " Ober die Bedingungen fiir eine
mdgliche Reunion" (1700). It is highly probable that there
are other writings of these three kinds hidden among the
considerable unpublished portion of Leibniz's writings. The
collective force of these writings is as a striking testimony
to the religious motivation of their author, lending a
definite sense of his being on a mission such as the one he
delineated to Burnett (p. 175).
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Yet as far as these writings are concerned, the student
of Leibniz the philosopher might argue that though they show
him to have been out to defend and reunite the Church, still
his philosophy proper, i.e. that work of his which does not
consider the Church or its teachings as its explicit subject
matter, was unaffected by all this, or at any rate could be
accurately studied without reference to his religious
convictions and aspirations. After all, the present century
has seen in Bertrand Russell a noted philosopher and anti-war
activist whose philosophy and social activism were by his own
admission unconnected. Nobody would suggest that to
understand Russell's theory of universals one must examine
his pacifism. Isn't it the nature of philosophy as a
discipline to be autonomous in this same kind of way? Isn't
Leibniz's philosophy-proper therefore quite rightfully
separable from his religious writings?
To these two questions I answer: in a sense yes and in a
sense no. I answer "yes" in the following sense: insofar as
philosophy in general and Leibniz's in particular is or
approaches a demonstrative system of propositions based on a
set of core premisses. I answer "no" in the following sense:
insofar as the issue is where the core premisses come from.
Given a set of basic premises, philosophers can make all
kinds of clever derivations which can be evaluated in the
public domain. But when it comes to explaining the basic
premises, there is little consensus on how to proceed.
Therefore in studying a philosophical theory or perspective,
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once we determine its core premisses, we may very well be
disappointed and even confused as to how anyone could
consider them to be basic, or how they were chosen. Sometimes
this frustration leads perhaps wrongly to the conclusion that
the author just had some strange beliefs, period. Other times
it may lead to the conviction that some mistake had been made
by the student and these couldn't be the real founding
premises, assuming that all unusual or counterintuitive
propositions in philosophy must be derived. (I see Leibniz's
philosophy, qua object of study, as a victim of both these
reactions to frustration.) After all, philosophy depends
largely on argument, and argument is supposed to go from what
is conceded to what is disputed. The conviction that some
mistake had been made leads in turn to a renewed attempt to
find the real basic premisses. If the philosophy being
considered is a particularly meticulous one, it may be
possible to repeat this whole activity several times and come
up with varying sets of "axioms" from any one set of which
the whole philosophy is deducible. This is surely the case
with Leibniz (see Introduction, p. 12 ff.).
This kind of scholarship, one which insists on the
conceptual autonomy of philosophy, thus often fails to answer
the question: where does the view in question come
from? Proximately, it comes from a set of core premises which
are assumed, though usually not without controversy, to be
self-evident. But ultimately it comes from wherever the core
premises come from. If these are alleged to have a source
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other than our natural perception, some scholars may consider
it beyond their jurisdiction to explore, leaving the roots of
the view ever a curiosity. But this is a shame. Whose
jurisdiction is it to say where a philosophy ultimately comes
from, if not philosophy's? Even the aforementioned Russell
took it as his duty as a historian of philosophy to consider
socio-political roots of philosophical ideas, (in his A
History ^ Western Philosophy . Simon & Schuster, 1967;
Preface, p. ix.
)
Why not religious roots?
The claim I've been making is that Leibniz's philosophy
has religious roots in that its core premises qua
philosophical are really derived from support from another
alleged source of evidence than philosophy's "native" source
of natural perception, and that this other source is
Revelation. In this section I've defended the claim generally
by trying to establish that he believed in Revelation, that
he held it in a position of primacy over philosophy, and that
his philosophizing and philosophy arose largely as a chief
component of a project to defend Revelation and the Christian
Church. To drive the point home more definitively I propose
in the next section of this chapter to show several key
examples of core propositions of Leibniz's philosophy as
grounded in his religious convictions. Specifically, I hope
to show that the six propositons discussed in Chapter 2 have
their roots in the religious convictions discussed in Chapter
1 .
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The Question of Philosophical Honesty
I cannot end this section without addressing the
following question; is it honest to philosophize subjecting,
as I'm claiming Leibniz did, one's philosophy to a standard
external to it, in his case Revelation? I think most would
agree that one of the main distinctions between real
philosophy and ideology is that the latter has the ulterior
motivation of justifying a set of beliefs, actions,
attitudes, or policies which it unquestioningly accepts as
above its criticism. We normally consider the philosophies of
known idealogues to be suspect and discreditable, if not
downright dishonest, for this very reason. The "philosophers"
of Italian fascism and of German Nazism are not taken
seriously; Heidegger is now held in disrepute by some because
of his apparent acceptance of Hitler's policies.
Philosophy, to the contrary, is supposed to have
priority over all other intellectual enterprises in that it
is within its jurisdiction alone to determine, if it can, the
answers to the basic questions, such as: what kinds of things
can be known, what is necessarily true or false, what kinds
of things are undeniable, and even what the conditions are
for justifiably believing something. Arguably, no knowledge
is had in rigour until and unless the basic philosophical
questions are answered; philosophy doesn't even assume that
they can be answered. How then can one creditably do
philosophy with a preconceived set of "truths" to which
philosophy must be subjected? This question clearly seems to
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take a rhetorical ’*no"
,
in light of which it has been argued
that Christians - or any subscriber to an allegedly divine
revelation - cannot really be philosophers. The reasoning is
that since real "believers" have by definition a bottom-line
commitment both to the facts that divine revelation is
possible and actual and to its content, what they take to be
the divinely revealed truths, it is impossible for them to
philosophize, because to philosophize entails starting out
with no bottom-line assumptions except, perhaps, the most
basic of logical principles.
A common response to this philosophical purism is that
everyone has bottom-line commitments of one kind or another,
and therefore anyone brings to philosophy an external
standard in the form of a set of beliefs philosophy must
agree with. This is a pessimistic response in that while
apparently acquitting the believer /philosopher of being a
sort of ideologue, it does quite the opposite: it makes every
philosopher an ideologue of sorts. If this is a defense of
philosophy against excessive purism, philosophy surely needs
no enemies.
I think there is a better response to that kind of
excessive purism which would disqualify believers from the
ranks of philosophers. It is true that anyone brings to
philosophy some deep convictions, such that if one's
philosophizing conflicted with them, one would tend to
suspect an error in the philosophizing rather than in the
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beliefs. But this does not corrupt the philosophical process
of any person p as long as he accepts:
a. that if p's commitments are true, then philosophy
can yield results that at the very least are
compatible with them;
b. that the more persistently p's philosophizing leads
to conflict with those beliefs, the greater the
probability of the following disjunction:
i. Either p is a bad philosopher or
ii. some of p's commitments are false;
and
c. the more others disinterestedly corroborate p's
philosophical work in varied ways, the less the
probability of i.
Of course, b and c have all the defects of inductive
statements; but the fact is that despite its problems, we all
depend on induction heavily in our thinking. I propose that
we actually depend on it as a way of testing our own
philosophical honesty. It is not dishonest to abandon a line
of reasoning because it conflicts with a deeper conviction.
We very well may make mistakes in our reasonings. What is
dishonest is not to begin to suspect a belief which
persistently flies in the face of apparently sound and
exhaustive philosophical reasoning.
In short, I believe it is quite possible to be a
believer/philosopher at least from the philosophy side. We'd
have to see for each particular set of beliefs if the same is
possible from the believer side - that is, if that belief
system itself prohibits philosophizing. It is an interesting
question to ask of Christianity; one might get differing
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answers from denomination to denomination. I shall not pursue
the matter here, other than to say that just in being a
philosopher-Christian, Leibniz was arguably more in line with
Roman Catholic tradition than with the tradition up to his
time of Martin Luther, noted for his anti-philosophical
stance (cf. W. T. Jones, Hobbes to Hume, Harcourt, Brace, &
World, Inc., 1969, p. 65). See also Leibniz's qualified
acknowledgement of this in Theodicy
. "Preliminary
Dissertation on the Conformity of Faith with Reason", § 12.)
The Roots of Leibniz's Metaphysics in Christian Theology:
The Derivation of Six Propositions
Derivation of Proposition 5: That The Actual World Is the
Best Possible World
It is probably as well known as any fact about Leibniz's
philosophy that he derives his best-possible-world theory
from the proposition that God, the Perfect Being, exists
(Proposition 1, from Chapter 1). Leibniz backs this deduction
by attempting to prove God's existence philosophically. Yet,
although hinting that rigorous philosophical proofs may be
possible, to the chagrin of philosophical purists he at times
conceded that even what he considered his best, the
ontological proof, was not rigorous, and indeed seems never
to have produced a rigorous version (see Leibniz to Eckhart
,
April-June?, 1677. Gerhardt , v. 1, pp. 220-224; and Jalabert,
p. 80). Still more disturbing to the purists is the fact
that the importance of proving God's existence is played down
by him in favor of advocating the presumption of truth "donee
197
probetur contrarium" ("until the contrary be proven") that
belief in God is shown to have via the ontological argument
( ibid.
,
pp. 80-81 ) .
Thus, what initially might have seemed like the makings
of a rigorous natural theology, where God's existence is
first painstakingly established and then other things are
drawn from it, begins to take on a different look. The
theocentricity of Leibniz's philosophy now seems prior to and
autonomous of the proofs. This suggests that he considers the
justification for his theism to come from a source other than
the proofs provided by natural reason. Now Leibniz admitted
only two sources of knowledge: natural perception and
revealed perception. The inference seems to be that Leibniz
felt entitled to believe in God based on God's existence
having been revealed.
If so much is true, then what looked like an exercise in
unrevealed theology, or philosophical theology, now looks
like it may be tied to Revelation. That is why I include
discussion of Proposition 5 in this section.
This should not be taken to mean that Leibniz was a
fideist, or one who denied the importance of reason in
matters regarding religious faith. By his own account, this
was certainly not the case:
"I am very far from credulity. . . . even regarding
the faith. I have held in fact that any amount of
rigour that was surrendered in an affair of such
importance as religion amounted to evasion of
truth." (Letter to Arnauld, 1671; Appendix A.
p. 351.)
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And again:
"But indeed, that religion is suspect which shrinks away
from the very analysis of its terms, which despises
self-examination, and hates [rigorous] philosophy"
( Ibid.
,
p. 344 )
.
The point is rather that natural reason works behind faith,
not before, in supporting it. Faith already has its own
inspired source to justify it, so reason is not required as
if to ratify it. Faith in this sense is belief grounded on
grace; yet whatever belief is grounded in this way can also
be grounded in reason (cf. New Essays
. Bk. IV, Ch. xviii,
p. 497). Its rational grounding may be shown in the form of
its defensibility against attacks, proofs of its possibility,
and occasionally demonstrations. But our failure to
demonstrate its rational grounding in one of these ways shows
nothing against it. Normally, repeated failure to prove
something has the force of a probable argument against it.
But this is so assuming the lack of greater evidence in its
favor. Certainly, if God makes some things known directly to
humans that the limits of their minds prohibit them from
demonstrating on their own - as is alleged of the doctrine
of the Trinity, for example - our inability to demonstrate
those things is insignificant evidence against them in the
face of their having been divinely revealed. And we can still
call upon reason in their defense against attacks.
There is no doubt that Leibniz took the task of
supporting the tenets of faith with the use of reason as
being of dire importance. He spent his life doing this. But
where he failed to achieve the rigour he aimed for as a
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philosopher, he went on to the next point, clearly confident
what he had not quite managed to do was yet feasible,
and comforted by the thought that his work, if lacking in
rigour
,
still advanced the degree of probability in the
tenets of faith from a rational standpoint.
In short, Leibniz's commitment to the existence of God,
the perfect being, should not be considered as resulting from
a dry, rational derivation, but rather as religious in
nature. Yet it stands candidly at the very heart of his
metaphysics, unfortified by the pretensions of philosophical
high rigour . This seems a bit ironic for a philosopher of
the age of enlightenment; and quite in contrast to Descartes,
who, claiming adherence to a rigorously skeptical method,
avowed to have derived God's existence by reason alone. Now
of course, most take Descartes to have failed, and so much of
his philosophy, depending strictly on God's existence, falls
victim to the very skepticism he advocated. Leibniz does not
have this vulnerability, since, although like Descartes, his
philosophy depends largely on the proposition that God
exists, his project was never to construct an independent
edifice of natural reason. He constructed his edifice of
natural reason (metaphysics) from fixed touchpoints with
Revelation, as is witnessed by the following:
"Just as regarding matters of physics there is no
one who does not prefer to trust the observation
of the senses. . . over reasoning by demonstration,
... so too would it be wiser, when reason and
revelation appeared to conflict, to mistrust
reason, rather than make revelation by contorted
interpretation accommodate reason" {"Apologia Fidei
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Catholicae ex Recta Ratione"
,
1679-86?, in Grua
P. 31).
Convinced of the truth of Revelation, he remained quite
confident that proceeding in the manner just described would
reveal the true philosophy, which, though in itself possible
to derive independently, was much easier to construct with
the teleological guide of Revelation (cf. Discourse
. §§ XIX,
XXI, and XXII on helpfulness of teleological method). If he
could sketch out its rough structure, others might be able to
flesh it out later in rigour. In this way, revealed truths
which are also knowable by natural reason, such as the
existence of God, can be held from the start as linchpins of
metaphysics even before being rigorously established by
natural reason. The perfection of metaphysics would of course
have to await the demonstration by natural reason by all that
can be demonstrated; but the lack of perfection would not
halt the sketching out of the true metaphysics.
The roots of Leibniz's best-possible-worlds theory
(Proposition 5) lie in the defense of God's existence, more
specifically in the balanced defense of God's "greatness" and
"goodness"
:
"Theologians of excessive rigor have taken into
account his greatness at the expense of his
goodness, while those of greater laxity have done
the opposite. True orthodoxy would consist in
paying equal respect to both perfections" (A
Vindication qt God's Justice . § 2, 1710. Schrecker
and Schrecker, p. 114).
The greatness of God is His omnipotence combined with his
omniscience; the goodness of God is his omnibenevolence "and
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the perfections which derive from it, namely, his justice and
holiness (Ibid., § 1). The classic theodicean defense, which
Leibniz roughly follows, is this: God's goodness entails that
He wants to create the best thing possible; God's greatness
entails that He knows which is the best and is able to create
it. So God's goodness and greatness seen together entail that
God creates the best creatable thing.
Now for Leibniz the best creatable thing is the "best
possible world". To understand what this means it is
important to grasp, as I see it, three accompanying
assumptions and one stipulation. The stipulation is that a
world is a saturated complex of created substances. Worlds
are saturated in the sense that, respecting the law of non-
contradiction, nothing could be added to them; each is a
creation complete to the minutest detail, with no open
variables (Ibid., p. 116, § 15).
The first assumption can be considered as part of the
common property of traditional Scholastic metaphysics. It is
that created substances can have comparatively more or less
being or perfection (see: On the Ultimate Origination of the
Universe , 1697. Schrecker and Schrecker, p. 86). God can
create a spectrum of substances ranging from very narrow
limits of being, such as lifeless material objects, to very
broad limits, such as immaterial intelligent creatures,
angels. Moreover he can, of course, create diverse complexes
of these; in fact, an "infinite number of combinations and
series of possibles" (ibid.).
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According to the stipulative definition of 'world' and
the first assumption we can see that there are countless
possible worlds, each one either comparatively better, worse
or, until this is ruled out, equal to any particular one of
the others
.
The next two assumptions are particularly Leibnizean.
The second is that possible worlds in the stipulated sense
(call them: 'Leibnizean worlds') are the only candidates
considered for creation. I can find no passage in which this
is explicitly said, but nonetheless Leibniz makes it
abundantly clear that he holds it. The defense of this
assumption must be that somehow creating something other than
a Leibnizean world contradicts God's perfection, namely
either His goodness or greatness. We might go a step further
and say the defense must be that to allow such a possibility
contradicts God's greatness. For the question is not what He
does create, but what He can create, i.e. what candidates He
has to choose from; God's goodness is only at issue with
respect to the choice He actually makes. The only weakness
in this further step is that perhaps Leibniz neglected to
explicitly mention non-Leibnizean-worlds as creation-
candidates simply because he thought his worlds were
categorically the cream of the crop and anything less than a
Leibnizean world, such as - to take it to the extreme - a
creation consisting simply of a pastrami sandwich, was,
though technically a candidate, not worth mentioning for
reasons obvious to him and his perceived audience. This
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second assumption, then, is either to be seen as a
preliminary circumscription of God's creative options,
intended however to honor rather than to dishonor His
greatness; or it is to be seen as a precursory elimination of
candidates which were seen to be prima facie unqualified in a
way that Leibnizean worlds weren't.
The third assumption is that there is a maximal degree
of created goodness which is in principle actualizable
.
Thus there must be a best among possible worlds. This in
combination with the preceding assumptions and stipulation
entails that that world is the actual one:
"From this it is to be concluded that, out of the
infinite number of combinations and series of
possibles, one exists through which a maximum of
essence of possibles is produced into existence"
(On the Ultimate Origination of the Universe . 1697.
Schrecker and Schrecker, p. 86).
As he wrote to Des Bosses (1711):
"In my opinion, if there were no best possible
series, God would have certainly created nothing,
since he cannot act without a reason" (Wiener,
p. 95 ) .
The argument depends on dismissing the option of there
being more than one best no less than there being no best;
there must be only one best, for if there were a tie, God,
being rational, would by definition have no ulterior
criterion for choosing one or the other, so would not create;
for "there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God
which determines Him to select one rather than another
( Monadology , § 53. Montgomery, pp. 262-3). But if
He didn't create nothing would exist other than Him, whereas
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it seems absurd to deny that other things exist. Thus we are
supposedly compelled to rule out the possibility of more than
one best possible world. Similar reasoning rules out there
being no best.
An admission that Leibniz's best-possible-world theory
of creation, represented in Proposition 5, is drawn by him
from his not-quite-rigorously-but-quite-religiously based
commitment to the existence of God, the perfect being, is not
tantamount to an admission that it is properly so drawn. I
question the legitimacy of his derivation, and my problems
with it relate especially to the second but also to the third
assumption. This matter is treated in Chapter 4.
The connection between God and the best possible world
is seen to be even more intimate when Leibniz's metaphysical
essentialism is taken into account: the view that essence is
metaphysically prior to existence. (For an initial discussion
of Leibniz's metaphysical essentialism, see Chapter 1, p. 46
ff. See also p. 321 ff.) The following excerpt from an early
untitled work (undated. Gerhardt
,
v. 7, pp. 19-20)
illustrates this intimate connection, in a way almost
suggesting emanationism
:
"[Since necessary being exists] there is therefore
a cause why existence prevails over non-existence,
to wit: necessary being is the existentif ier
{ Existentifleans)
.
But the cause which makes it be
the case that something exists, that is that
possibility claims existence, makes it be the case
as well that every possible has an exertion toward
existence, since a reason restricting the field
to certain possibles cannot be found. In this sense
it can be said that every possible is-for-existing
( existurire ) , namely in that it is founded in the
Being existing by necessary act, without which
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there is no way in which possibles might make it
into act.
"However from this it does not follow that all
possibles exist; this would rightly follow if all
possibles were compossible. But since some are
incompatible with others, it follows that some
possibles don't make it into existence. Some in
fact are incompatible with others, not only with
respect to the same time, but also with respect to
the entire universe, since future things are
involved in present things. Meanwhile from the
conflict among all possibles competing for
existence it at once follows that that series of
things exists by which the most exists, i.e. the
greatest of all possible series." (Textual
numbering scheme omitted in translation.)
The picture painted here is that creation happens in the
following manner. Possibilities, which already are just by
the existence of a being capable of actualizing them, also
have by the same fact a demand or exertion to exist in
proportion to how much reality is in them to be actualized.
From here the determination of what actually exists is almost
geometrical. Since not all possibilities can coexist - some
are mutually exclusive - the greater possibilities outcompete
the lesser ones so as to bring into act the maximum amount of
being. Thus the necessary being's very act of existing brings
about the existence of the best possible world.
This almost sounds like emanationism - a theory
Christian doctrine opposes - according to which finite
existence flows necessarily from God's nature. Leibniz no
doubt didn't want to appear an emanationist , and his
commitment to Christian doctrine suggests that he was not
one. Yet it is tough to decide whether this excerpt
expresses emanationism. To be sure, in other places he makes
it clear that creation proceeds from God's will, not His
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nature
.
But he also stresses that God's will is perfectly
determined by His nature; His perfection entails that He
wills the best (possible world).
It is not hard to imagine why Leibniz ran into
(difficulties with this position. If His will is determined
by His nature, then indirectly so is everything the will
determines. This may not yet be emanationism, but it seems to
come close. The defense of Leibniz is that the best possible
world is not strictly a necessity because alternative worlds
are possible. Unfortunately this response has the appearance
of begging the question. What is at issue is exactly whether
in light of God's perfection other "possible" worlds are
really possible. The strict test of possibility is non-
contradiction; but doesn't assuming the existence of another
possible world other than the best lead to a contradiction,
namely that the perfect being is imperfect? Consider the
following definition of "existing thing" that Leibniz
offered: "that which is compossible with the most perfect
being" Definitiones"
,
1683-94?, in Grua
,
p. 325). According
to this, only actual things are compatible with the existence
of God, the necessarily existent. It is difficult to see in
what meaningful sense that can be considered possible which
is incompatible with the existence of the necessary being.
It might be argued that a substance's possibility has
only to do with the coherence of its notion. Thus something
would be possible if it is not self-contradictory; but in
determining if a notion is self-contradictory, necessary
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truths not exclusive to that notion may be legitimately used:
all the theorems and principles of logic, to say the least.
This puts us in a bind: if we make use of the proposition
that God exists, nothing but actual things turn out not
leading to contradiction, since anything non-actual is by
definition according to Leibniz incompatible with God's
existence, not to mention with that of the best possible
world. On the other hand, if we categorically refrain from
making use of the theistic proposition in doing our
possibility tests, we have to say why this necessary truth is
out of play while the others aren't. Arguably that God exists
is not a logical truth; does Leibniz insist we must confine
ourselves to logical truths among necessary truths when we
are determining whether something is possible? I think not.
Leibniz certainly gave loose rein to some metaphysical
principles, such as the principle of sufficient reason. It is
difficult to see any other justification for suspending the
reference to God's existence in any proof or test, if in fact
it is a metaphysically necessary proposition.
Another question Leibniz's essentialism causes to arise
is how, by the competition of individual possibles, the best
possible world infallibily results. If the competition is
indeed individual
,
the whole intent is to gain entry into the
actual world. To be sure, we have to think of this as
perfectly simultaneous, not a one-by-one sorting procedure.
Yet it is conceivable that a world would result which
contains the best individuals crammed to capacity, and still
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not be the best world. Maybe the best world has a variety
between great and small, incidentally including some lesser
beings to the exclusion of some greater ones. Leibniz's
response to this is that each substance God considers is
complete in concept, so as to include reference, albeit
vague, to the whole world it would exist in. The upshot of
this is that possible substances have built-in world
designation; each substance is compatible with exactly one
world, so if you choose one substance, you must choose the
entire world that goes with it. As a result, the ultimate
competitors for actuality are not individual substances, but
worlds. And in a competition of worlds there can be only one
winner: the best.
Derivation of Proposition 6: That Teleological Explanation Is
an Indispensible Key for Revealing the Sufficient Reason of
Things
I propose that in Leibniz's thought. Proposition 6 draws
its support ultimately from Proposition 1: that God, the
perfect being, exists. The general idea is that because God
exists, we can understand every existing thing as existing
because it conforms to God’s perfect creative purpose, which
is the best possible world, and every possible but non-
existing thing as not existing because it fails to conform to
God's purpose. Moreover, God's existence not only makes
sense of the principle of sufficient reason, that nothing is
without sufficient reason for its being exactly as it is; but
also provides the key to the sufficient reason of things: the
criterion of conformity to the best possible world.
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There is some controversy in the claim just made that
ought to be pinpointed. Certainly it is not controversial to
subordinate teleology to a belief in God's existence. It is
difficult to find anywhere an atheistic or even agnostic
natural philosophy that is teleological. That everything has
a purpose which serves in explaining its reality strongly
suggests that there is a being responsible for ordering
things according to purpose. What is controversial is to
subordinate the principle of sufficient reason to the
proposition that God exists, or to claim that Leibniz did so.
Normally proofs of God's existence proceed from an initial
concession, implicit or explicit, to the principle of
sufficient reason and go on to the conclusion that God
exists. Leibniz himself once wrote that "the existence of God
cannot be demonstrated without this principle" Conversatio
cum domino Episcopo Stenonio de libertate”
,
Nov. 27, 1677.
Handschriften
.
Ch. IV, v. IV, No. 3, B1 . 12, p. 73). How can
this not rule out the subordination of the principle of
sufficient reason to the existence of God? It seems that we
would be left with a vicious circle: God's existence is
supported by the principle of sufficient reason, which in
turn is subordinate to God's existence.
It is difficult at times to definitively decide on
claims of circularity, since a proposition may be basic in
one sense and not in another. For example, Descartes
accepted the proposition 'I exist' as basic, in the sense
that I cannot fail to believe it on its own merits. Yet in
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another sense it is not basic: it is not necessary that I
exist. Other people might reasonably doubt my existence.
Circularity is inconsistency in the priority order of a
set of beliefs. Some beliefs may be basic, held on their own
merits, while others may be deduced from more basic ones. It
is invalid to justify belief A by belief B, then justify the
latter by the former; this would entail the contradiction
that A is more basic than B and B is more basic than A. But
sometimes a system of thought may only apparently have
circularity. The reason is that, as I've just illustrated,
an order of priority for beliefs may hold for one perspective
and not another, whereas it is not untypical to jump from one
perspective to another. Of particular concern are two
perspectives philosophers jump betweeen. Aristotle expressed
it as follows:
"Now 'prior' and 'better known' are ambiguous
terms, for there is a difference between what is
prior and better known in the order of being and
what is prior and better known to man." ( Posterior
Analytics , Bk. 1: Ch . 2, 71b-72a. McKeon, p. 112.)
Thomas Aquinas later developed this into the distinction
between the "quoad nos" (to-us) and "quoad se" (in-itself)
perspectives. What is most prior quoad nos are principles
self-evident to us; what is most prior quoad se are
principles self-evident in themselves. If God, the necessary
being, exists, then certainly that He exists must be a
principle quoad se, for the very conception of Him entails
His existence; this does not mean that it is a principle
quoad nos, since it may be far from self-evident to us, not
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having inunediat© acc©ss to a suffici©ntly cl©ar and distinct
conc©ption of Him, that H© ©xists.
In short, I am claiming that L©ibniz subordinat©d not
only t©l©ology but also th© principl© of suffici©nt r©ason to
th© ©xist©nc© of God; y©t L©ibniz also s©©m©d to agr©© that
us© of th© principl© of suffici©nt r©ason is indisp©nsabl© in
proving God's ©xist©nc©. This looks lik© th© makings of a
cas© for circularity against L©ibniz. To d©f©nd L©ibniz, it
would hav© to b© shown that th© support suffici©nt r©ason
giv©s to God's ©xist©nc© is according to a diff©r©nt
p©rsp©ctiv© than that according to which, as I am claiming,
L©ibniz draws support for th© principl© of suffici©nt r©ason
from God's ©xist©nc©, just as in a s©ns© th© proposition 'I
am.' is basic, and in a s©ns© not. This matt©r will b©
r©turn©d to shortly.
Teleology Derived from Theism - The less controversial
matter is to show that th© proposition that teleology is
indispensable has its roots in a theistic commitment. It is
hard to imagine teleology without such roots. Accordingly,
most of Leibniz's direct discussion of teleology, th© science
of things according to purpose, is theistic. Observe how the
Discourse starts out:
"1. Concerning the divine perfection and that God
does everything in the most desirable way.
"2. Against those who hold that there is in the
works of God no goodness, or that the principle of
beauty are arbitrary.
"3. Against those who think that God might have made
things better than he has." (from a letter to Count
Ernst, Feb. 1, 1686. Montgomery, p. 68.)
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The implication is that the actual world is the best possible
c^®^bion because of God's perfection. By inference, anything
in the actual world should be studied according to the key of
its being in conformity with the best possible world, and
anything possible but not actual should be studied according
to the key of its not being in conformity with the best
possible world.
It may be wondered to what extent this kind of study
leads to knowledge, even if the perfect being does exist.
Leibniz was not a skeptic on this point:
"As regards the ends which God proposed to himself,
I am convinced that we can know them and that it
is of the greatest usefulness to investigate them.
In general whenever we realize that a certain
thing renders some eminent services we can safely
affirm that this, among others, was the end
intended by God when he created that thing."
("Critical Remarks Concerning Descartes'
Principles", on § 28. Schrecker and Schrecker,
pp. 30-31)
Back to the Discourse at XIX., Leibniz continues to argue
the centrality of teleology or reasoning by final cause,
still referring to God:
"I bring no accusation against our new philosophers
who pretend to banish final causes from physics,
but I am nevertheless obliged to avow that the
consequences of such a banishment appear to me
dangerous, especially when joined to that position
which I refuted at the beginning of this treatise.
That position seemed to go the length of discarding
final causes entirely as though God proposed no end
and no good in his activity, or as if good were not
the object of his will. I hold on the contrary that
it is therein [in final causes] where the principle
of all existences and of the laws of nature must be
sought, because God always proposes the best and
most perfect." (Erdmann, v. II, p. 825. Montgomery,
pp. 33-4 followed in part.)
213
Not only does this passage make clear that Leibniz thought
both that teleology is essential to gaining a true
understanding of things and that it accepts God's existence
as a given, i.e. as more basic; it also suggests something
stronger: that the most fundamental understanding of things
is to be gained by teleology or the study of final causes.
This points in the direction of saying that the sufficient
reason for things, especially for existents, is revealed by
teleology
.
Sufficient Reason a Derived Principle? This passage from
the Monadoloqy expresses the connection Leibniz sees between
teleology, sufficient reason, and God's existence:
"53. Now as there are an infinity of possible
universes in the Ideas of God, and but one of them
can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for
the choice of God which determines him to select
one rather than another.
"54. And this reason is only to be found in the
fitness or in the degree of perfection which these
worlds possess, each possible thing having the
right to claim existence in proportion to the
perfection which it involves.
"55. This is the cause for the existence of the
greatest good; namely that the wisdom of God
permits him to know it, his goodness causes him to
choose it, and his power enables him to produce
it." (Montgomery, pp. 262-3. Emphasis mine.)
In short, Leibniz is saying that the sufficient reason
for existence is fitness; now fitness is a teleological
notion: the fittest world is the best, the one which conforms
to God's purpose. This suggests that the sufficient reason of
things cannot be expressed or discovered outside of a
teleological framework. This establishes a sense in which
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suffici©nt ir©ason is subordinat© to teleology, and through
the latter to God's existence.
Yet it is far from clear how significant this
subordination is, whether we can infer from it that Leibniz's
commitment to God's existence is more basic than his
commitment to the principle of sufficient reason.
Subordination of the latter to the former can be in either of
the following senses:
i. quoad nos: God's existence is more clear to us
than the principle of sufficient reason; our
natural disposition to believe in God is stronger
than that to believe in sufficient reason.
ii. quoad se: God's existence is more basic in
itself; the principle of sufficient reason
cannot stand theoretically justified without
admitting God's existence.
It surely doesn't seem that i is true, nor that Leibniz
intended it; otherwise it would surely be inappropriate to
support God's existence with the principle. I think ii stands
a better chance of being the sense Leibniz intended,
while probably the converse of i is true, namely that the
principle of sufficient reason is more clear to us.
To complicate matters is the following admission by
Leibniz
:
"One of my great principles is that nothing happens
without reason. This is a principle of philosophy.
Still, in the end, it is nothing else than the
avowal of divine wisdom, although I don't mention
it at the outset." ( Handschriften , Ch. IV, v. I,
No. 4, Bl. 39, p. 58. Undated and untitled.)
I take this to express something close to what is expressed
in ii, above; that to accept the principle of sufficient
215
reason as known or justified is tantamount to admitting to
God's existence.
Having just considered another claim by Leibniz to the
effect that God's existence cannot be demonstrated without
the principle of sufficient reason, one is hard-pressed to
refrain from accusing Leibniz of circularity. At one moment
he suggests that the principle of sufficient reason is more
basic, at another moment he hints that the proposition that
God exists is at least as basic, if not more so. Our best
chance to acquit Leibniz of this charge is to somehow show
that the Aristotelian-Thomist ic perspectival distinction
applies
.
This is how I think Leibniz's reasoning works. He begins
with his version of the ontological argument, which he takes
to establish not that God exists but that belief in God is
justified (on this see also New Essays
.
v. IV, Ch. x,
p. 438), and upon it supports the principle of sufficient
reason. Then he uses sufficient reason to demonstrate God's
existence along a posteriori lines. This would clear him of
circularity, since the initial argument justifying belief in
God does not employ the principle of sufficient reason.
Subsequently the principle of sufficient reason is justified
by the legitimately presumed existence of God, which the
initial argument permits to us; and finally, the
independently justified principle of sufficient reason is
employed to demonstrate God's existence from other evidence
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more clear to us. This is not circular, given the change
in perspective from quoad se to quoad nos.
This thinking can be characterized more vividly as
follows
:
1. The idea of God contains existence. Therefore if
God is possible, He exists.
2. The only way for something not to be possible is if
its idea is inconsistent, such as the idea of a
round square.
3. We are theoretically entitled to believe in the
possibility of anything, until it is shown or it is
clear that it is not possibile, i.e. that its idea
is inconsistent.
4. It hasn't been shown nor is it clear that the idea
of God is inconsistent.
C5. We are theoretically entitled to believe that God
is possible ( 2 , 3 , 4 )
.
C6. We are theoretically entitled to believe that God
exists ( 1 , 5 ) .
7. God exists (Justified assumption, C6).
8. We are naturally very disposed to believe the
principle of sufficient reason.
9. If God exists, the principle of sufficient reason
has decisive theoretical support.
10.
We are theoretically entitled to accept as
certainly true anything we are naturally very
disposed to believe which has decisive theoretical
support
.
Cll. We are theoretically entitled to accept as
certainly true the principle of sufficient reason
(7, 8, 9, 10).
12. The principle of sufficient reason is true
(Justified assumption, Cll).
13. God's existence is demonstrable a posteriori if and
only if the principle of sufficient reason is true.
C14. God's existence is demonstrable a posteriori
(12, 13).
But why should we grant a presumption of truth to God's
existence, in virtue of the ontological proof given above in
1-7? As Jalabert explains (p. 81), to show an idea
consistent, and therefore a substance possible, is, strictly
speaking, impossible. The only thing we can prove directly is
inconsistency or contradiction. Consistent ideas are never
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deductively proven consistent, but rather over time
inductively, by the persistent failure to of an inconsistency
proof to come to mind. A criticism of this might be that the
only ideas we are entitled to inductively presume consistent
are those which are clearly and distinctly grasped, whereas
the idea of God is not so grasped. Leibniz's response to this
was that consistency is itself the mark identifying clear and
distinct grasping of an idea, so the latter cannot be used as
a condition for identifying the former. (Ibid., pp . 79-80.)
Lest it be thought that the principle of sufficient
reason is being treated too lightly and deserves to be
considered as an absolutely basic principle, it should be
noted that, like the principle of the identity of
indiscernibles
,
it has a trivially basic logical application
which tends to get confused with the more theory-laden
metaphysical application we have been discussing. The
following passage may serve to illustrate the principle's
trivial application:
"For the existence [of a thing] all of its
necessary conditions (requisita) must be present
in being. A necessary condition is that without
which a thing cannot exist; the aggregate of all
its necessary conditions is the full cause of the
thing. Nothing exists without reason. For nothing
exists without the aggregate of all its necessary
conditions." ("I>e Existentia”
.
Grua, p. 267 )
I consider this to be suggestive of a trivial version of the
principle of sufficient reason because no mention is yet made
of what the necessary conditions are. We would all have to
admit that things have necessary conditions all of which must
be satisfied for the thing to exist. Controversy only arises
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when we try to identify the necessary conditions for
existence
.
Leibniz remained skeptical regarding actual attempts at
a definitive version of the a priori (ontological) proof (see
Leibniz-Eckhard correspondence, especially Eckhard to
Leibniz, 4-9-1677 and Leibniz's reply. Gerhardt
,
v. 1, Nos.
Ill and IV, pp. 215-224). Nevertheless, his claim that it is
impossible to prove that God exists without recourse to the
principle of sufficient reason ought, I believe, be
interpreted as relative to the more common a posteriori kinds
of demonstration (motion, efficient cause, design, etc.) His
preference for the a priori proof, if a definitive version
could be found, compared to his relative deemphasis on the a
posteriori proofs (Jalabert, p.69), indicates that the former
occupies the crucial position in his philosophy that the
characterization on page 217 illustrates.
Derivation of Proposition 7: That the Substance of a Body Is
Not Its Extension, but Its Active Principle
I propose that Leibniz's commitment to this proposition,
so central to his philosophy, comes out of a prior commitment
to Propositions 2 and 3, discussed in Chapter 1: the doctrine
of Real Presence, and the conviction that the Lutheran and
Catholic (and perhaps even Calvinist) accounts of the
Eucharist are compatible in their most important tenets.
This theological derivation has been suggested
elsewhere. In his work, Le Dialogue Irenigue Bossuet-
Leibniz
.
Francois Gaqu^re declares:
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Th© study of Catholic dogma, of Transubstant iat ion
and of the Lutheran dogma of Real Presence
conducted [Leibniz] to a conception of substance
consisting... in force, in opposition to that of
Descartes which consisted in extension." (p. 28.)
The general idea is that if we follow the then popular
conception of substance advocated by Descartes, that the
substance of body consists in extension, the doctrines of
Real Presence, Transubstant iation
,
etc. appear absurd, since
they entail the following propositions undigestible by
Cartesian metaphysics:
1. A body can be really present in a place where
its own proper extension is lacking (from Real
Presence ) ;
2. The extension of a body can be present where the
body itself is substantially lacking (from
Transubstant iat ion )
;
3. A body can have substantial presence through an
extension that is not proper to it (from Real
Presence, Tran- and Consubstantiation )
.
As this line of thinking goes, if any of these metaphysical
underpinnings of Eucharistic doctrine are true, the Cartesian
view of substances is false. Leibniz accepted the
antecedent, so he accepted the consequent and searched for
another conception of substance which was compatible with the
Eucharist
.
In the meantime he was also motivated by a desire for
Christian unity, and like other irenists of his time was
convinced that the doctrinal disputes to some extent were
semantic (see Eisenkopf, p. 139). This motivation led him to
look for a conception of substance which would reconcile
doctrinal disputes regarding the Eucharist, especially but
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not exclusively those between Lutherans and Roman Catholics.
What resulted was of course his conception of a substance as
unified not by extension but by a principle of force or
activity, which is itself immaterial. This would scjuare well
with Eucharistic doctrine and in fact cjo far in dissolvincf
doctrinal disputes between Christian sects. Another result,
as suggested in several of the citations in this section and
throughout Leibniz's writings on the Eucharist, is Leibniz's
ant i -Cartesian ism
.
I believe to have already established in Chapter 1 that
Leibniz had the theological commitments referred to in this
section, and in Chapter 2 that Leibniz held that the
substance of any body is its principle of activity. The point
here is to show that and how the latter is generated from the
former, as from accepted truths.
Textual Evidence - It is really not difficult to prove
that this is how things happened, since he recounted the same
several times. The main confession of his being up to such a
project is contained in his early letter to Arnauld (1671):
i. "It remains that I speak of the Eucharist. It has
been four years... since I have been reflecting on
the following problem: how to explain the
possibility of the mysteries of the Eucharist....
And this, happily, I seem to myself to have finally
accomplished. . . . When it was first grasped by me
both that the essence of body does not consist in
extension, as Descartes thought -a great man
otherwise, without a doubt - but in motion, and
that therefore the substance of body, that is, its
nature -and this agrees even with Aristotle's
definition -is its principle of motion... and yet
also that the principle of motion, the substance,
of a body lacks extension; at that time it appeared
most clearly why substance differed from its
appearances, and the method was discovered by which
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God can be clearly and distinctly conceived to
bring it about that the substance of the same body
be in many scattered places, or, what is the same,
under many appearances (species). In fact, this
also will be shown -something which has not
occurred to anybody
-Transubstantiation and Real
Multipresence do not differ in the final analysis.
Nor can a body otherwise be able to be in many
scattered places but that its substance be
conceived as given under various appearances. The
substance of the body by itself is not in fact
subject to extension and not, consequently, subject
to the conditions of space.... Nor therefore does
Transubstantiation, as expressed in cautious
phraseology by the Council of Trent, and as
elucidated by me in accordance with Doctor Thomas,
contradict the Augsburg Confession
. On the
contrary, the former follows from the latter."
(Appendix A, pp . 349-50.)
Earlier during the same year he wrote, in " Demonstratio
Possibilitatis Mysteriorum Eucharistiae" :
ii. "having worked for a time at demonstrating the
possibility of Real Presence, in accomplishing the
same task I came, beyond my expectations, upon
Transubstantiation; indeed I found that
Transubstantiation and Real Presence contain one
another in intimate, ultimate analysis" ( SSB . VI 1,
p. 516).
Another significant mention of his Eucharist-pro ject comes
in "On True Method in Philosophy and Theology", (c. 1686):
iii. " [ Alppearance differs from substance: there is
nothing repugnant about polytopia nor even
metousiasmon. For, as might seem astonishing,
consubstantiation of bodies resolves into
transubstantiation, and whoever claims the body is
given under the bread unknowingly asserts the
bread's substance to be destroyed with its
appearance remaining. The latter is confessed by
those who have come to understand the true and
inevitable notion of substance." (Gerhardt, v. 7,
no. XIV, p. 327. See also Wiener, pp. 58-65.)
Definitions - In these three citations are thrown
around a small array of theological technical terms: Real
Presence, Transubstantiation, Consubstantiation, Real
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Multipresence; as well as two metaphysical terms of unknown
origin: polytopia and metousiasmon; and mention of the
Council of Trent and the Augsburg Confession
. l refer the
reader to the preliminary discussion of these terms in
Chapters 1 and 2, as indicated. Here I simply provide
cursory definitions or descriptions sufficing to illustrate
the connection Leibniz claims to be making between them by
means of his conception of substance.
Real Presence: (P. 50 ff.) The doctrine that the body
(RP) and blood of Christ are substantially
present in the elements of the
Eucharist. Both Catholics and
Lutherans subscribe to this, but
occasionally the term was used to
indicate Lutheran Eucharistic doctrine
as opposed to Catholic
Transubstantiation
.
Transubstantiation
:
(P. 50 ff.) The doctrine, subscribed
(T) to by the Council of Trent . that in
consecration of the elements of the
Eucharist
:
i. the substance of the bread and wine
cease to exist while their
appearance continues; and
ii. the Real Presence takes effect
through the elements.
Consubstantiation
:
(P. 50 ff.) The doctrine, subscribed
(C) to by Lutherans which differs with
Transubstantiation only in insisting
that consecration does not bring about
the substantial annihilation of the
bread and wine, but the union of the
body and blood of Christ with the bread
and wine.
Real Multipresence: (P. 94 ff.) Never defined by Leibniz
(RM) and not often referred to; the context
suggests RM denotes a Lutheran position
opposed by Catholics. Lutherans
accepted the notion that Christ's
heavenly body is present "at one time
in many places" in the Eucharist
223
Elements of
the Eucharist:
Consecration
:
Polytopia:
Metousiasmon:
Council of Trent:
(CT)
Augsburg Confession :
ihC)
( Formula of Concord
. 1577, VII,
Antithesis 11; later comprised in The
Book of Concord
,
1580) while Catholic
authority is opposed to this, insisting
that the Real Presence is not the
Presence of Christ's body. (See The
Catechism of the Council of Trent, "The
Meaning of Transubstantiation" pp. 238-
240.) This is my guess of what RM
refers to.
The objects of consecration, which
undergo whatever transformation
consecration imparts on them, starting
from bread and wine.
The ritual, more or less following some
compilation of the words and actions of
Jesus at the Last Supper and the words
of St. Paul, which is believed to
summon a miraculous intervention by God
in which the elements, as proponents of
Real Presence believe, are transformed
into the body and blood of Christ.
(P. 94 ff.) The state of one substance
being physically present in more than
one discontiguous location
simultaneously
.
(P. 94 ff.) The change of something
from one substance into another; the
genus of which Transubstantiation is an
instance
.
A Roman Catholic council, begun in
1545 and completed in 1564, to define
Catholic orthodoxy on issues challenged
by reformers, especially Protestant
reformers. In the Council the doctrine
of Transubstantiation was officially
declared as well as an anathema against
subscribers to Consubstantiation
.
The first conciliar document or
"symbol" officially defining the
Lutheran theological stance (1530),
making up a part of what is now known
as The Book of Concord (1580). In the
Confession the doctrine of Real
Presence is upheld, while it is unclear
whether Tran- or Consubstantiation is
supported
.
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Principle-of
-Activity
Theory of Substance: (P. 98 ff.) The proposition that the
( ) substance of any body is its principle
of activity.
The Main Reconciliatory Work of Proposition 7 - In each
ii/ and iii, Leibniz makes claims about the work that
PA does both in supporting the possibility of the Eucharistic
mysteries and in dissolving the differences between accounts
of the Eucharist thought to be in mutual conflict.
In i Leibniz makes three such claims:
a. PA supports the possibility of RP.
b. PA collapses the difference between
T and RM.
c. PA shows that the portion of hC regarding
the Eucharist entails T.
In ii he makes the further claim:
d. By PA, T and RP are mutually entailing.
Finally, in iii he asserts:
e. By PA, C is a cryptic version of T; if PA is true
any confessor to C is unwittingly confessing to T.
We can simplify these into the following four propositions:
a'. PA is compatible with RP.
(b & d)'. If PA, then RP, T, and RM are mutually entailing,
c'. If PA, then ^ entails T.
e'. IF PA, then C entails T.
a' appears to be the first proposition of the four that
Leibniz discovered. It is in a sense most basic; it supports
belief as opposed to unbelief in the Eucharist, whereas the
others (implicitly, i.e. in their consequents) take belief in
the Eucharist for granted. Not that a' proves RP or even its
possibility. Even if PA is conceded to be true, compatibility
with it is not a criterion for truth, for many falsehoods are
compatible with truths. It is not incompatible with the fact
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that I ate grapes today that I did so yesterday, though I
didn't. Moreover, something which is not possible may be
compatible with some truth, at least in the restricted sense
that the particular truth gives us no additional leverage for
proving the thing's impossibility. Nonetheless, we can say a
doctrine is supported when a plausible metaphysics is
proposed which allows us to envision the doctrine's own
plausibility. The currency of the Cartesian view of
substance, as Leibniz often lamented, tended to convince
people of the implausibility of the Eucharist, despite
acrobatic attempts by Descartes and other Cartesians to
reconcile with it (see Pellisson to Leibniz, Oct. 23, 1691:
"I have many Cartesian friends who have not ceased being
quite good Catholics; they explain themselves according to
their manner, but it is true that the opinion of their
founder is not fit for bringing an understanding of this
marvel [the Eucharist] to those who lack it"; see also
Leibniz's "On True Method in Philosophy and Theology", 1686:
"Once when compelled to speak on the Eucharist, he
[Descartes] substituted apparent species for real ones,
reinvoking a doctrine repudiated by consensus among all
theologians." Gerhardt, v. 7, No. XIV, p. 326). Leibniz's
theory of substances supported the Eucharist by providing a
way around the obstacle Cartesianism presented.
If the substance of a body is its immaterial principle
of activity, that opens the door for discontiguous real
extensions being substantially one: provided that they are
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governed by the numerically same immaterial principle, a
"soul or something like it", then they are the same
substance. My hand is me no less than my nose is me; what
Leibniz's notion allows for is to say that it is not
impossible for something not contiguous with what is normally
considered to be my body to be just as much me as the
"main" me. This paves a straight path to envisioning Real
Presence, where the consecrated elements are supposed to be
just as much Christ as is Christ's heavenly body. We should
be reminded that an immaterial principle is not literally
contained in a place; local containment is only proper to
something material. Rather it is present in a physical
extension by virtue of its being its active principle, its
vital organizing force. By this view it could not be said
that only part of me is substantially in my finger; for as
Leibniz at length argues, the immaterial principle is not
divisible; only bodies are divisible; my soul is therefore
completely present in each body part.
Part of the consequent of (b & d)', that RP entails T,
looks as if it favors Roman Catholic at the expense of
Lutheran theology, while another (implied) part of the
consequent, that RP entails RM, looks as if it favors
Lutheran at the expense of Catholic theology - albeit this
connection is made through T, which Lutherans don t accept.
Regarding the former, indeed the theologians of Trent argued
the same, although in a different way than Leibniz (The
Catechism of the Council of Trent , p. 236). Regarding the
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latter, Lutherans felt commitment to RP compels us to assert
that Christ s body is not bound within the limits of heaven,
while Catholics insisted that Christ's heavenly body is not
involved in RP.
In Leibniz's eyes, the effect of his notion of substance
upon these doctrines is to make them all amount to
essentially the same thing. That same thing is the multiply
transubstantiated substance of Christ. RP has Christ becoming
really present within what was bread and wine. By PA that
means Christ becomes the principle of activity of the
elements. Whatever principles of activity were initially in
the elements causing them to be bread and wine are now
subsumed under Christ's own principle, just as a brain cell's
principle of activity is subsumed under the animal's
principle. The brain cell is considered to be under the
control of a higher principle of activity; we don't say that
besides the animal, there is the brain cell. This being the
case, we don't consider the bread and wine to be any longer
substantially present, but subsumed. To be sure, the bread
and wine were never substances metaphysically, but they were
certain aggregates of substances. The principle of activity
of the substances of these aggregates don't have to be
annihilated for T to take place; T only requires that the
bread and wine cease to exist substantially, and that can
happen by subsumption. Another analogy is eating. Part of
what I eat gets subsumed by my organism. Yet I am not made of
applesauce and pomegranates. Stuff once in those things are
228
now in me, but having been consumed, those things cease to
®xist, since the stuff of them is now under" another principle
of activity. For Leibniz, this would be true even without
annihilating the principles of the subsumed substances. Hence
RP can only happen by T.
The next point is that to admit T (or RP) is an implicit
admission of RM. In the Eucharist through T, Christ becomes
bodily present in many places at the same time. Nothing
prohibits us from concluding that Christ's body is present in
many places at the same time. Now to be the body of x is
simply to be an extension whose principle of activity is x.
In this sense 'body' is almost a collective term: my hand is
my body, my sperm is my body, my lungs are my body, etc.
Moreover, contiguity has no essential significance by this
definition, so no preference is given to a bigger chunk of
body over a smaller one as being more truly the body, nor for
one part over the other for any other reason. So just as it
doesn't make sense to say that my hand is unrelated to my
leg, since they are extensions sharing the same principle of
activity, so too it doesn't make sense to say that Christ's
heavenly body is unrelated to Real Presence. That Christ does
not feel the sensation of being bit whenever the Eucharist is
consumed does not entail non-relation, but simply a different
function being carried out by the principle of activity in
one part of the collective embodiment than in another. The
Real Presence is only separated from Christ's heavenly body
in that the two are discontiguous; but contiguity is no
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condition for bodily relation according to PA. Hence, we say
that in a sense Christ's body is reproduced without excluding
his heavenly body for any special reason. But the sense in
which we say his body is reproduced is a collective one: his
principle of activity covers more extension through the
Eucharist
.
A footnote to the last paragraph is that 'Real
Multipresence' is a misleading term. One would think Leibniz
would have been opposed to any version of RM to the effect
that Christ himself is reproduced; for his soul or principle
of activity remains one and never gets multiplied. The
question of entailment in the other direction is less of an
issue. Certainly, T entails RP, since it presupposes RP in
being a manner of explaining how RP happens. On the other
hand, RM entails T, since the only way for Christ to become
really present in many different instances of bread and wine
is for his principle of activity to subsume them,
substantially eliminating them.
The puzzle about c', namely that PA surprisingly allows
AC to entail T, is that ^ never seems to take a stand
against T in the first place. Interestingly enough,
AC speaks very briefly on the Eucharist, or Lord's Supper,
making only the following pronouncement on it:
"It is taught among us that the true body and blood
of Christ are really present in the Supper of our
Lord under the form of bread and wine and are
there distributed and received." (Article X,
German edition. Tappert , p. 34.)
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This is clearly an affirmation of RP, but indicates no
preference between C and T. For here it is unclear whether by
"form' is meant something accidental or something
substantial. In the former case we have a straightforward
confession of RP, and may refer to the derivation discussed
above, from RP to T assuming PA. In the latter case, Article
X expresses RP and C; in this case we may till refer to the
discussion of e' below for the derivation of T from C
assuming PA and thus avoid conflict.
In fact, the first Lutheran statement in opposition to
T occurs in the Smalcald Articles
. written by Martin Luther
himself in 1537
:
"As for transubstantiation
,
we have no regard for
the subtle sophistry of those who teach that bread
and wine surrender or lose their natural substance
and retain only the appearance and shape of bread
without any longer being real bread, for that
bread is and remains there agrees better with the
Scriptures...." (Tappert, p. 311.)
Contrast this with Melancthon in the Apology of the Augsburg
Confession six years earlier, who concurred with Vulgarius
that "the bread is not merely a figure but is truly changed
into flesh." (Tappert, p. 179. See note 5.) It is odd that
Leibniz failed to draw attention to the fact that Lutheran
opposition to T had not yet surfaced in AC, but indeed was
present in other documents or "Symbols", such as the
Smalcald Articles , as definitive of Lutheranism as was AC.
As for e'
,
the derivation of T from C is to some extent
a return to the discussion of (b & d)'
.
Assuming PA, C
entails that both the principles of activity previously in
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th© elements and Christ's principle of activity are present
in the Eucharist. Now C does not entail that part of the
consecrated elements are Christ and part bread and wine, but
that they are at once wholly Christ and wholly bread and
wine. To be wholly Christ, they must be unified by the active
principle of Christ, so that they are no longer mere bread-
and wine-aggregates. Thus the aggregates of substances making
up the bread and wine are subsumed under Christ's active
principle. This is identical to Leibniz's account of T. Thus
it is rather a case of misspeaking to say that the bread and
wine are still wholly present, since they are subsumed under
the order of Christ's active principle. True, nothing of
them has been positively annihilated, but coming under a
higher order of activity, they lose their substance.
Proposition 7 and Virtual Presence - As discussed in
Chapter 1, (p. 59 ff.), Calvin attributed not Real Presence
but Virtual Presence to the Eucharist: Christ is not
immediately present in the consecrated elements, but acts
upon them from a distance. Leibniz interpreted this talk as
talk of a spiritual or metaphoric distance rather than a
spatial distance. In the following extract from a letter to
Pellisson (Jan. 8, 1692) he hints at a way of reconciling the
doctrines of Virtual Presence and Real Presence;
"the subject itself is present, and its presence is
real, in that it emanates immediately from its
essence.... A virtual as opposed to real presence
has to be without this immediate application of
essence or primitive force, and only comes about by
actions at a distance or by mediate operations.
But here [in the case of principles of activity vs.
their corresponding corporeal substances] there is
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no distance. Those who follow Calvin admit a real
distance, and the virtue of which they speak seems
to me to be spiritual, only having relation to
faith. ... I will say further that it is not only
in the Eucharist but everywhere that bodies are
only present by this application of primitive force
to location; but naturally this is only according
to a certain extension or magnitude and figure and
with regard to a certain location, from which other
bodies are excluded." ( SSB . I, 7, p. 249.)
Here Leibniz is being cautiously unf orthright
,
but
nonetheless it is possible to grasp his radical point. The
category of distance is inappropriate to the relation between
a principle of activity and the body it informs. For
principles of activity are immaterial, and immaterial things
lack location, whereas distance is a relation between
locations. Therefore it is just as incorrect to say that
Christ's principle of activity is in the same place as the
consecrated elements as it is to say it acts upon it from a
distance. Christ's principle of activity, just as mine, is
properly speaking in no place. A substance only has real
physical presence in virtue of a principle of activity acting
upon it and organizing it into a whole. This understood, any
dispute over the Eucharist as to where Christ's principle of
activity resides, in the elements or elsewhere, is shown to
be irrelevant. I take it Leibniz is suggesting that the
dispute between proponents of Real Presence and those of
Virtual Presence is of this nature, and that therefore one
side cannot be condemned without condemning the other. If
this is realized, the dispute should be rendered obsolete,
and there should be no further reason for disagreement on the
same score. This reconciliation hinges only on the acceptance
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of PA, which might lead one to consider whether this was a
added motivation for Leibniz to hold Proposition 7, or
whether this only occurred to him after his metaphysical
convictions had matured.
I remain a bit tentative about suggesting this as a
conviction Leibniz wholeheartedly stood behind, or much less
that the search for a reconciliation between RP and VP played
a motivational role in the development of his metaphysics.
For one thing, Leibniz himself did not press this point as
strongly as he pressed the other points. Besides, it is
quite possible that VP proponents would turn the tables and
consider Leibniz's metaphysics as heterodox since it doesn't
allow for a distinction between Real and Virtual Presence. At
any rate, there is no doubt in my mind that Leibniz at least
put out feelers in this direction, and possibly had something
like this in mind from the start.
The Theological Significance of Leibniz's
Anti-Cartesianism - In reading Leibniz it is hard not to
notice his opposition to Cartesian metaphysics, most
pointedly on the issue of the substance of bodies. This is
witnessed by several of the citations quoted thus far in
this section. Leibniz's Eucharistic commitments provide the
key to understanding this opposition. Again, I favor
Leibniz's early letter to Arnauld as providing a clear
indication of this:
"it is amazing how much the philosophy of Descartes
confirms them [opponents of the Eucharist]; and it
has been favorably received by their school, both
because it is so elaborate and because it seems
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irreconcilable with the Roman Church. For will one
who believes that the essence of body consists in
extension ever believe that a body can take on the
extension of something else, while retaining its
own substance? Whence all of Descartes' protests
to the contrary are believed simulated and
inconsistent with fact" (Appendix A, p. 344).
Is Leibniz insinuating that a true believer in the Eucharist
cannot be a Cartesian? Perhaps not, but there is no doubt
that Leibniz saw no plausible way of reconciling the two.
This is noteworthy for two reasons. First, Leibniz proved
himself over and over to be quite adept at envisioning
plausible ways of reconciling or accommodating ideas thought
to be irreconcilable. An extreme example is that at one time
he apparently accepted or at least tolerated both
heliocentrism and geocentrism, apparently subscribing in the
same letter to the Copernican hypothesis:
"Concerning motion, then, several propositions of
great importance have been demonstrated by me....
First, that there is no cohesion, or consistency,
to a resting thing.... [From this] follows a
demonstration of the Copernican hypothesis."
(Appendix A, p. 346.)
and to a geocentric physical hypothesis:
"Although I may seem to have proven elsewhere
[earlier in the letter] the motion of the
earth... still a light circles around our earth in
a daily motion." [He goes on to explain the
physical cause of this motion, indicating that he
does not consider it to be an illusion, as
heliocentrists look upon the movement of the
sun]
.
( Ibid.
,
p . 352 .
)
Second, Leibniz was not an anti-traditionalist, and
Cartesianism was by his time tradition. Leibniz was wont to
reconcile his views as much as possible with widely accepted
views, for these two reasons I think it highly probable that
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Leibniz could not imagine a plausible way in which
Cartesianism could square with the Eucharist and his other
theological commitments, and thus felt compelled to oppose
it
.
Derivation of Proposition 8: That the Active Principle or
Nature of an Existing Substance Is Its Actualized Complete
Concept
I propose that it was a commitment to the existence of
God, the perfect being (Proposition 1) which led Leibniz to
so vehemently hold Proposition 8.
The Argument Suggested by the Monadology - From the
start it should be conceded that the evidence for this point
is a bit subtle. Leibniz argued for it in several different
ways varying in degree of rigour and often in a manner less
than obviously revealing dependence on his theology. One of
his most famous arguments for Proposition 8, that contained
in the beginning of the Monadology
. illustrates both this
apparent independence from theology and lack of rigour:
"2. Now there have to exist simple substances, for
composites exist; a composite is nothing other
than a mass or aggregate of simple elements....
"6. Thus one may say that Monads cannot begin or
cease to exist except [for any monad] all at once.
That is to say they can only begin by creation and
cease by annihilation; whereas that which is
composite begins or ceases to exist by [combination
or dissolution of] its parts.
"7. There is also thus no way of explaining how a
Monad can be altered or changed in its interior
by another creature.... The Monads have no windows
through which something might enter or leave....
As such neither substance nor accident can enter
into a Monad from without....
"10. I take it for granted that all created being
is subject to change, and by consequence the Monad
as well ....
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Furthermore, there is nothing besides
these that can be found in a simple substance,
that is to say, perceptions and their changes! It
is in these alone in which can consist all the
^^internal action of simple substances....
"70.
... [E]ach living body has a dominant
Entelechy which is the soul of the animal. But the
members of this living body are full of other
things, plants, animals,* of which each in
turn has its own Entelechy or dominant soul."
(Erdmann, v. II, pp . 705-10.)
there is no hint at a theological underpinning.
(First mention of God in the MonadoloQv
. in fact, doesn't
come until § 38, in the conclusion of an argument from
sufficient reason.) On the other hand, there are enough
unguarded premises in the argument expressed in this
selective excerpt, as well as throughout the Monadology , to
cause suspicion as to whether he was really expressing in
rigor a deduction from basic commitments to derivative ones,
as one might suppose. I don't believe he was doing so, and an
examination of the argument expressed in the Monadology may
allow me to explain why.
I think the argument goes something like this:
1. If there are composites, there are simple
substances i.e. Monads (definition 'composite').
2. There are composites (observation).
C3. There are simple substances (1, 2).
4. All transeunt change is by composition or division.
5. Simple substances are not composed, nor can they be
divided (definition 'simple substance').
C6. Simple substances are not subject to transeunt
change ( 4 , 5 )
.
7. Change in a thing is either transeunt or immanent
i.e. proceeding from the nature of the thing
(exhaustive disjunction).
8. All created substances are subject to change
(metaphysical principle).
C9. All simple, created substance is subject only to
immanent change, i.e. change proceeding from its
nature ( C6
,
7
,
8 ) .
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10. Everything about a created substance is contained
in its sequence of changes conjoined with its
initial state.
11. The initial state of a substance proceeds from its
nature (metaphysical principle).
C12. Everything about a simple, created substance
proceeds from its nature (C9, 10, 11).
13. That nature from which proceeds everything about
its corresponding substance is a complete concept
(definition 'complete concept').
14. Every substance that exists is the actualization
of a nature (metaphysical principle).
C15. Every existing simple substance is the
actualization of a complete concept (C12, 13, 14).
16. In the final analysis every substance is simple.
C. Every existing substance is the actualization of a
complete concept (C15, 16).
The argument contains 11 independent premises. Of these,
four - 1, 5, 7, and 13 - are based on less-than-controversial
definitions, 2 is a concedable "observation", and 8, 11, 14,
and 16 can be considered as strong principles from a
traditional standpoint. That leaves 4 and 10 to set the
Leibnizean tone against a traditional background. It is not
that they are outlandish; both have a certain plausibility.
The problem is that not being self-evident, they require
defense; whereas in the above citation they are not even
expressed, but tacit. Reasoning in which the crucial
premises are tacit is not characteristic of a definitive
treatise by as disciplined a philosopher as Leibniz. To be
sure, things which at one time tacitly enjoy consensus
approval might in another age be judged as requiring express
scrutiny. Still, the laxness of reasoning here indicates that
the Monadoloqy is not a primary exposition of Leibniz's
commitments
.
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Transeunt Change by Composition or Division - Transeunt
change in a thing is change brought about by the causation
of another thing. Leibniz's view, discussed in Chapter 2 was
that among finite things there are no transeunt causes; only
God can effect changes on other things. Here the issue is
what kind of change transeunt causation between finite things
would bring about if it occurred. Leibniz argues from
simplicity to non-interaction as if the connection were
obvious, hinting that premise 4 is tacitly operative. If
substances cannot interact because they are simple, then
interaction must depend on being composite. The kind of
interaction peculiar to composites to the exclusion of
simples is that resulting in dissolution or recombination of
parts in various ways. When I walk down the street, my shoes
strike against the pavement, causing a gradual dissolution of
the soles, and perhaps an even more gradual dissolution of
the pavement. Moreover, the force of my steps adds a motion
to the air which in turn adds motion to my eardrums,
whereupon I perceive a sound. Except for my perception of the
sound, none of this can exist if in the final analysis
nothing exists but simple substances.
One problem with this premise is that it is not
difficult to imagine partless creatures truly interacting.
Some claim to have direct spiritual contact with spirits, or
with their twin around the world. Leibniz would in the end
write this off as predetermined harmonization by God, but
until he proves this, it would beg the question to discount
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the competing hypothesis. This alone gives reason to doubt
that Leibniz intended the MonadoloQv as a rigourous exercise
rather than less charitably and less believably conclude that
Leibniz's sense of rigour was lax.
Substance as a Sequence of States - Premise 10 seems
sensible enough: all there is to know about something is how
it starts out and the sequence of changes it undergoes.
It is reminiscent of a mechanistic outlook, and as such it
may seem to have the same possible flaw: the absence of
teleology. Someone who accepts final causes as essential to
the understanding of things - Leibniz does - wants
to know not only about initial states and sequences of change
from one state to another, but also the purpose of the
thing's existence; the purpose guiding the changes; how the
thing fits into the scheme of things. The complete concept of
a thing should entail these things as well as states and
sequences. But there is no hint of teleology in the cited
excerpt. The failure to introduce a teleological perspective
into the early stages of the treatise is a signal to me that
the Monadology is, or at least starts out as, a less-than-
rigourous formalist exercise, an attempt to hint in a sketchy
manner at the formal deducibility in principle of his
metaphysics, which is primarily teleological. This is in
contrast to saying that the treatise deduces less basic
commitments from more basic ones.
The Monadology : An Apology to Formalists - In short, I
consider the Monadology at best as an attempt by Leibniz to
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present his philosophy to opponents of teleology, i. e. to
formalists, starting from common beliefs more basic to them.
As such it cannot be used as evidence for how Leibniz
developed his philosophy or how he came to be so convinced of
Proposition 8.
Overview of the Theology of Proposition 8 - Before
presenting the texts that evidence the theological origins of
Proposition 8, the following should be noted: from a
theological perspective, there really are only two possible
reasons that would support the truth of Proposition 8. The
first reason is that God can only create substances according
to complete concepts. The second is that substances created
according to complete concepts are always better, or perhaps
better put, that the best possible world is a world all of
whose substances are created according to complete concepts.
In other words, if we assume God, the perfect being, exists,
then for Proposition 8 to be true, one of the following must
also be true:
i. The existence (actuality) of open substances
(substances created according to incomplete
concepts) is metaphysically impossible.
or
ii. The best possible world entails that all created
substances are closed (created according to
complete concepts).
Note that in this context i entails ii but not
Y j_Q0— Y0jf sa , If i is true then no actual world can have but
closed substances; now since we are assuming God, the perfect
being, exists, it follows that the best possible world is the
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actual world; h©nce it can only have closed substances. On
the other hand, there are reasons for ii that don't involve
ii can be true because, although God is able to create
open substances, they are inferior categorically to closed
substances
.
So if Leibniz held Proposition 8 for theological
reasons, it had to be either because open substances are
inferior, or because they are uncreatable (even prescinding
from God's goodness). To argue for Proposition 8 by the
former is obviously an attempt to defend God's goodness. To
argue for Proposition 8 by the latter is, perhaps less
obviously, an attempt to defend God's greatness, by
dissociating it from inconsistency. For if God's greatness
entails that He might create what is uncreatable, then the
notion of God involves contradiction andthus God, not being
possible, does not exist. Texts which display either way of
reasoning therefore can be counted as revealing the
theological motivation for Proposition 8: God, the perfect
being (i.e. both perfectly good and perfectly great), exists.
Theological Support for Proposition 8: The Inferiority
of "Open" Substances - From time to time Leibniz wrote things
that suggest his commitment to Proposition 8 is on account of
a conviction that open substances are inferior to closed
ones. In an early untitled and undated work (Gerhardt, v. 7,
No. VIII) for example, he writes (p. 290):
"9. ...[F]rom the conflict of all possibles
demanding existence this at once follows, that
that series of things exists by which the most
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exists, that is the maximum among all possible
series ....
"14. It follows also that that series has
prevailed, by which the most distinct cogitability
comes into existence.
"15. For distinct cogitability gives order to the
thing and displays beauty to the thinker. Order,
in fact, is nothing but the distinct relating of
many things. And confusion is where many things
are present, but there is no way of distinguishing
one thing from another....
"17. It follows, too, that the world is a cosmos,
an ornate plenum, so made as to maximally satisfy
the intelligence."
The thought here seems to be that the actual world must be
completely determined because anything less would lack
"distinct cogitability", would entail confusion, would fail
to be maximally beautiful to the intelligence; in short,
would be less good, or inferior.
Compare the above with a comment made in a letter to Des
Bosses late in Leibniz's life (August 19, 1715; Loemker, v.
2, XVI, p. 999) which comes in response to an analogy Des
Bosses offered suggesting that a world in which substances
interact might be a better one than a world in which they
don ' t
:
"In reply to your analogy, I admit that the
architect who rightly fits stones together acts
with greater art than one who has found the
stones already so prepared by someone else that
they fall into order when merely brought together.
But on the other hand, I believe you will admit
that the craftsmanship of the architect who can so
prepare stones in advance will be infinitely
greater still."
Des Bosses by the analogy referred to was favorably
comparing a world in which we are the original architects of
our actions to a world in which God has beforehand determined
our actions. Leibniz concedes this point from the point of
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view of the created agent, but adds that a world fully
predetermined from its outset is better overall, since it is
of the greatest conceivable craftsmanship. This gives a
pretty solid indication that Leibniz never dropped the
inferiority argument even in his latter years.
A Stronger Line of Support: The Uncreatability of
Open Substances - Although Leibniz from time to time employed
the inferiority argument as a defense of Proposition 8, it
should be noted that he more often utilized the stronger
uncreatability argument. Indeed, use of the latter makes the
former almost superfluous, since the latter trivially entails
the former. The fact that he never quite dropped the
inferiority argument might be an indication that he was not
completely confident in the correctness of his reasoning with
respect to the stronger argument. Lack of confidence on this
matter is also suggested by the tentative language he uses
and the repeated failure to plainly state his position.
Consider for example the following, from the same
letter to Des Bosses:
”I do not believe a system is possible in which the
monads act upon each other mutually, for there
seems to be no possible way to explain such
action. I add that influence is superfluous, for
why should one monad give another what it already
possesses? It is the very nature of substance that
the present is great with the future and that
everything can be understood out of one. . ."
Not only is there uncharacteristic tentativeness: "there
seems to be no possible way, etc." - but there is question-
begging as well. Clearly, a system in which substances or
monads really interact is one in which they do not already
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possess what other monads are to give them, and is one in
which a substance is not "great" with its future in the sense
of virtually or predeterministically containing it. That is
exactly what is at issue! Des Bosses is challenging Leibniz
to give his reasons for believing real substantial
interaction to be impossible, and Leibniz, at least
explicitly, fails to do so. Still, Leibniz's words do hint at
the uncreatability argument. Confessing that there is no
possible way to explain substantial interaction is tantamount
to confessing that open substances are impossible. He hints
at the same both in pressing the claim that monads already
possess what they apparently receive from others, and in
insisting that it is the very nature of substance to entail
at any moment anything that will ever happen to it. It is
difficult to see any other apparently compelling reason
against open substances but that God cannot create other than
in accordance with his complete knowledge. If we insist on
steering clear of theology in interpreting Leibniz, as many
scholars have done, how can we come to any understanding of
Leibniz's motives for Proposition 8? The trivial fact that
every substance has a corresponding complete concept does not
empower us to come to any conclusion about the nature of
substances. It is ridiculous therefore to posit a logical
genesis for the Proposition.
Having said that I should admit that Leibniz at times
appeared to offer a logical defense. One case of this appears
in the Discourse , under § VIII. This text presents a defense
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of Proposition 8 that s©©n\s to b© bas©d on th© logic of
propositions
:
"Now it is clear that every true predication has
some foundation in things; when a proposition is
not identical, that is when the predicate is not
expressly contained within the subject, it
must be that it is virtually contained therein,
which the philosophers call in-esse, meaning that
the predicate is in the subject. Thus the term of
the subject must always enclose that of the
predicate, in a manner that whoever completely
understood the notion of the subject would also
judge that the predicate pertained to it. That
being the case, we can say that the nature of an
individual substance or of a complete being is to
have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to
comprehend and allow to be deduced from it all the
predicates of the subject to which this notion is
attributed." (Erdmann, v. II, p. 819. Emphasis
mine
.
)
The reasoning can be paraphrased as follows. If a subject in
any manner contains all the predicates that are truly
attributed to it, it seems as though the true notion of that
subject must entail all the predicates as well, in such a
manner that it entails all and only true predications of the
subject. But there is a catch, however, and it is that a
subtle reference to God is made by the phrase: "whoever
completely understood the notion of the subject". In view of
this fact, I think we are warranted in suspecting a
theological basis. Perhaps Leibniz is suggesting that since
God is omniscient, his conception of every possible substance
is complete, and that being the case, it only seems proper to
conclude that whatever He chooses for existence. He chooses
and creates according to His perfect conception of it. This
would rule out open substances. If a nature is that in
accordance with which, as if a blueprint, God creates a
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substance, then by the present reasoning it seems that all of
these "blueprints'* He has to consider are, in virtue of His
omniscience, filled out in every detail, with no open
variables. Since it is impossible for Him to render Himself
ignorant
,
it would seem that He could do no less than create
closed substances.
The context from which the above excerpt is taken bears
further witness to the theological source of this argument.
The main statement of § VIII reads as follows:
"VIII. In order to distinguish between the
activities of God and the activities of created
things we must explain the conception of an
individual substance." (Montgomery, p. 12.)
The argument in the earlier citation would have no force in
defending Proposition 8 unless there really existed someone
who "completely understood the notion of the subject", i.e.
of any candidate for individual existence. For Leibniz, God
would be the only one capable of such understanding.
The difficulty in definitively establishing Leibniz's
motives in ruling out open substances is that he often takes
so much for granted. For example, he typically defines
'substance' as 'complete being' (see "£>e Mente"
,
in Grua, p.
266), thus making it seem trivial that substances are closed.
In fairness, this was the same definition used by Spinoza,
and probably enjoyed popularity among determinists . After
all, if determinism is true, all substances are closed. Yet
I think it unsatisfactory to say Leibniz opposed open
substances because he was a determinist; this could be said
of some determinists, but in his case I would think it the
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other way around. My reasoning is that a determinist is
either agnostic/atheistic or theistic; the former presumably
have a bottom-line commitment to universal causation, that
the universe is governed by a set of infrangible physical
laws; while the latter may base their determinism on God's
greatness. While the former don't have to address the
question of why God doesn't create open substances, the
latter do, and Leibniz belonged to the latter. So of Leibniz
and other theistic determinists it would have to be said that
they are determinists because they are opposed to open
substances, more particularly to God's creating them; either
because He can't or because He won't.
Perhaps the closest Leibniz ever came to actually
stating the uncreatability argument is in Handschriften . Ch.
IV, V. VI, No. 12, Bl. 14; p. 88):
"From the foresight of God it follows that things
are determined in their causes. For to know
something is to know the truth of a proposition;
to know the truth of a proposition, however, is to
know why it will be so. If therefore God perfectly
forsees things, he forsees not only that they will
be, but also why they will be..."
The thought expressed here in other terms is that prescience
can't be had of an open substance, i.e. of a substance whose
total history is not determined from the start. For true
prescience includes full knowledge of the reason why
everything that happens happens. But knowledge why, in this
context, is assumed to be causal knowledge, and full causal
knowledge entails full explanation of latter states of things
from earlier states. The perfect, omniscient being has to
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have such knowledge of everything, therefore things have to
really be that way. Things really being that way, when He
creates the first state of things, he virtually creates every
subsequent detail, since all is determined from the first
state
.
There is no doubt something odd about this way of
thinking that concludes to determinism from the premise of
foreknowledge. But as there are different ways of knowing,
quite plausibly there are different ways of foreknowing;
maybe determinism is a necessary condition for some kind of
foreknowledge. Still it is far from clear that is a necessary
condition for all kinds of foreknowledge, much less for God's
way of foreknowing. The question of whether the
foreknowledge-to-determinism inference is valid will be
discussed in Chapter 4 (p. 305 ff.).
In short, I believe Leibniz felt he could not support
the existence of open substances and was committed to
Proposition 8 because he could not imagine how God could
create them without compromising His goodness, but especially
His greatness. Open substances have comparatively less
created detail than closed substances and thus, as creations,
have less goodness or being. But more importantly, the
creation of open substances looks like it contradicts God's
omniscience, in that it curtails His having perfect
foreknowledge of them. In a similar vein Leibniz was
motivated to hold that no two substances can be identical in
their nature or "blueprint", because that would curtail God's
249
being able to distinguish them in ahstracto {Confessio,
pp. 124-6). If substances are open, with variables yet to be
filled in, that opens the door to all kinds of
indistinguishable pairs. For instance, if it was not part of
George Bush's creation blueprint that he go to Yale, as the
actual George Bush did, then there may be a possible George
Bush who goes to Harvard. Yet this pair of George Bushes
would be identical as open-substance creations, since it is
not written into the blueprint by which they were/would have
been created where either goes to college. Leibniz would
consider them in principle indistinguishable as creations,
and thus perfect foreknowledge of either could not be had.
This in turn would mean God is not omniscient, since there
are some things He does not always know. So Leibniz, by
holding individual substances to be "infima species"
( Handschri ften , Ch. IV, v. VIII, No. 24, Bl. 86; p. 120), in
the sense that no further detail about them is left to be
filled in, no doubt thought himself to be defending his
commitment to the proposition that God, the perfect being
exists. For if individual substances are indeed infima
species in his sense, then there is no problem envisioning
how God can always have perfect knowledge of each of them.
Derivation of Proposition 9: That There Are No Material Atoms
Overview and Some Textual Evidence - I propose that
Leibniz's commitment to this proposition is grounded in
several theological commitments. First, since Proposition 9,
as discussed in Chapter 2, is arguably deducible from either
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Proposition 7 or 8 and we may justifiably give Leibniz credit
for recognizing this, it enjoys the theological backing that
each of these enjoy. Beyond that, Leibniz's opposition to
material atomism is motivated by a defense of God's
perfection (Proposition 1), the Real Presence (Proposition
2), and perhaps even of the Reconcilability of apparently
opposing doctrines of the Eucharist (Proposition 3), most
notably Real Presence with Calvin's Virtual Presence. We have
already discussed the theological backing of Propositions 7
and 8, so we need not bring it back into discussion here,
except as it relates to new points made.
It should be conceded that Leibniz's own argumentation
against material atomism is largely lacking in significant
express reference to theological commitments. True, an
occasional hint of theological reasons is dropped, such as
the following from a December 8, 1686 letter to Arnauld
(Erdmann, v. II, p. 836):
"I recall that Mr. Cordemoy in his treatise on the
discernment of the soul and body felt obliged, in
order to save substantial unity in the body, to
admit atoms or indivisible extended bodies... but
you have judged well, sir, that I would not be of
this sentiment.... The man who only consists in
a mass characterized by an infinite hardness -
which conforms no more to divine wisdom than does
the void - would not be able to contain in himself
all past and future states, much less those of the
universe." (Emphasis mine.)
But these are few and cryptic, mostly embedded in discussions
of other things and difficult to extract in argument form.
Still, it is not difficult to notice a distinctly theological
background to the reasons he does express, especially in
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light of how his opposition to atomism fits in to other
aspects of his philosophy which do have express theological
backing
.
I can provide one instance of an express theological
argument against material atomism, from a letter to Des
Bosses (November 1
,
1710. Gerhardt
,
v. 2, No. LXXIII,
p. 409):
"Among many contentions of mine [against material
atomism] is the following, which I demonstrate:
matter is not composed of atoms, but is infinitely
subdivided in act, such that in any particle of
matter is a world of creatures infinite in number.
For if the world were an aggregate of atoms, it
could be accurately comprehended by a finite mind
sufficiently noble."
Here Leibniz gives the view, discussed more below, that
material atomism is false on the grounds that God can do and
has done much better: He has created a world which is not
perfectly knowable by any finite mind. But it is not clear
why the assumption of material atomism would necessitate
finite comprehensibility; why not have an infinite number of
atoms? Still, a Leibnizean best world could be thought of as
superior in that every chunk of it is infinite,
comprehensible only to God.
Leibniz's opposition to material atomism was a complex
battle fought on many fronts, but a careful analysis reveals
three principle grievances against it (paraphrased from
Chapter 2 )
:
i. There can be no material atoms, since there is no
unity in extension.
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ii. There can be no material atoms, for if there
were the universe would be in principle
unintelligible, either because of too little or
too much distinctness.
iii. There can be no material atoms, for if there
were, the actual world would not be a plenum,
being which is requisite to being the best
possible world.
Now there are varying versions of material atomism, as
Leibniz acknowledged; it is not the case that each of the
above complaints applies to each version. Perhaps we can
safely say that i does apply to all versions of material
atomism, but ii would apply only to versions insisting on
material atoms as simple extensions with no other traits,
whereas iii applies only to theories entailing the existence
of a void.
What I will argue in this section is that i has behind
it a commitment to Propositions 2 and 3, while ii and iii
ultimately gain their support from a commitment to
Proposition 1: ii relying on God's omniscience and iii on
God's perfection as a whole.
Much of the material in this section relies on work
already done both in earlier sections of this Chapter and in
earlier Chapters. For that reason, many of the notes refer
to earlier points in this work, in which places the bulk of
the textual evidence from Leibniz is cited.
No Unity in Extension: In Defense of Real Presence and
Its Reconcilability with Virtual Presence - By his own
confession, Leibniz had embraced the theory of material
atomism early in his life as a philosopher, but then, "after
many reflections", dropped it ("New System of Nature, etc. ,
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in Journal des Savans
, June 21, 1695; in Wiener, p. 107).
The reason he gave for disavowing atomism was, as is
paraphrased in i, that "it is impossible to find the
principles of a true unity in matter alone", whereas
"multitude can only get its reality from true unities"
(ibid.). There are two plausible interpretations of this,
which may have been intended simultaneously. The first is
that matter is infinitely divisible in principle, and though
there may be practically indivisible bodies, mere practical
indivisibility does not constitute a criterion for unity.
The second plausible interpretation is that there are many
substantial unities in che world - such as humans, dogs,
plants - whose unity is obviously not accounted for by
material atomism.
I concede that one does not have to resort to theology
to find in Leibniz good motivation to be opposed to material
atomism. But I believe to have already presented good
evidence in this Chapter that Leibniz's search for an
alternative to Cartesian dualism was motivated by a desire to
defend the Eucharist and reconcile the varying doctrines.
Now what Leibniz was opposed to in Descartes was precisely
his contention that material extension was a criterion not
only for unity but for substantial unity of bodies, which in
short, amounts to a materialist conception of body.
This bone of contention between Leibniz and Cartesianism
stands also between him and material atomism, for it too is a
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materialist conception of body. Unless there can be unity in
extension, material atomism cannot be true.
There is abundant textual support
,
a good amount of
which I have cited, for concluding that throughout his life,
but especially from the outset of his philosophical life,
incompatibility with the Eucharist was what bothered Leibniz
so much about materialist conceptions of body in general. If
that is the case, then it was a commitment to the Eucharist,
particularly to the Real Presence, that ultimately moved
Leibniz against atomism as well as Cartesian dualism. I think
there are good reasons backing this specific claim, despite a
shortage of express textual support.
Admittedly, in the absence of express textual support,
my claim can go only as far as it is true that Leibniz
regarded atomism as a materialist conception of body
incompatible with his formal conception, which was designed
to accommodate the Eucharist. The best way to establish this
is to show that the contrary contradicts Leibniz's
philosophy. Supposing material atomism to be compatible with
Leibniz's formal atomism, then to a substance, say, a human
being, it would have to be possible to ascribe two principles
of unity, one being the atoms (indivisble material entities)
that compose her body, and the other being her soul or formal
principle of unity. This would amount to a kind of dualism;
hence when making a substantial account of a human being it
could not be said that she is unqualifiedly or ultimately a
single unity; ultimately she is an aggregate of atoms and a
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soul, with primacy granted to neither. Thus this kind of
dualism could not give us a unified view of bodies. But it
is clear that a unified view of bodies was just what Leibniz
wanted. So he had to oppose even a dualist version of
material atomism.
Leibniz so confidently insisted on the unity of bodies
because he recognized it to be a necessary condition to the
Eucharist. He did so in spite of the fact that the
prevailing philosophy of the time, Cartesianism, had already
discarded the notion, as well as atomists such as Gassendi.
Leibniz was frustrated that apparently sincere Catholics
like Descartes and Gassendi could put forward philosophical
doctrines which were to all appearances incompatible with the
Eucharist. He was flabbergasted at the disposition of such
people to arrive at and hold on to philosophical conclusions
in blind independence of theological commitments. This
motivated him to argue vehemently for the unity of all
truths, and especially for the reconciliation of truths of
faith with truths of reason. Descartes's disclaimer that he
was a philosopher and not a theologian did not wash with
Leibniz
.
Both Propositions 2 and 3, excluding extreme feats of
conceptual acrobatics, depend on a unified notion of body.
Proposition 2, does so because in order for the Real Presence
to be true, the body of Christ must be present although the
particular atoms of his natural (heavenly) body have not been
sent into the elements. Pure material atomism, where a body
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is simply an aggregate of material atoms, could not make
sense of this doctrine. Nor could a modified dualistic
version, since the body would have also to include the
material atoms that make up his natural body. It would not
help to remand the miracle to each of the material atoms of
the natural body, since they would be pure extensions
incapable of being imperceptibly present in other extensions.
All dualism would allow us would be the presence of Christ's
soul and divinity, but not his body. Now according to
Leibniz's formal atomism, the body and blood of Christ are
present when his own monad is the active principle in the
extension of the elements. For the active principle is what
gives a body identity and unity, not extension.
Proposition 3 depends on a unified notion of body
because if any substantiality is granted to extension on its
own, then it could not be said that the bread and wine are
substantiality absent after consecration, making at best
Consubstant iat ion true - assuming a dualist version of
material atomism - and Transubstantiation false in either
case. Moreover Virtual Presence would remain irreconciliably
distinct from Real Presence, since the former would mean that
Christ's monad is acting on the elements without the presence
of his material atoms, while the latter, though now
practically absurd, would mean that both Christ's monad and
his original material atoms were present.
In short, it is not difficult to see how commitment to
any form of material atomism would necessarily have strained
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L©ibniz s commitmsnt to Propositions 2 and 3, ©spocially in
light of th© fact that L©ibniz was an activist for th©
r©conciliation of faith and r©ason. This would naturally
motivat© him to oppos© mat©rial atomism as incompatible with
true faith doctrine.
Unintelligibility of Material Atomism: In Defense of
God's Omniscience - As shown in Chapter 2 and as recapped in
ii above, the theory that there are material atoms as simple
extensions would lead either to the conclusion that some
atoms are identical in nature, or that each is
incommensurably different. In the first case, Leibniz would
argue in accordance with his principle of the identity of
indiscernibles that God could not tell them apart viewed
separately from their contexts, which of course infringes
upon God's omnipotence and thus is to be rejected. In the
second case, where all atoms differ, they must as simple
extensions differ incommensurably. They cannot have anything
in common extension-wise, for any similarity of extension
entails more elemental extended parts, which would contradict
their simplicity. Thus it would be impossible to group them
as a genus though in fact they ought to be. This
unintelligibility in principle would limit God's ability to
have a unified science of His creation, thus challenging once
again His omniscience. In either case, the simple-extensions
version of material atomism looks incompatible with Leibniz's
theology
.
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Inferiority of Material Atomism: In Defense of God's
Perfection, or of the Best Possible World - iii is intended
against atoms-in-a-void versions of material atomism. The
argument is that void entails lack of being where more being
could have been. Void is emptiness, whereas the best God can
do is create a world as full as can be with being. A world
with a void is not as full as can be with being. Therefore,
assuming the actual world to be composed of atoms in a void,
it cannot be the best possible world. But if the actual world
is not the best possible, then either God failed to choose
the best, didn't know the best, or couldn't produce the best.
Thus God could not be the perfect being, lacking either
omnibenevolence, omniscience, or omnipotence. I think this is
what ultimately motivated Leibniz to reject any atoms-in-a-
void theory.
It is hard to give a blanket summary of Leibniz's
opposition to material atomism. But if forced to choose a
prevailing reason, it would have to be the same that moved
him against Descartes: extension is not a satisfactory
criterion for substantiality. This motivation has been traced
earlier in Chapter 3 to the defense of the Eucharist.
Derivation of Proposition 10: That Substances Were All
Created at Once
I propose that Leibniz's commitment to this proposition,
which was perhaps less than certain, was motivated by a more
basic commitment to the Doctrine of Original Sin (Proposition
4). He revealed this motivation expressly rather late in his
life, but rather openly. Still, there is some indication in
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his earlier writings defending Proposition 10 that he had a
secret reason for being convinced (see Chapter 2 - in short
because he never revealed a sufficient motivation for having
this view until he revealed the one about which we are now
speaking ) , and I propose that this later-revealed reason is
the same as the secret one.
Textual Evidence - Besides an occasional indication that
his motivation for advocating all-at-once creation was to
avoid undermining the proposition that the soul is immortal
(see for example Handschriften
. Ch
. IV, v. VIII, No. 24, B1
.
93, pp. 122-3: "If you say that souls... are created daily by
God, it is to be feared lest someone infer that it is
therefore equally probable in return that [souls] are also
daily annihilated by God in the dying of the animal. And if
annihilation is so ordinary and frequent, then all that
reasoning in favor of the immortality of the soul also
perishes which is based on the premise that the soul cannot
perish except by annihilation."), Leibniz chiefly argued for
it because of its usefulness in accommodating the doctrine of
Original Sin, to which there is no doubt that he was
committed. He aired this view mainly in two treatises: the
Theodicy . and another known by its Latin title. Causa Dei
Asserta , originally published together with the Theodicy ,
both completed in 1710. He also brought up the matter in a
letter to Des Bosses in 1709 (September 8), but the
discussion there essentially refers to a writing of his which
would turn out to be the Causa Dei Asserta .
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It is interesting to note that the discussion in the
Theodicy proceeds in an opposite direction from that in the
Causa Mi; the former proceeds, despite an initial mention
of the problem of original sin, along independent lines in
favor of all-at-once creation and treats its accommodation of
Original Sin almost as a lucky find, while the Causa Dei
. I
think more indicative of Leibniz's thinking process, shows
the accommodation of Original Sin to be a primary motivator
in his opting for all-at-once creation. My reasoning in favor
of the Causa Dei is supported by Paul Schrecker:
"The Causa Ml (A Vindication of God's Justice),
published as an appendix to the Th4odic4e in 1710,
summarizes in a rigorous and concise style the
development of ideas in the great work.
. .
.
[T]he
Th4odic4e is much more a highly popularized work
than a methodical... exposition of Leibniz's
philosophy. That is why Leibniz... added to it
a systematic abridgement in Latin [the Causa MlH'
(Schrecker and Schrecker, p. xxvii.)
I cite the following tracts from the Theodicy and the
Causa Dei ( Vindication ) . First the Theodicy ;
"86. The first difficulty is how the soul could be
infected with original sin, which is the root of
actual sins, without injustice on God's part in
exposing the soul thereto....
"90. Now as I like maxims which hold good and admit
of the fewest exceptions possible.... I consider
that souls and simple substances altogether cannot
begin except by creation, or end except by
annihilation. Moreover, as the formation of
organic animate bodies appears explicable in the
order of nature only when one assumes a
preformation already organic, I have thence
inferred that what we call generation of an animal
is only a transformation and augmentation. Thus,
since the same body was already furnished with
organs, it is to be supposed that it was already
animate, and that it had the same soul: so I assume
vice versa, from the conservation of the soul when
once it is created, that the animal is also
conserved, and that apparent death is only an
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envelopment, there being no likelihood that in the
order of nature souls exist entirely separated from
all body, or that what does not begin naturally can
cease through natural forces.
"91. Considering that so admirable an order and
rules so general are established in regard to
animals, it does not appear reasonable that man
should be completely excluded from that order, and
that everything in relation to his soul should come
about in him by miracle.... It is thus my belief
that those souls which one day will be human souls,
like those of other species, have been in the seed,
and in the progenitors as far back as Adam, and
have consequently existed since the beginning of
things, always in a kind of organic body.... This
explanation appears to remove the obstacles that
beset this matter in philosophy or theology. For
the difficulty of the origin of forms disappears
completely; and besides it is much more appropriate
to divine justice to give the soul, already
corrupted physically or on the animal side by the
sin of Adam, a new perfection which is reason, than
to put a reasoning soul, by creation or otherwise,
in a body wherein it is to be corrupted morally."
(Farrer, pp. 169, 172-3.)
Now the Causa Dei
:
"81. We must now deal with the hereditary
transmission of the contagion, engendered by the
fall of our first parents and passing from them
into the souls of their posterity. There does not
seem to be any more suitable explanation for this
than to state that the souls of his posterity were
already infected in Adam. To understand this
doctrine, we must refer to recent observations and
theories which seem to support the opinion that
the formation of animals and plants does not
proceed from some amorphous mass, but from a body
which is already somewhat preformed, enveloped in
the seed, and animated long before. Hence, it
follows that by virtue of the primeval divine
benediction some organized rudiments of all living
beings... and even their souls, in a certain way,
were already existent in the first specimen of
every genus to evolve in the course of time. But
the souls and the principles of life which are in
the seeds destined to be human bodies are supposed
to run through a special process. They remain at
the stage of sensitive nature, just as do the other
seminal animalcules which have not that
destination, until the time when an ultimate
conception singles them out from the other
animalcules. At the same time the organized body
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receives the shape of the human body and his soul
is elevated to the degree of rationality (I do not
decide here whether through an ordinary or an
extraordinary operation of God).
”82 One may... believe that the corruption of
the soul induced by the fall of Adam, albeit this
is not yet a human soul, attains the force of the
original inclination to sin when later on it
finally rises to the degree of rationality....
"83. Thus we may overcome the philosophical
difficulties engendered by the origin of forms and
souls ....
"84. At the same time we overcome the theological
difficulties concerning the corruption of souls."
(Schrecker and Schrecker, pp. 131-3.)
Discussion of Textual Evidence - What is peculiar about
Leibniz's reasoning here is that it doesn't cease to be
probabilistic as opposed to demonstrative. He is advocating a
metaphysical thesis - all-at-once creation, without rigorous
metaphysical argumentation. He goes so far as to bring in the
tentative biological observations of his time as supporting
evidence. This is an indication that his motivation isn't
philosophical
.
The Causa Dei text practically allows us to conclude
that Leibniz felt the only good way to explain the doctrine
of Original Sin was by recourse to the literal preexistence
of all human souls in Adam. The puzzle of how a privation
suffered by Adam because of his disobedience could be
passed on to others thus would be resolved by saying that the
transmission was physical and immediate. Our souls were
present in Adam, in a prerational form, our rationality at
best present in unactivated blueprint form; yet we were not
present in addition to Adam, for our souls were subjugated
to the organizing principle of his soul. So anything suffered
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by Adam in his entirety, including all that came under the
subjugating influence of his soul, would be suffered by any
subjugated soul within him capable of ever receiving it . We
were capable of receiving it since we were to become rational
and were and remain animals
. So at that time we received it
as a latent defect, which became active on our becoming
rational
.
It is to be admitted that all this is far from
perspicuous, yet it is not without its genius. It is not
ridiculous to say that a defect may be held latently by a
creature even though the faculty to which it pertains
is not yet operative. A defect pertaining to an as yet
unactual faculty may be carried in another actual faculty as
a change in it which though not harming its own operation per
se would harm the operation of the as yet unactual faculty
once it began to operate. More generally it may be held as
the privation of some actually held trait the presence of
which would be essential to the unflawed exercise of the as
yet unactual faculty. In this case, though he does not give
us a full elaboration, Leibniz does suggest that the
privation we receive in our prerational state which upon our
coming to rational becomes the defect of original sin is an
inordinate inclination to sensible things (Schrecker and
Schrecker, 133-4); it is not implausible to see this as
receivable by us in our prerational state.
The fact that Leibniz also argued that "the true root of
the fall... lies in in the aboriginal imperfection and
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weakness of the creatures” (ibid., p. 131, No. 79), does not
indicate a parallel line of reasoning alternate to Original-
Sin thinking. Leibniz thought sin unavoidable from the
creative standpoint; the best world has sin in it. But it is
clear by the close juxtaposition of these two commitments
that he believed God chose original sin transmitted to all
humanity through Adam as the best way to cope with evil. That
being the case, we are not absolved from trying to get at the
mechanics of its transmission from Leibniz's standpoint.
Of course. Original Sin has the problem of appearing to
be in just. Why would God choose to create us in such a way
that we all virtually become disgraced sinners by the
disobedience of one (or two)? Leibniz feels all-at-once
creation vindicates God from the appearance of injustice, for
according to it He is not placing newly created rational
souls into corruption, but rather is giving already corrupted
souls, or allowing them to attain to, reason (he doesn't
commit himself to whether our becoming rational is by an
ordinary or extraordinary act of God, although this very
distinction is not very significant in Leibniz), by which
they will be enabled to choose to flee corruption in Christ.
But why create humans so intercorruptable in the first place?
Leibniz does not go as deep as this; he was of the
disposition to concede that the answers to many questions of
this type are simply beyond our ken, we not being omniscient.
Nowadays many have problems just getting a clear idea of
what Original Sin is. This is in contrast to Leibniz and his
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perceived audience, who felt comfortable enough with the
doctrine to enter into discussions about it without feeling
the need to give a full exposition of it. That is why the
contemporary reader is likely to come away disappointed after
reading Leibniz's discussions of it. The question of whether
the disobedience of Adam was the immediate cause of the
defect of original sin, or whether it merely provoked God to
deprive Adam of something, is not discussed. Nor is it
discussed exactly what is the trait deprived or suppressed. A
full exposition of this, and other puzzling matters is
contained in Chapter 1, Proposition 4.
Final Note to Chapter 3
It bears repeating that the selection of the six
propositions discussed in this Section and in Chapter 2 was
not intended as representing the core premises of Leibniz's
metaphysics, although most of them are central. The intention
rather was to show significant examples of Revealed-
theological motivation in Leibniz's metaphysics and
especially among its key or oft-repeated themes, as specific
support of the thesis argued in general in Section 1 of this
Chapter that Leibniz's metaphysics was Revelation-motivated.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATING LEIBNIZ'S "CHRISTIAN METAPHYSICS"
Synopsis
From the evidence presented in the preceding chapters, I
think it is clear that Leibniz was out to establish a
Christian metaphysics, as a chief component of a strategy to
establish and defend the truth of Christianity; and that the
metaphysics he did was the result of that intention.
Although he openly admitted that he would never be able to
complete this task, it is fairly certain that he felt he'd
sketched out its structure in enough detail to enable others
to carry forth the metaphysical project. (It is doubtful
whether he ever thought to have accomplished the same with
respect to other components of the larger strategy, such as
that of developing a clear and distinct science of
jurisprudence, or that of establishing a methodology for
historical research capable of eliciting universal consensus
on the facts of history.
)
His attempt at a Christian metaphysics in retrospect was
a balancing act of attempting to satisfy at once four
objectives: to establish a metaphysics that is:
1. Christian, by accommodating the articles of
Christian faith -most expressly those which have
been challenged in the public forum - and
essentially the whole "Gospel truth";
2. a metaphysics, by having formal dependence only on
self-evident principles of natural reason;
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3. r6union ori©nt6d, having th© pow©r of resolvingbetween the different Christian denominations on
the one hand and science and religion on the other,
semantic disputes and disputes grounded essentially
in confusion about metaphysical propositions; and
4. not ideology, i.e. not a system of thought intended
to uncritically support a doctrine, in this case
Christian doctrine.
This metaphysics would accommodate Christian doctrine by
having the power to be used to prove things like God's
existence, to display the possibility of things like the
Eucharist, and at least to refute all contrary arguments,
such as those against the Incarnation and the Trinity.
Leibniz on this point not rarely lashed out at Descartes for
philosophizing in a manner which "artfully evaded the
mysteries of faith" ("On True Method in Philosophy and
Theology", 1686. Wiener, p. 63).
As a metaphysics, it would have to be drawn deductively
from tenets of natural reason. But it is not as if these
tenets are what would have generated the metaphysics
altogether, for in the more important teleological or
motivational sense it is Revelation that is basic; indeed,
ultimately the most basic of Leibniz's commitments. This way
of thinking avoids circularity, since the "order of
execution" (the formal deductions) of the metaphysics is one
thing, and its "order of intentions" (the motivating
commitments) are another. (Note the Scholastic dictum: "First
in the order of intentions is last in the order of
execution.".) This theme is discussed at length in his Feb.
11, 1697 letter to Burnett. (See pp. 185-7.)
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What gives a most distinctive twist to Leibniz's
metaphysics was a deep motivating commitment to the
proposition that the truth leads to reconciliation. So in
particular, metaphysical truth will lead to the dissolution
of many doctrinal disputes. As Leibniz saw it, division in
the Church was a problem to which a solution existed, and a
true, comprehensive metaphysics would naturally play a
significant role in the solution, since so much of Christian
theology presupposes it. Cleaning up metaphysics would lead
to more perspicuous theology. Beyond that, reconciliation
involves the accommodation of already existing views as much
as truth will allow: in religion, philosophy, or science.
But whatever view, however popular, that tended to divide
rather than unite the fields of knowledge and faith had to
have falsehood in it and should not be received without
qualification. Leibniz's lifelong commitment to the
conformity of faith and reason witness to this, as do his
efforts to reconcile Christendom. On this note Paul
Eisenkopf aptly observed (p. 47) that "Reform is for
[Leibniz] a way to Church unity".
Finally, it would be no help to Christianity if a
"metaphysics" were developed to accommodate it uncritically.
The task, rather, must be to seek a true, critical
metaphysics which could stand on its own and also accommodate
Revelation. If there didn't exist such a metaphysics, this
would mean Christianity were false. This conviction, together
with the commitment to Christianity, yields a conviction that
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there is such a metaphysics. Leibniz's contempt for ideology
comes through in comments criticizing the Scholasticism of
his time ( that frivolous philosophy, by no one understood, a
big part of which is solely in defense of Transubstantiation
,
or prepared solely for defending it"; Appendix A, p. 344) and
in emphasizing the importance for Christendom of a critical
attitude. Writing to Arnauld for the first time in 1671, he
put it as follows:
"let me say something of the worry I've had
concerning religion. Now, I am very far from
credulity.... I have believed in fact that any
amount of rigour that was surrendered in an affair
of such importance as religion amounted to evasion
of truth." (Ibid, p. 351.)
If Leibniz was true to his words, he clearly must have
striven against an uncritical attitude toward Revelation
while not forfeiting belief in it
,
a line which only someone
quite confident in the truth of his faith could resolve to
toe
.
Why Not Traditional Scholasticism?
In defending the claim that Leibniz was after the
establishment of a sound Christian metaphysics, the question
arises: in what respect did Leibniz think the traditional
scholastic metaphysics not to fit the bill? Wasn't Thomas
Aquinas after the same thing in adapting Aristotle to a
Christian agenda? The four conditions discussed above could
serve as a key to answering this question.
In the first place, it is arguably ill-fitted for
expressly accommodating Revelation in an up-to-date fashion.
For part of accommodating a doctrine is defending it against
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well-known objections. Scholasticism was and is rather
rigidly anchored in philosophical work done in Medieval times
when controversies were less abundant. As such it lacks the
flexibility to respond to the vigorous new attcks and
disputes
.
In the second place, Scholasticism had some significant
problems and disagreements within it on basic metaphysical
issues, which almost seem to require a breaking of new ground
to resolve. Consider especially the disagreement between
Thomists and Scotists on the individuation of corporeal
substances. The former place it in matter, the latter in
form
.
In the third place, if reconciliation is truly possible
then it arguably begs the question to insist that
Scholasticism not be radically transcended in some ways, for
it is almost exclusively associated with support of one side
(the Roman church) of the dispute. It was one of the
aggravating factors effecting the schism in the first place,
which would definitely seem to disqualify it from serving the
mediating function. Even if it were a fundamentally sound
metaphysics, another system of thought would be required to
display the truth of it in terms more understandable to its
opponents. This other system would because of the work it
would have to do be a metaphysics.
Finally, it is not at all obvious that Scholasticism
provides sufficiently critical support for Christian
doctrine. Since it was principally developed at a time when
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doctrine was not being strongly doubted or scrutinized by
scholars to nearly the extent that it later was during the
Reformation, it might very well appear to be ideology through
the eyes of an Enlightenment scholar. At any rate, Leibniz
hinted that such was his suspicion regarding the
Scholasticism of his time.
Christian Metaphysics: Did Leibniz Succeed?
The question whether Leibniz was actually successful in
sketching out a Christian metaphysics along the lines just
described cannot be definitively answered philosophically.
For one thing, his success depends on whether Christian
doctrine is true; now it would defeat his own purpose to
suggest he establishes such a thing philosophically, since to
claim it is contrary to Christian teaching: the articles of
faith or truths of Revelation are not demonstrable by natural
reason. In fact Leibniz did have dreams of establishing the
truth of Christianity; however this was not to be a
demonstration of it, but more of a comprehensive account of
its credibility, involving several disciplines such as
history, jurisprudence, etc.
Another problem in answering this question is that
Leibniz concentrated mostly on the accommodation of a select
few doctrines that were in crisis during his time. In light
of this fact it is hard to see how he would have tried to
accommodate many other aspects of Christian doctrine, even
some that were also subjects of contention: the status of
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Mary among the saints and practices venerating her, doctrines
regarding the other Sacraments of the "Roman church":
Confession, Matrimony, Baptism, Holy Orders, etc. It is even
unclear what doctrines he would have been out to defend. I
think it is the case that he was unsure about many of these
things himself, and this unsureness was part of his
motivation in developing the comprehensive strategy we've
been speaking about: to determine which are the real
doctrines. His starting point would be a metaphysics guided
by the inspiration of a few central propositions regarding
Christianity that he was sure of.
Still, it might be asked whether the metaphysics Leibniz
did do is supportive of Christianity in the way he intended
it to be. On this score, seven observations may be noted, the
first four tending to an affirmative answer and the latter
three tending to a negative answer. First, his metaphysics
allows us to envision the possibility of the Eucharist, which
had been suffering a loss in credibility due to materialistic
developments in modern, especially Cartesian, metaphysics.
Secondly, it allows a reconciliatory envisionment of the
Eucharist with respect to disputed interpretations of it
within Christianity. Thirdly, it provides a more elegant way
of explaining the remaining appearance of bread and wine
after consecration than that provided by Scholasticism.
Fourthly, it provides a way of reconciling the existence of
evil with the existence of God, and in particular provides a
way for explaining Original Sin. But fifthly, it makes
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ionmsnt of som© d.octrin©s, such as th© Trinity and th©
Incarnation, ©v©n mor© difficult, d©spit© L©ibniz's own
©f forts to d©f©nd th©s© doctrin©s. Mor©ov©r sixthly, it
r©mains difficult to s©© th© validity in L©ibniz's
m©aphysics of concluding that th© world is p©rf©ctly
det©rrnin©d in all its d©tails. And s©v©nthly, it r©n\ains
difficult to se© how a d©t©rministic m©taphysics can b©
Christian, d©spit© L©ibniz's lif©long advocacy of that
position
.
Envisionment of the Eucharist
Th© adv©nt and popularization of both Gass©ndi-typ©
atomism and Cart©sian dualism during th© Enlight©nm©nt mad©
it mor© difficult to s©© th© possibility of th© Eucharistic
pr©senc© of th© body of and blood of Christ. If ©xtension is
th© crit©rion for bodily substanc©s, how can th© substanc© of
Christ, the God-man, be present in th© ©xtension of
something else? Presence of a body would seem to require
presence of its own, proper ©xtension. A Gassendist or
Cartesian to avoid conflict with th© Faith typically did at
least on© of two things: claim th© mutual autonomy of
philosophy and theology, or begin speaking of a distinction
between apparent and real ©xtension. In th© first case these
philosophers could be accused of committing the double-truth
fallacy: that two incompatible propositions may
simultaneously be true, provided that one of them treats of
natural things and the other of supernatural. In the second
case, these philosophers could be accused of adding
I
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incredible complexity to metaphysics. For if before
consecration the bread and wine have real extension, and
afterward only apparent; whereas after consecration Christ
is present by virtue of real, while lacking apparent,
extension; then to what cause are we to attribute apparent
extension? Is it just a miraculously sustained illusion, thus
making God out to be a deceiver? If it is regarding sacred
things permissible for God to deceive, then what about
ordinary things? The admission of real extension above and
beyond the perception of it is only economical for the
Christian of the Enlightenment assuming that God would breech
His moral perfection were He to deceive us into perceiving
things as real independently of being perceived which have no
reality other than in being perceived. If it turns out that
He can regarding such an important thing as the Eucharist
choose to deceive us or some of us salva his moral
perfection, then it is difficult to see why He could not with
moral justification use this same kind of "deception" in
other instances, or indeed universally. Thus the whole idea
of real extension becomes dubious in that it seems
superfluous
.
On the other hand, if we opt not to refer to God to
explain this distinction between real and apparent extension,
our hands are tied with respect to explaining it at all.
Interestingly enough, the difficulty of Cartesians and
Gassendists who wish to maintain Eucharistic doctrine plays
right into Leibniz's hand. The only reasonable way out of
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their difficulty is to admit that it is (at least sometimes)
permissible for God to "deceive" us in a sense by creating a
world in which perceptions are harmonized without the help of
any ultimately material anchor. Once this is admitted, a
great obstacle to the reception of Leibnizean metaphysics has
been lifted or at least displaced. For Leibniz believed that
the reality of this world lies in perfectly harmonized
perceptions with no ultimate material anchor. It would be
very difficult for Christian Gassendists and Cartesians to
admit some "deception" of this kind and yet avoid the
slippery slope to the Leibnizean position.
Leibniz's non-materialism provides an elegant
envisionment of the Eucharist by making the criterion of
bodily substance to be an immaterial organizing principle of
activity (monad). This has the force of deemphasizing
appearance, contiguity, and propriety of extensions. If
Christ's bodily presence in the Eucharist depends only on the
coopting of the elements by an immaterial principle -
Christ's monad - then the remaining appearance of the
elements is no puzzle. Nor is it any longer a puzzle how
Christ's body can be fully present in many scattered places
yet unmultiplied: the unity of body is provided by the monad,
and a monad is either present or not in a body accordingly as
it has active control. In this sense, just as my monad or
"soul" is fully present in every portion of my body by being
its principle of activity, without resulting in an infinite
multiplication so too is Christ's monad fully present in any
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consecrated element, and any part of any consecrated element,
without resulting in an infinite multiplication. Finally, the
question of which extension is proper to a bodily substance
is moot, since a monad may and does appropriate and vacate
extensions on a continuous basis in the course of its life
The only unusual thing about the Eucharist is that it is a
discontiguous appropriation, whereas we are only accustomed
to contiguous appropriations, such as the appropriation of
nutrients into the body by digestion. But discontiguity is no
longer a deep puzzle; for, as has just been explained,
contiguity is not a criterion for being a unified bodily
substance in Leibniz's metaphysics.
Reconciliatory Vision of Eucharist
The reception of Leibnizean metaphysics would give an
elegant way not only of envisioning the possibility of the
Eucharist, but would do so in a way that could dissolve some
of the chief doctrinal disputes about the Eucharist among the
Christian sects. In particular, the Calvinists, the
Lutherans, and the Catholics could reconcile their views on
the nature of Christ's presence within the consecrated
elements. The Lutheran Consubstantiation would collapse into
the Catholic Transubstant iat ion the moment it was received
that the substantiality of a body is conferred solely by the
dominant monad even without destroying the subordinated
monads. So just as the monads governing our cells are not
properly said to confer substantiality as long as they are
subordinated to our dominant monad or "soul", so too the
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monads present in and definitive of the substantiality of the
bread and wine before consecration lose their status as
substance-def iners once they are made subordinate to Christ's
monad. Although they are not destroyed during consecration,
the substance of the bread and wine is destroyed at the
moment Christ's monad appropriates the elements.
A further step toward reconciliation is made once
Calvinists accept Leibniz's metaphysics. Then they will see
that there is no distinction between what they call the
"virtual" presence of Christ in the Eucharist and what
Lutherans and Catholics (and Anglicans, etc.) call His "real"
presence. In either case, it would amount to Christ's active
principle appropriating the elements. Since Christ's active
principle, like all active principles, is immaterial, the
meaning given to the Virtualist proposition that He acts on
the elements "from afar" can only be figurative. That which
is immaterial has no location, properly speaking, so it
cannot be distant in a literal sense. If Leibniz's
metaphysics on this point is correct, then a bodily substance
can be present in one sense: by its immaterial active
principle dominating some extension. This being the case,
there is no difference between Virtual and Real presence. In
both cases the presence of Christ consists in His monad's
domination of the elements.
Superior Elegance in Accounting for Remanent Species
The received account in the Roman Catholic church for
how the species or appearance of the bread and wine remain
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after consecration is that they remain as accidents without a
subject. Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the
Council of Trent, it is fairly well spelled out in its
companion. The Catechism of the Council of Trent (p. 228):
"The Catholic Church firmly believes and professes
that in this Sacrament the words of consecration
accomplish three wondrous and admirable effects.
[The first two are Real Presence and
Transubstantiation. ] The third, which may be
deduced from the two preceding.
. . is that the
accidents which present themselves to the eyes or
other senses exist in a wonderful and ineffable
manner without a subject."
Putting aside whatever practical merits this teaching may
have, e.g. the strengthening of faith in God's ability to
defy physical law, etc., there is still some reason for
holding this position. If one allows the accidents to inhere
in a subject after consecration, the only available subject,
assuming Transubstantiation, is Christ. But if the accidents
of bread and wine inhere in Christ, that is to say that they
become accidents of His body. Now there were those who
opposed the Eucharist on the grounds that it would cause pain
to Christ when the Eucharist was masticated and consumed.
The natural response of one defending the Eucharist is to say
that the accidental history of the consecrated elements is
not connected to the accidental history of Christ's sensate
body: Christ does not feel himself bitten and chewed during
consumption of the Eucharist. This defense would in turn
seemingly lead to the conclusion that the accidents or
remaining sensible appearance of the consecrated elements do
not inhere in Christ, and hence inhere in no subject at all.
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If the last bit of reasoning is valid, then any believer in
Real Presence and Transubstantiation would have to accept the
non-inherence theory to avoid inconsistency.
There are other versions of the argument, but they are
all directed toward the objective of denying that the
consecrated elements are sensate. It appears to the
proponents of non-inherence that the only rational way to
assert insensateness is to assert non-inherence. The former
is the more basic of the commitments, and the latter is
derived from the former.
The result of all this is a theory of the Eucharist
that is very difficult to accommodate in a plausible
metaphysics. The accidents of the consecrated elements are
miraculously sustained by God without inhering in anything.
This seems to go against what it is to be an accident, and so
it is unclear whether it could receive the necessary
clearance as metaphysically possible. Even if it is, is it
necessary for a subscriber to the Real Presence and
Transubstantiation to come to this conclusion? If it is not,
and if there is a more elegant explanation that just as well
accommodates doctrine, shouldn't that be opted for as having
the presumption of truth in its favor? For theistic thinkers
usually grant that God operates on a principle of economy; if
this is true it would seem, ceteris paribus, that the more
elegant explanation is the one closer to the truth.
Moreover, as a believer, shouldn't one feel motivated to
avoid, if possible, to subscribe to obscure explanations.
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diligently striving for the most perspicuous accommodations
of doctrine?
I believe that it was this way of thinking that led
Leibniz to come up with a less clumsy envisionment of the
Eucharist. As he saw it, it was unnecessary and unbehooving
to the credibility of the Eucharist to defend it via
reference to mysteriously non-inhering accidents. For it is
not necessary to admit that all that inheres in a body is
sensate in the same way the body is sensate. That which
begins to inhere in a substance enters into the organization
of it; takes on a role determined by the active principle or
"soul" of the substance. Possibly the role of something
inhering in a substance is not one of the typical ones we are
familiar with in our ordinary observation of things. Along
these lines, it is difficult to see regarding the Eucharist
why one could not say that the accidents of the elements now
inhere in Christ, but in an extraordinary way that leaves
them as insensate as they were before. Of course, Leibniz
thought everything was sensate, or at least composed of
sensate things. But this has no bearing here, where the
issue is to account for how the consecrated elements can be
Christ's bodily substance without having the sensateness of
Christ's sensate body.
It seems pretty clear, then, that Leibniz's view of
substances offers a more elegant account of the Eucharist
than the non-inherence account.
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Theodicy and Original Sin
Two Puzzles - Two things have always been and remain
guite difficult for Christian theologians to explain. The
is how a perfect God has allowed such despicable evil
in the world He created. The second is how the sin of our
first parents is justly imputed or transferred to us in the
form of Original Sin. Leibniz's metaphysics offers plausible
solutions to these two puzzles.
The usual theological response to the first puzzle is
that God created human beings and angels with free will, in
order that they be capable of loving creation, each other,
and especially Him. A world containing free beings who love
each other and God is the only world worthy of being created
by God. The unfortunate drawback to such a world is that
it contains the possibility of moral evil, of bad will.
Free-willed finite creatures are capable of choosing not to
love creation, each other, and God. When such occurs, then
evil has come into the world. In the actual case, it was the
greatest angel, Lucifer, who chose against loving. Being so
great in being, he influences many weaker free-willed
creatures, many of which yield to bad will themselves. In
particular, Adam and Eve, the first humans, yielded to
Lucifer. Their sin against God brought a distributive curse
or privation, "original sin", on all of their human
descendants, with the exception of Jesus, in virtue of His
divinity; and, many Christians say, the Virgin Mary, in
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virtue of an anticipatory grace required for her to be fit to
mother the incarnate God.
Part of the divine remedy to moral evil or bad will is
to permit physical evil into the world as a pruning mechanism
of sorts. With the introduction of the physical evil of
death, evil humans die eventually, curtailing their ability
to spread an evil influence; suffering and death sometimes
breaks stubborn hearts; those who see the physical evil
theologically as a (perhaps remote) consequence of moral evil
(bad will) are likely to strive more against moral evil. The
pruning mechanism of physical evil is to hold moral evil at
bay until the complete remedy for evil in the world - Christ,
God incarnate - gains complete domination over the world
after having lived, died, risen from the dead, ascended into
heaven, and had His presence firmly established, through the
loving work of His disciples, among all free-willed creatures
in creation. The remedy of Christ insures a glorious outcome
for creation, a divine kingdom of love for all creation and
the Creator, especially between free-willed creatures and
God
.
So in traditional Christian theology, the justification
for God's allowing evil in the world is twofold: first, it is
the result of free will, which is prerequisite of a world
worthy of God's creation; second, God provides a remedy for
all evil - Christ - such that the world is insured a glorious
outcome
.
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This ©xplanation r©n\ains unsatisfactory for many p©opl©
aghast at th© ©vils of this world. Isn't God abl© to pr©v©nt
any particular ©vil without off©nding th© fr©© will of a
cr©atur©? Catholics maintain that although a pop© may b©
p©rsonally wick©d, his official pronounc©m©nts on Church
t©aching ar© guarant©©d not to b© fals©. This guarant©©
would hav© to d©p©nd on divin© int©rv©ntion ; ©v©n if th© pop©
makes the pronouncement with ©vil intention, still, God
insures th© its veracity. Could God not in similar wise
prevent all ©vil? Couldn't h© give th© would-b© assassin a
stroke, causing him to forget his dastardly mission?
Couldn't H© hav© prevented th© WWII holocaust by causing
Hitler's death before th© atrocities were conceived?
Couldn't he let me die just before I develop th© adulterous
intention that leads to my moral corruption? In any case of
evil, it seems that God could preventively intervene without
disrupting the integrity of free-willed creatures. After all,
if I die at 70 years instead of 80, my earlier death is sure
to prevent some would-be later instance of bad will. But
this doesn't infringe on my moral freedom.
The point is that hanging evil on free will and making
the latter out to be a necessary condition of a world worthy
to be created does not get God off the hook. For within these
constraints there is still plenty of room for preventive
intervention on God's part. In light of this, one is still
left to wonder why God chooses sometimes to allow atrocious
evils to occur.
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As to the second problem with the traditional
"theodicy", the justice and possibility of the transmission
of original sin from the first parents to us, the doctrine
precedes explanations of its possibility, and the
explanations provided traditionally were not such as
to quell the debate. The closest to being the "official"
traditional explanation was, not surprisingly, the Thomistic
one
.
According to Aquinas, original sin is transmitted to
each of us because we were all "present in Adam.
. . not in
act, but... as in an original principle.... [Human]
nature's origin [in Adam] passes along the defects mentioned
[constituting original sin] because the nature has been
stripped of that help of grace which had been bestowed upon
it in the first parent to pass on to his descendants along
with the nature" ( Summa Against the Gentiles . IV, Ch. 52,
replies to objections 7, 10). In other words, Adam and Eve's
disobedience brought about a privation in the graces with
which God had embellished human nature, graces which were to
have accompanied human nature in each actualization. It is
unclear whether or to what extent this privation is supposed
to occur as a punitive divine intervention or is a direct
consequence of the sin itself. At any rate although it is
supposed to be a just privation, yet it remains unclear just
why the rest of us are guilty i.e. deserve to be deprived of
graces because of Adam and Eve; indeed the extra graces might
have served as a shield against sin.
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What moral defect did we inherit from our original
parents in virtue of which it was proper for us to be
deprived of graces, and how did we inherit it? St. Thomas
doesn t distinctly address this aspect of the question. He
only goes so far as to make it clear that we are now so
liable to sin because of the graces original sin has deprived
us of
.
Leibniz's metaphysics should be credited with giving
plausible responses to these two puzzles, the problem of evil
and the problem of the justice and possibility of the
transmission of original sin. In deliberating on whether
Leibniz's was more or less a Christian metaphysics, this may
be seen as weighing toward the "more" side; unless of course
his views turned out to contradict Christian doctrine.
Leibniz on the Problem of Evil - The problem of evil is
a much addressed issue in Leibniz, perhaps the most addressed
among all the philosophical issues he treated. The Theodicy
the Confessio Philosophi . the Vindication , and significant
parts of the Discourse . especially the beginning, all were
written to defend God's justice in the face of evil in the
world. An inability to defend God on this point would have
jeopardized his whole theocentric metaphysics, a metaphysics
based on the premise that God, the perfect being, exists. It
should be noted that a negative response to the problem of
evil would be as far as concerns the Judeo-Christ ian
conception of God an atheistic response. Those who gave a
negative response were clearly then the most potentially
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dangerous of Leibniz's opponents. Accordingly, more effort
had to be exerted to surely defeat them, if Leibniz was to
securely plant his philosophy in the mind of humanity.
Maybe it was because he saw atheism as a real threat of
his time that Leibniz was motivated to work out a more
careful and comprehensive defense of God's justice than
indeed had been offered within the Church itself up to his
time. The age of great academic feats in the Church had
already eclipsed during a time when an atheist could be
summarily dismissed as a fool, in accordance with the
Psalmist
:
"The fool says in his heart, 'There is no God!'"
(Psalm 14:1. The Jerusalem Bible, 1968)
At any rate, Leibniz saw that if God, the perfect being truly
does exist, then we can reason from that fact to conclude
that whatever evils that do exist could not have been
prevented without worsening creation! This argument is far
from original to Leibniz; he himself attributed it to
Augustine ( Theodicy , Summary, Objection 1, Answer to
Prosyllogism. Farrer, p. 378). What distinguishes Leibniz's
rendering of the position is something we will come to
shortly.
Another element of Leibniz's theodicy is, again,
borrowed, this time from St. Thomas. The latter had long ago
written that:
"one could say that defects of this kind [those
tending to sin], both bodily and spiritual, are
not penalties, but natural defects necessarily
consequent upon matter. For, necessarily, the
human body, composed of contraries, must be
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corruptible" (Summa Against the Gentiles
. iv,
Ch. 52, reply to second objection. Emphasis
mine
.
)
.
To be sure, this comment is shortly thereafter balanced
against the conviction that God's grace could supply the
natural shortcomings. Still, Aquinas does present here the
notion of metaphysical evil, that any finite thing considered
as such is inherently liable to corruption. Leibniz's use of
this notion again distinguishes his defense of God from a
Thomistic one.
In short, Leibniz culled two premises from Christian
academic tradition to form the basis of his theodicy:
i. No actual evil is preventable salva the
optimality of the actual world; or, perhaps
more familiarly, any actual evil exists only in
order that a greater good may be brought into
the world than could have been otherwise.
ii. The ultimate roots of moral evil lie in
metaphysical evil, i.e. in the metaphysically
unavoidable corruptibility of finite being.
What he did with them is what distinguishes his theodicy from
traditional Christian thought. We will come to this
momentarily
.
Three preliminary observations are in order. First, it
is important to note that i and ii are not necessarily
Christian teaching. It is also important to note secondly
that the negative and affirmative renderings of i are
equivalent. This is so in spite of the fact that the negative
rendering is likely to be less favorably received by
Christians. If we are to defend God by saying He only permits
evils so that he might bring about a greater good, we must
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admit also that to prevent any actual evil would curtail a
greater good. The latter would not be the case only if there
were some superfluous evils in the world, evils that could be
prevented without harm to the goodness to the world. If this
were the case, then the former could not be true: the
existence of superfluous evils contradicts the premise that
God only permits evil so that He might obtain a greater good.
A third point is that i is difficult to maintain within a
stable system of thought that is not determinist. The
presence of this felix culpa sort of reasoning in Christian
scholarly tradition makes it difficult in fact to
consistently deny determinism. Indeed, some, including
Leibniz, took it as a sign that the underlying metaphysics
suggested by Christian scholarly tradition is determinist.
In fact, Leibniz formed from i and ii a determinist
theodicy. Because of ii, it is metaphysically impossible for
God to create a worthwhile world that has no evil in it. But
according to i, God makes use of every evil in the world to
bring about a greater good. According to Leibniz's
elaboration, this entails that not only every case of
physical evil but also every morally evil act by any person
is indispensable to the existence of the best possible world.
If his reasoning from these two not poorly received
premises of Christian scholarly tradition is valid, then
Leibniz has a good case for saying his theodicy is the one
the Church had been in need of. It is rather elegant,
certainly more so than the defenses of God's justice
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previously available. It is stable, embracing determinism
rather than wavering between an Augustinian necessary-fault
line and the line that God does not determine moral evil.
Whether Leibniz's reasoning is in fact valid is a major
question which I will save for the end of this chapter.
Leibniz on the Justice and Possibility of the
Transmission of Original Sin - Leibniz's accommodation of the
justice and possibility of the transmission of original sin
is another point which might favor the hypothesis that his
was a Christian metaphysics. In comparison with the
perennial obscurity of Christian theologians on this point,
Leibniz's proposed solution is again more elegant and more
complete. Again its difference with traditional explanations
is subtle yet leads to quite a different picture.
Leibniz departs subtlely from the Thomistic account of
the transmission of original sin in his interpretation of how
we are present in Adam.
Aquinas argues we are virtually present in Adam: the
same originally grace-embellished nature of which Adam was
the instantiation was to be passed to us; and the privation
it received was also eventually passed to us. Adam's
instantiation was a privileged one, in the sense that the
nature-plus-grace human mold that was to be the standard for
all humans, was yet alterable by his action, whereas it is
not claimed that any other human can alter that mold. Even
Christ did not return the mold to its pristine state;
original sin is still present in the unbaptized soul, and
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some of the defects incurred by original sin remain even in
the baptized soul. The metaphysics required to back this
explanation has always remained obscure. Moreover, as
discussed above, the Thomistic explanation leaves as an
insufficiently examined puzzle the question of desert of
original-sin privation. Although these things do not make
Original Sin incredible or absurd, they still cry out for a
more elegant, easily comprehensible defense against those who
ridicule it. That's where Leibniz comes in.
Leibniz argues we are actually present in Adam. Thus
when God deprives Adam, we as present in him are also
immediately subject to the same privation. Moreover, our
actual presence makes us accessory to Adam's sin, thus we
deserve the same privation.
This sounds at first even less likely that the Thomistic
explanation. How can we be actually present in Adam? This is
really not difficult to imagine in Leibniz's metaphysics: our
monads are under the domination of Adam's monad; they lie
within the organized aggregate of his body. As such we cannot
be considered substantially present, since the only thing
substantially present within a monad-organized body is the
substance corresponding to the dominant organizing monad
itself: in this case, Adam. Yet, we are actually present,
participants in Adam's substantiality. In that sense we were
"all in it together" from the start.
As might have been suspected, there is an interesting
twist, one that complicates both the question of desert and
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the question of the possibility of transmission. The twist is
that we are all present in Adam in pre-rational form!
Leibniz preferred not to argue that we would come to be
rational by a separate miracle; he preferred to argue that
whatever internal monadic process that was eventually to turn
us out to be rational had not yet worked itself out. The
problems this causes to arise are two. First, it can hardly
be denied that moral culpability is contingent upon being
rational. In light of this, how can our having been pre-
rational accessories to Adam's sin inculpate us? Second,
sustainers of Original Sin can hardly argue otherwise than
that original sin is a privation capable of being borne only
by rational creatures. How then can our pre-rational
presence in Adam explain the transmission of original sin?
Pre-Rational Participation in Sin - The Leibnizean
response to the first problem is that although we were
monadically pre-rational, yet we were participants in Adam's
rationality and that makes us culpable if we should ever be
able to bear culpability, which we are obviously now able to
do. In virtue of our participation in Adam and our now
independent substantiality, we can say that our selfhood
historically overlaps with Adam's selfhood. We ourselves
participated in Adam's rational life, and his sin was part of
that. Therefore we are culpable for original sin if we are
culpable at all.
Of course, if we are to be culpable at all we must be
able to bear culpability and the privations it warrants. We
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normally would say that non-rational or pre-rational beings
are not capable of bearing culpability. A dominated monad in
Adam, say, governing a cell in his liver, which is not to
ever become human or another rational substance, can hardly
be said in any meaningful way to participate in Adam's sin.
Moreover, during Adam's sinning there is hardly seem to be
any significant differences between that monad and another
inner-liver-monad which was destined to become human. If it
is absurd to attribute culpability to the one, why isn't it
absurd to attribute culpability to the other? Alternately,
when a woken infant screams out chillingly in the night,
giving his mother a heart attack, we can hardly give any
blame at all to the infant, since at its stage it is not
blame-bearing. Of course, if an adult not completely out of
his mind did the same thing, it would be another story.
Pre-Rational Reception of Original Sin - If we are to go
along with Leibniz we shall have to explain how our
pre-rational presence in Adam is different both from the pre-
rationality of an infant and from the non-rational presence
of other monads in Adam, such that we now can bear
culpability for what took place then and the privations
warranted by it, and the latter two can't.
The Leibnizean response to this, the second problem, is
that culpability and privations pertinent to rational natures
can in fact be seminally stored in a monad-soul which is not
actively rational, to become activated when the soul gains
rationality. Leibniz spoke more expressly about the latter:
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privations pertinent to rational natures. A not-actively-
rational soul can store a defect pertinent to rationality in
the form of a defect to another faculty it does have. For
instance, if my healthy bodily desires become either
excessively exaggerated or depressed, that is likely to
distort a forthcoming or emerging faculty of reason. In the
former case: the bearing of culpability, it is not difficult
to imagine that something which had once participated in
rational action, then ceased to, and finally has become
rational again, would still bear responsibility for all his
rational action, both in the remote past and presently. Most
proponents of transmigration theories of the soul accept
something like this.
The remaining task for defending Leibniz in my
estimation is explaining how prerational monad can
participate in rational action, while other non-rational
monads can't. In the case of an infant, it is easy to see the
difference: an infant is not subsumed under a dominant monad
that has attained responsible rationality, whereas we in Adam
were. But so were the monads never-to-become-rational ! I
think Leibniz leaves of with the oddity of having to say that
in rigour, even the monads never-to-become-rational did in
fact participate in Adam's rationality and may sustain
defects because of doing so; but that it is improper to say
they are culpable on the grounds that they never become
rational subjects. However, if per impossibile God were to
change His mind and confer rationality upon them, they would
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then properly be said to have the culpability of original
sin. At best they can be called potentially culpable, that
potency's activation coming only with their becoming
rational
.
It may be contended that Leibniz's explanation of
Original Sin is no model of perspicuity; he would probably
have agreed. But remember, he was just trying to get the big
ball of a comprehensive, clear and distinct Christian
metaphysics rolling. In this context it is a rather ingenious
and viable attempt.
Thus far we have discussed aspects of Leibniz's
metaphysics which might weigh in favor of its really being a
Christian metaphysics. Now I wish to discuss aspects which
might weigh against it on the same score.
Difficulty of Accommodating the Trinity and the Incarnation
Background - Leibniz expended a considerable effort in
his early intellectual career defending fundamental Christian
doctrines against contemporary attacks. Some of these,
particularly those pertaining to the Eucharist, he went on to
accommodate into a metaphysical system, which, though to him
was never worked out but in sketchy form, nonetheless tends
to become more rigorous the more in proximity it gets with
favored Christian doctrines. Two most central dogmas of
Christianity which did not receive the latter pattern of
treatment from Leibniz were the Trinity and the Incarnation.
To be sure, Leibniz did not neglect to defend these
doctrines against attack; and this fact should clear him
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against accusations of wavering commitment to the doctrines.
But his metaphysics seems conspicuously insensitive to them.
As noted by Pierre Burgelin (p. 16), "[f]rom a monadological
perspective, the triplicity of persons in God can appear
singularly embarrassing". One could say the same for the
duplicity of natures in Christ (the Incarnation). All this
is obvious cause for concern regarding a metaphysics claimed
or at least hoped to be Christian.
Before going any further, it should be noted in defense
of Leibniz that the Trinity and the Incarnation are
notoriously difficult doctrines to treat philosophically,
both on their own and especially in conjunction with one
another. The notorious difficulty with the Trinity lies in
explaining how being one rational substance does not entail
having only one personal identity, and on the other hand how
being three persons entails neither being three substances
nor being of three natures. A big difficulty with the
Incarnation is explaining how being of two natures does not
entail being two substances. A puzzle involved with holding
both the Incarnation and the Trinity is that while they both
require a means for explaining substantial unity in the midst
of a stubborn diversity, the apparent explanation of one is
incompatible with the apparent explanation of the other.
According to the Trinity, God is one substance
apparently in virtue of the fact that although He is three in
persons. He has one nature. But according to the
Incarnation, Christ is one substance apparently in virtue of
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th© fact that although h© has two natur©s, h© is on© p©rson.
This frustrat©s both thos© who wish to ©xplain th©
substantial unity of a rational b©ing in t©rins of natur© —
©x©mplif ication - on© natur©, on© substanc© - and thos© who
wish to do so in t©rms of p©rsonal id©ntity - on© p©rson, on©
substanc©
.
Th© afor©m©ntion©d difficulti©s notwithstanding, it
arguably should b© a major chall©ng© of a m©taphysics that is
to b© consid©r©d Christian to g©t around th©m and thus
accommodat© th©s© two principal doctrin©s. L©ibniz's
m©taphysics not only do©s not s©©m to off©r much h©lpful
insight in addr©ssing this chall©ng©, but s©©ms to mak©
matt©rs ev©n wors©, with r©sp©ct both to ©xplaining th©
Trinity and Incarnation ©ach on its own and in r©lation to
on© anoth©r
.
The Trinity Problem - Leibniz's metaphysics makes God
out to b© something like a monad - an all-dominating on© at
that. Th© chief qualification is that unlike other monads,
God is substantially autonomous from what H© organizes or
dominates: there is no soul of th© universe; that which is
organized by God does not thereby get included in His
substantiality. Now God's comparison to a monad is presumably
based on His being a percipient; a rational percipient, no
less. Now, this creates a problem for explaining the Trinity,
because as likened to a monad God ought to be one, yet the
criterion for being the sort of monad God is likened to
being a rational percipient - sounds like the criterion for
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being a person. God is supposed to be three persons; does
this not entail having three perspectives or distinct centers
of perceiving? If so, then it sounds like God is three
monads, being which would according to Leibniz's metaphysics
entail that "He" is not one substance but three. In other
words, a thing's monad is supposed to be its nature, yet what
it is to be a rational monad sounds awefully close to what it
is to be a person; this puts the Trinity in jeopardy.
The Incarnation Problem - A spinoff of the problem just
related pertains to the Incarnation. Of the three persons in
the Godhead, only one, the second, is supposed to be involved
in the Incarnation. If the divine nature as a whole is a
"monad" of sorts, as Leibniz claims, and Christ is wholly
participant in the divine nature, how can two persons be
excluded from the Incarnation? This problem can only begin
to be addressed when an adequate distinction between the
divine nature and the divine persons has been made, something
which I am claiming Leibniz's theory of monads, together with
his likening of God to a monad, makes it hard to do.
The Compatibility Problem - A third difficulty Leibniz's
metaphysics poses for the explanation of the Trinity and the
Incarnation is that of simultaneously accounting for the
substantial unity of the Godhead and the substantial unity of
Christ. The unity of a substance is provided by its dominant
monad. God's substance is simple, comprising only the
"monad" of His nature; this because He (alone) is
incorporeal. Presumably Christ's unity is suppliod by his
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dominant monad. The problem is: what can his dominant monad
be? His being includes wholly the divine nature and a
particular human nature (as Leibniz would put it). We have
mentioned directly above that the divine nature was
considered by Leibniz as a sort-of monad all by itself. it
IS also true that Leibniz considered particular human natures
to be monads: my nature, your nature, etc., each a different
monad. How then do these two separate monads come together in
Christ to form a substantial unity? In Leibniz this could
happen only in one of three ways:
_i. both monads are subsumed under another monad;
ii. the human monad is subsumed under the divine
"monad"; or
iii. the divine "monad" is subsumed under the human
monad
.
Leibniz never suggested that the divine "monad" could be
subsumed at all, but if not, then there are only two options.
In any case, following Leibniz's rules for monads we can say
that according to i Christ would not be substantially human
and could hardly be divine; for substantiality is conferred
only by the dominant monad. For similar reasons it looks like
Christ under ii could not be substantially human and under
iii could not be divine. So in no case does there appear to
be an explanation for a single being substantially both human
and divine.
iii at least has the merit of making Christ out to be
truly human. Can his substantial divinity be salvaged by
claiming that the divine "monad" has the privilege of being
subsumed without losing its power to confer substantiality?
299
It wouldn t violate the spirit of Leibniz's metaphysics,
since the divine nature is not exactly a monad anyway. I
think this option has merit, but is not without its own
inherit difficulty. For it assumes a human nature has the
^P®^ture to receive within it the divine nature; certainly it
could not be that a human nature, which is finite, has a
closed-systemic containment of the divine nature, which is
infinite. The only option we can even consider prima facie
for a finite nature subsuming an infinite one is by some kind
of open-systemic aperture. And that's the rub: Leibniz's
monads are closed systems! Sure, they have "windows" to God,
but only as ^ machine to its energy source. Each actual monad
has already been created in all its detail, and thus any
"human nature" that has aperture to content supplied by
another nature is really no human nature for Leibniz, but
only the shell of one. So it seems at best that Christ can be
made out to be a God-man hybrid: perhaps wholly God, but not
wholly human, in the sense of being endowed with a complete
human nature as you and I are. This closed-system or
deterministic aspect to Leibniz's thought seems to present a
difficulty for its being compatible with Christian doctrine.
Ironically, Leibniz sees it as a consequence of God-centered
philosophy. To understand how he sees this let us retrace our
steps a bit.
God and Determinism
The main feature of the metaphysics Leibniz envisioned
and spent his life sketching out was theocentricity . God's
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existence was to be proved and from that all else would
follow by formal deduction. But he thought it important for
himself, who had the vision of this metaphysics, to
anticipate some of its formal conclusions by another way of
reasoning which depended on Revealed truths not quite as
premises, as in theology, but as it were hidden guidelines.
If Revelation is true, its truths could be used as clues to
metaphysical truth even before these were arrived at by
strict formal deduction. Once thus used to establish the
significant conclusions, one could patiently and confidently
await the advance of formal deduction upon them. The end
product would thus have no dependence upon Revelation in a
formal sense, and the preparatory work that Revelation did to
help establish the metaphysics could just as well pass out of
memory as far as the metaphysical system was concerned. Yet
the whole reason for conceiving this metaphysics was defense
and support of the faith.
Despite Leibniz's deserved reputation as a great formal
thinker, the formal structure of his "Christian" metaphysics
remained sketchy. There are many scattered patches of rather
rigorous formal deductions, and then there are significant
areas which received little treatment. Perhaps the most
significant area, despite a not uncommon perception that
Leibniz took it for granted, is the conceptual connection
between God's nature and a perfectly determined world.
His lack of formal rigour in this area notwithstanding,
Leibniz does give hints about the connection he envisions.
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The hints he gives can be lumped into three groups
,
without
prejudice against a possible common thread: the first based
on the way God thinks, the second on a version of the
foreknowledge-to-preordination inference, and the third on
what I call his metaphysical essentialisir.: that essence
precedes existence in the order of being.
The general idea of the first is that God's omniscience
implies that He has clear and distinct ideas of all possible
things in complete detail; all actual things are created
according to the idea God has of them, such that nothing
actual is incompletely determined. The second is in brief
that God has perfect foreknowledge of things, and divine
foreknowedge entails complete preordination, since to know
something ahead of time as God does entails knowing its
causes. In the third case, the essences of things are already
real in virtue of God's existence, and compete for existence
in virtue of their degree of being; the result of this
competition is that that group of essences gains existence
which contains the highest degree of being among all possible
groups. That being has more essence which is more determined,
and completely determined beings are possible, hence the best
world is completely determined. (Here we must be careful to
observe a distinction between 'real' and 'being' on the one
hand and 'actual' and 'existing' on the other. The former two
refer to a sort of preliminary "existence" as objects of the
divine mind, while the latter refer to the more ordinary
sense of existing.
)
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The Way God Thinks - Hidden behind Leibniz's much-
discussed identity-of-indiscernibles "principle" are the more
fundamental convictions that
i. things can't be in such a manner that God can't
think them properly; and that
ii. God creates in things the same precision of
detail that he is aware of in them.
Since no one doubts that an omniscient being is supposed to
be aware of all details in everything, it should follow both
that things cannot exist in such a way as to render
impossible this fully detailed awareness, and that things are
created replete with the minutest detail God sees in them
past, present, and future.
With this in mind, perhaps it is understandable why
Leibniz would oppose any theory of creation by "incomplete
blueprint" or "open nature", whereby God creates many things
according to the exact same nature, blueprint, or idea,
allowing them to differ only by accidents of context. In
such a case, all things sharing the same nature would be
indistinguishable in essence, yet different in number. God,
considering the idea of each, would have no way of telling
one from the other, since their distinguishing accidents of
context are not included in their nature/blueprint /idea
.
This would challenge His omniscience. But even if it could be
explained how God is omniscient even though he can't
distinguish all things by the ideas He creates them by, the
problem would still remain why God doesn't create according
to the knowledge He has of things. It would seem that since
His knowledge of things is complete in all their details. His
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creation of each thing should also be complete in all its
details
.
Or perhaps it is not all that understandable. Firstly,
it is not clear that God creating things according to
incomplete blueprints entails that His knowledge is
incomplete. He may well know the whole history and intricate
details of each substance although He didn't create them
according to such detail, nor calculate things to arrive at
such a state. Only if foreknowledge entails preordination
would we have to concede this point - which we will be
discussing shortly. Otherwise, there is nothing to prevent
the possibility that God knows things according to one
set of complete ideas and creates them according to another
set of incomplete ideas or natures. Perhaps being the "best
world" requires being created thus; perhaps His creating thus
displays even more eminently God's wisdom and power.
Secondly, although if God exists, i must be conceded,
i.e. that the manner of being of things can't be incompatible
with God's omniscience, the fact that two things have the
same nature does not preclude God's omniscience, as long as
He as some way of thinking, not limited to their nature, that
allows Him to distinguish any two such objects. And surely He
does, or at least one would think: for He can think of them
in their respective distinguishing contexts. By this
reasoning the problem of indiscernibles that even God can t
distinguish is not of metaphysical consequence, since any
candidate for existence has a context God can know it by.
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even if He doesn't or wouldn't create it having that context
in its nature. In Leibniz's defense it might be replied that
to admit that God thinks this way when He deliberates over
what to create is a tacit admission that accidental contexts
are contained within the blueprint of creation, thus
precluding open-blueprint creation. But again, what
necessitates God to create something exactly according to His
knowledge? He may create me knowing I would write this
dissertation without creating me to write it. More on this in
the final section of this Chapter.
It is rather puzzling that Leibniz would refuse to God
this multiplicity of ways of thinking. Yet in the Theodicy
.
§ 38, he seemingly does, apparently agreeing with his
imagined incompatibilist determinist opponent - Leibniz being
a compat ibilist - that "it must be that the foreknowledge of
God has its foundation in the nature of things... this
foundation, making the truth predeterminate". Perhaps some
insight into his motivation for placing this restriction on
how God thinks may be found in his reasoning for favoring the
foreknowledge-to-preordinat ion inference. See in particular
discussion of the foreknowledge-of-why preordination
inference, below.
The Foreknowledge-to-Preordination Inference - It may
come as a surprise to some that Leibniz subscribed to the
inference, by some concerned fallacious, that God's
foreknowledge of things entails His preordination of them.
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To discover exactly why he held this is a challenge I want to
address here. But first let us consider the issue in general.
It is not uncommon to think that if an almighty being
has foreknowledge of some event, He has preordained it.
After all, he is capable of preventing anything from
happening or making anything happen, and if He foresees an
event, that indicates a decision not to prevent it.
That which He has decided to prevent doesn't happen, so
foresight of an event that is in fact prevented would be
fallacious
.
Yet the view that foreknowledge implies preordination
has its problems. Normally knowing a fact is not thought to
have any influence on the fact's realization in act. Knowing
something is not causing it to be so; rather to the contrary
it is a thing's being such which has an influence on
someone's knowledge that it is such. Unless we are to apply
the term 'knows' to God disanalogously to how we normally use
it, we would have to say as well that God's knowing something
does not itself cause it to be.
The best arguments for proponents of this kind of
inference have therefore to be a bit more sophisticated. One
more sophisticated attempt is that God's foreknowing
something entails, as said above, that He allows it to
happen; God's allowing something to happen implies
responsibility for it; since God is morally perfect anything
He is responsible for contributes to things working out for
the best; and whatever under God's watchful eye contributes
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to things working out for the best is a preordained part of
God's Master Plan.
This view is deducible from Leibniz's metaphysics. God
created the best possible world, so anything He permits, no
matter how evil, is a component of the best possible world.
We can therefore be assured that any actual evil is permitted
in order ultimately to usher in a greater good. So whatever
He permits is a preordained part of His plan; and admitted
that He foresees whatever He permits
,
whatever He foresees
is preordained.
I think there are two errors in this reasoning. First,
God's moral perfection entails only that whatever He permits
not hinder things working out for the best. Perhaps He allows
some events that are extraneous to His plan. Lest this appear
as a violation of the divine economy, consider the
possibility that some things are the case which neither help
nor hinder things working out for the best, whereas God's
preventing them would be a hindrance. In such a case it would
be imperfection on God's part to prevent them, though their
non-occurrence would not hinder His plan. A Leibnizean might
call this double-talk, but I don't think it is. There are
many ways for a thing not to happen, and unless divine
determinism is true not all of them can be construed as
divine preventions. It is up to a determinist therefore to
establish determinism independently of this argument in order
to discount the present criticism. For since argument itself
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is intended to establish determinism, it would be begging the
question to presuppose determinism in the proof of the same.
Secondly, it is not necessarily the case that whatever
contributes to the best outcome of things is a preordained
part of God s plan. Perhaps God has a plan which makes
prudent allowances for things He knows will happen though He
didn't preordain them. In such a case. He might turn an
evil occurrence to His advantage, such that it winds up as an
integral part of His plan, and in that sense "contributes" to
the greater good. Again, this possibility can only be
discounted when divine determinism has been established on
other grounds
.
Three Arguments in Leibniz Supporting the Inference -
In fact Leibniz did either present or at least suggest other
arguments in favor of the divine-foreknowledge-to-
preordination inference. I count three of them, which I shall
discuss in what I see as their ascending order of
compellingness
.
The Perfect-Order Argument - The first argument is
hinted at in the following excerpt from a letter to Remond de
Montmort, 1715 (Wiener, pp. 188-9):
"[T]he order of things... requires everything to be
distinctly explicable.... Now it is impossible
that the entire Universe should not be well
regulated, the prevailing perfection being the
reason for the existence of this sytem of things
in preference to any other possible system."
I see this as expressing the following:
1. God chooses to create that world with the
"prevailing perfection" of order; perfection of
order is the raison d'etre of the actual world.
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2. The prevailing perfection of order is one in
which every detail is "distinctly explicable".
3. An order in which every detail is distinctly
explicable is one in which every detail is integral
to that order.
4. The blueprint by which God creates something
includes its raison d'etre.
5. Everything in the blueprint of creation is
preordained
.
C6. Every detail of the actual world is preordained
(1-5).
To this we can safely add:
7. God eternally foresees every detail of His
creation, the actual world.
This allows us to conclude:
C. All that God foresees is preordained (C6, 7).
One thing this argument highlights is the trivial fact
that any argument for universal preordination by a Perfect
God is also an argument for the foreknowledge-to-
preordinat ion inference.
The argument is valid, since if every detail of the
actual world is entailed by the raison d'etre of the world,
the latter is contained in the blueprint of creation, and
everything in the blueprint is prordained, then every detail
is also preordained by being entailed by something
preordained. Moreover, God being omniscient sees all the
details eternally, therefore all that he foresees is
preordained. This satisfies the foreknowledge-to-
preordinat ion inference.
The crux of the argument lies in what makes the best
world best. If we allow that the best world is the one with
the maximum of interdeducible order, then the argument goes
through. But again, this is tantamount to admitting
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determinism, which the argument is intended to establish.
Given that fact, it would be illegitimate to concede what
amounts to determinism unless provided the proof of another
argument
.
In Leibniz’s defense, he hints at the above argument in
the context of his metaphysics, taking for granted his
monadology, which is at stake here. As such we can't blame
him for circularity, since he is not attempting to pass the
argument off as foundational. Circular arguments can be
valid, sound, and perhaps even useful for instructive
purposes within a system. The only knock on them is that they
are of no use in an adversarial situation.
The following two arguments, however, Leibniz does
attempt to pass off as foundational for establishing the
validity of the divine-foreknowledge-to-preordinat ion
inference and hence, determinism. The first is an argument
still current in philosophy, which we might call truth-
eternal determinism (TED). The second is more unique to
Leibniz; call it the foreknowledge-of-why preordination
inference (FOWPI).
Truth-Eternal Determinism - Leibniz's most clear
presentation of TED is in the Theodicy , especially §§ 36-38:
"Philosophers agree to-day that the truth of
contingent futurities is determinate... for it is
as sure that the future will be, as it is sure
that the past has been.... Thus the contingent
is not, because it is future, any the less
contingent; and determination, which would be
called certainty if it were known, is not
incompatible with contingency. . .
.
"37. This determination comes from the very
nature of truth.... Now this truth which states
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that I shall writ© tomorrow is not.
.
.
n©c©ssary.
Yet supposing that God foresees it, it is
necessary that it come to pass.
. .
.
"[Divine] foreknowledge in itself adds nothing
to the determination of the truth.... does not
make truth more determinate; truth is foreseen
because it is determinate, because it is true; but
it is not true because it is foreseen." (Farrer
pp. 143-4.)
The idea is that since there is already a complete set of
truths about the future, though we may not be able to know
them all now, the future is already determined before it ever
happens. This argument does not essentially require a
theological context, but the latter is a persuasive
embellishment that Leibniz opts not to neglect.
It is hard to know exactly what to say about this
argument, whether it be the theological version or not. Some
seasoned philosophers have indeed taken it as positive
evidence of determinism or some sort of resigned fatalism.
To others, it is an obvious case of a notorious fallacy of
modal logic. It seems there is little dialogue possible
between the two positions.
The thought in favor of this way of reasoning is that
sometimes things we cannot deny, or ways we cannot help
thinking, constitute conclusive evidence in favor of views
that we can deny. It is not rare to hear believers in God,
for example, argue that nobody is really an atheist, and that
everyone's way of thinking inevitably reveals his or her
latent theism. Similarly, it might be said that the very way
we think about the future implies that the future is already
irrevokably "fixed", including what we will think and choose.
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For after all, we can have no doubt that either it will rain
tomorrow or it won't. This implies, as the argument goes,
that one of the disjuncts is now and has always been true.
Whichever is true is fixed as such, and it is only our lack
of knowledge of which is true that makes the future seem any
less fixed than the past.
The theological twist Leibniz uses on it can give the
addtional thrust that the way we can't help but think about
the future is positive proof that the future is already
determined by God. Leibniz feels we have evidence on other
fronts that creation is fully determined, so he doesn't press
the theology here. Rather, interestingly, he uses the
argument as a springboard to discuss a version of
incompat ibilist determinism to which he, as a compatibilist
,
is opposed: the inference from TED to the conclusion that
there is no freewill for creatures.
The argument against TED is that it abuses a logical
truism, i.e. that given something is true, it is true; and
twists it into the modal fallacy that if something is true,
it is true necessarily (or infallibly, irrevokably , etc.).
Although proponents, as does Leibniz, almost universally
concede that future contingents are not necessarily true, the
alternate qualification they choose still sounds an awful lot
like necessity.
TED is therefore a very controversial argument, with
probably the balance of contemporary philosophers against it.
I think its irreconcilable controversiality disqualifies it
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from being an acceptable foundational argument for the
universal preordination and hence for the foreknowledge-to-
preordinat ion inference. This is one place where Leibniz
the reconciler would most definitely have been mistaken to
stake his fortune.
The Foreknowledge-of-vniy Preordination Inference -
FOWPI is perhaps Leibniz's most serious attempt at
establishing the foreknowledge-to-preordination inference.
Perhaps the clearest expression of it by Leibniz was on an
undated, apparently private note catalogued in Handschriften
(Ch. IV, V. VI, No. 12, B1 . 14, p. 88), reading as follows:
"From the providence of God it follows that things
are determined in their causes. For to know
something is to know the truth of a proposition,
while to know the truth of a proposition is to
know why it is to be the case. If therefore God
foresees things perfectly, he will foresee not only
that they are to be, but also why they are to
be. ...
"
The genius of this argument is that it turns on a rather
stringent definition of knowing, by which knowing entails
full determination of causes. A surprising corollary of this
definition is that if determinism is false, some facts cannot
be known. If there are some facts which cannot be known, then
of course these facts are unknowable even to God - whether
they be future or past!
At this point, we have an interesting decision to make
regarding omniscience, namely: is omniscience the perfection
of knowing all facts, or of knowing all that is knowable? In
favor of the former, a fact is something that is the case,
something true; how can we consider something omniscient
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which fails to know some truth? In favor of the latter, is it
not the case analogously that omnipotence is the ability to
do anything that can be done? No good theologian expects God
to do what is absolutely impossible. So we might argue
along parallel lines that it is no contradiction to God's
perfection that He fail to know the unknowable.
There is no doubt from the way Leibniz argues here and
in advocating the identity of indiscernibles that Leibniz
conceives omniscience in the former manner. If this is the
true conception of omniscience, it seems harder to deny his
argument for preordination or determinism based on God's
omniscience and especially foreknowledge. If He doesn't know
some fact. He fails to be omniscient. But the acceptance of
this conception of omniscience forces us once again into a
choosing situation. The bind it puts a theist in is to either
accept determinism/preordination or reject the stringent
definition of knowing which brought us into difficulty in the
first place.
So we must consider whether the definition of knowledge
Leibniz uses here is faithful to what knowing really is.
This consideration brings us back into the age-old debate on
what it is to know. The proposing of stringent definitions of
knowledge such as the one above brings with it either a
skepticism strong enough to limit God's knowledge or the
requirement of a perfectly determined world. For such
definitions amount to requiring that knowledge be deductive;
and unless the world is perfectly determined, we can never
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even in principle have sufficient evidence to deduce all
facts of reality from preceding ones. Now when the Judeo-
Christian notion of a Perfect Being entered the picture, the
choice was made all the more difficult. The choice for a
theist now seems to be either against omniscience on the one
hand or free will on the other. Of course Leibniz, a
compatibilist
,
did not perceive the thst's choice in this
way; he considered free will and determinism as a compossible
(and actual) pair. Nonetheless it is the former perception
that made (and makes) determinism controversial in Christian
circles; it seems to force the denial of either of two
western theistic tenets.
At any rate, Leibniz's use of this stringent sense of
'knowledge' threatens to bring us full-circle, in the
following manner. To vindicate Leibniz's thought we have
been seeking a justification for determinism in an entailment
of preordination by foreknowledge, which brought us to try to
establish this entailment on the definition of knowledge; but
whether the definition opted for is appropriate or not seems
to depend on the settling of the determinism question, which
indirectly it was supposed to settle. Thus we cannot hope to
solve the puzzle of Leibniz's determinism based on the
proposed stringent definition of knowledge - unless there be
some way to ratify the definition independently of the
determinism question.
One Leibnizean way to attempt to do so is via the
principle of sufficient reason:
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Nothing exists for which it would be impossible
for someone who had enough knowledge of things togive a reason adequate to determine why the thing
is as it is and not otherwise." (Gerhardt, v. VI,
p. 602. Cited in Mates, p. 155.)
This amounts to saying an omniscient being must know of every
fact not only that it is but exactly why it is the case and
not otherwise. The problem here is, does the principle of
sufficient reason present support here, or merely a
paraphrasing of the definition? I think the latter is clearly
the case, and therefore that it is the principle of
sufficient reason that is ultimately at issue.
The Question of Contingent Self-Causation - Indeed, it
comes out from a reading of Leibniz's several formulations of
the principle of sufficient reason that the principle itself
is a cryptic statement of rather than evidence for
determinism. For it is ultimately a denial of contingent
self-causation (CSC), and the denial of CSC is determinism.
If there is such a thing as CSC then some things are not
deducible in principle. But first let it be understood what
contingent self -causation is, and then it will become evident
how the principle of sufficient reason and determinism are
denials of it; how it precludes the universal deducibility in
principle of actual facts.
CSC seems at first blush to be a contradiction in terms.
For the usual reference to self causation is regarding
necessary self-causation , which some, including Leibniz but
excluding Thomas Aquinas, attribute to God. Secondly,
'contingent' means 'neither necessary nor impossible', while
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that which causes itself to exist would seem to have to be
either impossible or necessary. That is to say, given that
nothing can bring itself into existence out of nothingness, a
self-caused being would have to either be eternal or
impossible. Now once a being has been granted as eternal and
self -causing
,
it seems out of the question to deny it the
status of "necessarily existent", for how could it fail to
exist? This in fact is not airtight reasoning, for although
being necessary entails being eternal in the sense of always
existing, the converse is not true. Something can always
actually exist and yet possibly not have.
At any rate, I am not using CSC to refer to something
contingent causing itself to exist, but rather to something
contingent causing, or better, originating a change in
itself. That is, CSC occurs when something or someone
contingent, say, George Washington, originates a change in
himself, especially the formation of an intention, such as to
cross the Delaware, without that intention being a strict
function of aspects of himself or the world (or God! ) that
were in existence previous to the formation of the intention.
Now the affirmation of CSC only entails that some contingent
thing somewhere originates a change in itself. In other
words, perhaps humans have the capacity of originating
intentions in the manner just described, yet most of their
intentions are still strict functions of previously existing
aspects of themselves, the world, or even God. The
affirmation of CSC especially regarding human intentions does
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cornmit on© to attributing it directly to every intention.
The existence of some case of CSC, then, clearly
precludes the universal deducibility in principle of things.
This in turn would rule out determinism and Leibniz's
principle of sufficient reason, which are tantamount to the
latter. Thus if there is CSC in the world, not even God can
have complete deductive knowledge of things. This makes CSC
an absolutely deadly virus to any theology according to which
omniscience entails complete deductive knowledge. Leibniz's
is one such theology, so naturally its prudent creator
provided the strongest defense that he could against CSC: the
principle of sufficient reason.
We are still left with the question why Leibniz chose
such a theology. Alas, I don't think I can answer that
question, beyond the following suggestions: that the dawning
scientific age tended to create the impression that there
were no limits to the progress of demonstrative reason upon
reality; and that the very notion of knowledge was coming in
Leibniz's time to be so strongly dominated by the notion of
scientific, demonstrative knowledge that Leibniz lacked an
imaginative grasp of other possible kinds of knowledge - call
them "intuitive" - that are just as genuine as and perhaps
even superior to demonstrative knowledge, and perhaps could
cover the same territory and more. Ironically, Leibniz,
following traditional theology, did attribute to God a
universal intuitive knowledge. The catch is that for Leibniz
this just meant an all-at-once deductive grasp of all things
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(wiener, p. 285). The option Leibniz neglected is that God
eternally perceives all reality directly. Choosing this
option would allow one to argue that God is omniscient in
that He eternally perceives all reality, and although He is
able to deductively know all deducible knowledge. He does not
have deductive knowledge of all reality because not all
reality is deducible.
Of course, unless CSC is plausible none of this matters.
And that's the rub: it's hard to see CSC the plausibility of
CSC. In fact, it could be said that Leibniz's principle of
sufficient reason gains its persuasive force by exploiting
the apparent implausibility of CSC.
Affirming CSC is the most straightforward way of
defending the doctrine of free will: we have free will in
that we originate at least some of our intentions or choices.
Now it is not rare to find a philosopher who clearly affirms
the doctrine of free will; yet it is rare to hear any clear
affirmation of the existence of CSC. Moreover, the general
strategies for defending free will are not many; the choice
is between CSC, compat ibilism - Leibniz's choice - and the
least savoury, the acceptance of uncaused contingent states
or events. In light of these facts, it is hard not to avoid
the impression that CSC is a "hot potato" - hot enough to
drive philosophers to oppose free will or adopt a position of
compat ibil ism
,
which is more than a lukewarm choice itself;
hot enough also to keep the non-compatibilist advocates of
free will from thoroughly explicating their views.
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CSC seems to be a notion the mind just cannot sit easy
with. But this does not make it implausible. It is arguably
just one of a whole class of "instable" notions, some of
which are widely considered as plausible; such as infinity,
eternity, non-spatiotemporal existence, and non-sensory
intuition. These notions are all, like CSC, incomprehensible
to us; even if they refer to actual aspects of reality, we do
not seem to be equipped to make distinct concepts of them.
Arguably it would be narrow-minded for us to reject these or
any notion in their class solely on account of our inability
to "stabilize" them, render them distinct in our thought. Yet
Cartesianism
,
or perhaps an abuse of it, ushered just this
prejudiced policy into modern philosophy.
Leibniz was by no means a Cartesian, but he tended to
follow with qualification ( Critical Remarks Concerning
Descartes ' Principles . 1692, § 43. Schrecker and Schrecker,
p. 35) the Cartesian epistemological policy of setting aside
all but clear and distinct notions. For although he conceded
that Descartes had "not given an entirely satisfactory
solution" on this matter ("Reflections on Knowledge, Truth,
and Ideas", 1684; in Schrecker and Schrecker, p. 3), and also
that this Cartesian policy was often abused (ibid., p. 8), he
also eulogized those who "philosophize with their own minds"
(after his own heart!) as choosing not "to accept anything
except those things which can be clearly and distinctly
conceived"; and also as despising "all those terms which...
are unexplained" (Appendix A, p. 343). Of course this did not
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lead him and many other philosophers to reject all indistinct
or incomprehensible notions; there was a lot at stake in
protecting some of them, particularly those associated with
God. But they protected them by trying to show that they are
least in principle. Still, the Cartesian policy
prompted Leibniz and other philosophers to keep this (what I
am calling) "protected class" of notions to a minimum. It may
have been this that resulted in compatibilism being favored
over a CSC explanation of free will among philosophers who
accepted free will.
The down-side of this Cartesian epistemological policy
is that it is not strictly truth-oriented. Who is to say that
some of these to-us incomprehensible notions, such as perhaps
CSC, are not indispensible for our attaining an optimum true
understanding of things? This drawback reveals the prejudice
of the Cartesian policy, with which Leibniz, I think, was
to some degree afflicted.
In the final section of this chapter an attempt will be
made to show the plausibility of CSC.
Metaphysical Essentialism - A final motivation for
Leibniz to be a determinist may be found in what I call his
metaphysical essentialism: the view that essence precedes
existence in the order of being. (I say "metaphysical" to
distinguish it from other theories labeled "essentialism".
See also pp. 46 ff. and 205 ff.) Perhaps the most clear
statement of it, albeit still a bit disguised, is found in
his essay, "On the Ultimate Origin of Things" (1697):
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[A]s the ultimate origin must be in something
which is metaphysically necessary, and as the
reason of the existing can only be from the
existing, there must exist some one being
metaphysically necessary, or whose essence is
existence ....
But in order to explain a little more clearly
how, from eternal or essential metaphysical
truths, temporary, contingent or physical truths
arise, we ought first to recognize that from the
very fact that something exists rather than
nothing, there is in possible things, that is,
in the very possibility or essence, a certain
exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some
claim to existence; in a word, that essence tends
of itself towards existence.... [A]ll possible
things... tend by equal right toward existence,
according to their quantity of essence or reality,
or according to the degree of perfection which
they contain, for perfection is nothing else than
quantity of essence.
"Hence it is most clearly understood that among
the infinite combinations of possibles and
possible series, that one actually exists by which
the most of essence or of possibility is brought
into existence ....
"Whence... it is evident that the author of
the world. . . makes all things determinately ; for
he acts according to a principle of wisdom or of
perfection. Indeed indifference arises from
ignorance, and the wiser one is, the more
determined one is to the highest degree of
perfection." (Wiener, pp. 347-9)
I say that the essentialism in this passage is disguised
because of the phrases: "the existing can only be from the
existing" and "from the very fact that something exists,
etc."; these are references to God, whose reality is the
founding source of all reality. Because of these phrases, one
might be led to interpret the entire passage as expressing
that essence precedes existence in the order of being except
for in God. These phrases notwithstanding, I think Jalabert
argues well that Leibniz's essentialism extends even to the
divine reality. Jalabert concludes from Leibnizean passages
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such as the following that Leibniz is a "positive aseitist",
i.e. that he held that the divinity is not uncaused, as
Aquinas had it (negative aseity), but so-to-speak self-
caused, in the sense that His existence is accounted for by
His essence:
"For, regarding eternal things, even if there be no
cause, a reason [for existence] must be
understood, which for immutable things is their
necessity itself, that is their essence..."
("On the Ultimate Origination of Things", 1697.
Gerhardt, v. 7, p. 302. See also Jalabert,
p. 127. emphasis mine).
Even if Jalabert is wrong and Leibniz does in fact make
an exception for God, it remains that he was an essentialist
regarding all contingent things. Actual things gain existence
by their essences outcompeting other essences. As argued in
Chapter 3 this competition amounts to a team-sport, where the
participants are compossible sets of essences; the one with
the greatest perfection or "quantity of essence" wins, gains
existence. It seems that in rigour, God really does nothing;
His mere existence sets things in motion in that it makes
essences real possibilities and not just "chimeras". The
reality of essences gives them a claim or "push" toward
existence. Creation follows as a result of the competition
among essences, won by the greatest or best possible world.
Leibniz goes on to argue that this process entails that
the actual world is predetermined in all its details. The
reason is that detail is quantity of essence, which in turn
is perfection; the more detail, the more essence, the more
perfection. The best possible thing is the most perfect, ergo
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the most detailed. Moreover, the most detailed possible
thing is completely filled out in detail, since if it were
not completely filled out in detail, something more detailed
would be conceivable, namely something just like it but whose
open variables were filled in. Thus essentialism
,
it seems,
entails determinism.
In brief, the two major points that need to be evaluated
are first, that God's existence entails essentialism at least
with respect to contingent being, and secondly, that
essentialism entails determinism.
God to Essentialism? The question might alternately
be posed as: what compelled Leibniz to develop his vision of
indirect creation, whereby God's existence gives an
existence-push to all possibilities and creation results from
a competition of essences not all of which can exist
together? One guess is that this view is the result of an
attempt to conceive God as simple act, whereas direct
creation accounts separate God's creative act from His simple
act of existence and thus seem to preclude divine simplicity.
This is not a bad motivation; though it is not a foregone
conclusion that direct creation does in fact preclude God's
simplicity, it does seem to. For the sake of argument I will
concede that indirect creation is a fact.
His indirect creationism aside, another aspect of the
claim that God's existence entails essentialism is that being
compatible with the best possible creation is a sufficient
reason for the existence of a contingent thing. For
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6ss©nt ial ism maintains that all and only such things exist in
actual creation. As a result of the competition among
essences, the greatest compossible amount of essence pushes
its way into actuality. Nothing that could have made it in
fails to, and of course nothing that couldn't because of
incompatibility succeeded. I would like to see if God's
existence really entails this.
It may readily be conceded to Leibniz that if God, the
perfect being, exists, then any state of affairs that does
not entail contradiction can be actualized. This follows from
God's omnipotence.
Now let us call any state of affairs which does not
entail contradiction a "possibility". In this wide sense
possibilities are autonomous, do not depend on God's
existence. Leibniz labelled a possibility in this sense a
"chimera", that is to say an entity of the imagination, a
"fancy". Something may be a chimera even though it has no
real chance of existing, as long as it contains no internal
inconsistency. Only "things" such as square circle fail even
to be a chimera. On the other hand, Leibniz considered as a
"real possibility" that possibility which can be actual.
The point is that, supposing that no creator exists, all
possibilities are chimeras; nothing has a chance to be
actual, for nothing has a candidate for being its efficient
cause. On the other hand, if God does exist, then all
possibilities are real, since each has a candidate - God -for
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being its efficient cause. So from the fact that God exists
it follows that every possibility can exist.
One might also readily concede that if God, the perfect
being, exists, then His creation is the best possible; for He
can never fail to do the best, and that presumably includes
creating the best. Now if the actual creation is the best
possible, then every actual thing must be compatible with the
best possible creation.
From these things it follows that given God's existence,
all possibilities, albeit real, fail to exist if they fail to
be compatible with the best possible creation. For their
existence would entail that God did not create the best. So
only things compatible with the best creation exist. That
brings us halfway. What needs to be determined further in
judging whether God's existence entails essentialism is
whether the converse is also true, namely: that all things
compatible with the best possible creation exist. With the
risk of sounding a leitmotif one too many times, I don't
think this can be established unless it is first established
that essentialism entails determinism. If such is
determined, then the answer would be "yes"; otherwise, the
evaluation of both sides of the God-to-essentialism-to-
determinism inference will be "non sequitur”
.
Essentialism to Determinism? The question is whether the
maximum (in perfection) compossible arrangement of essences
is in fact "fixed from the start", complete in detail. Let us
concede for the sake of argument that perfection is
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equivalent to quantity of essence; what it comes down to then
is whether quantity of essence is equivalent to quantity of
detail. If so, an indeterminist essentialist is a dead duck,
for reasons given just above. In the next section I will
attempt to show the plausibility of denying the latter
equivalence, and hence, of denying Leibniz's inference of
determinism from God's existence.
Christian Determinism? Testing the God-to-Determinism
Inference with the Open-World Option
Leibniz was convinced that the existence of God entails
determinism, and hence that a Christian metaphysics must be
determinist. Against this view are two possible
counterpositions: the contradictory thesis and the contrary
thesis. The contradictory is that the existence of God is
compatible with an indeterminist metaphysics. The contrary is
that that the existence of God is incompatible with
determinism. If either of these two counterpositions are
correctly sustainable, then the inference we are testing is
invalid
.
Of course, the evidence required to make a definitive
decision on this matter ex sola ratione is lacking to us
mortals. At best we can hope to put the God-to-determimism
inference in doubt by illustrating the plausibility of at
least one of its two counterpositions. In what follows I hope
to show that the contradictory thesis is plausible, and give
some indications why even the contrary thesis is not entirely
out of the question.
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Leibniz begins his metaphysics with the existence of
God, the perfect being, who on account of His perfection,
creates the best possible world. He goes on to conclude that
the world is completely determined by God in His creating it.
But what if determinism itself is a disvalue in that a
deterministic world is incompatible with the existence of
some eminently greater value? In such a case it would be
inconsistent with His own nature to create the kind of world
Leibniz said He does. So we ought to consider the
plausibility of there being a preeminent value that is
incompatible with determinism.
Leibniz's belief that a deterministic world is better
than a world not completely preordained has an obvious appeal
that can be expressed by a warehouse analogy. If I own a
warehouse with the intention of making a profit by having
things stored in it, it would be most profitable for me to
have it always be filled to capacity. In a similar sense,
supposing God to be working within set limits, he would
achieve the best creation by filling those limits to
capacity. This seems a reasonable analogy, since, after all,
God is presumed to be working within the limits of
f initeness
.
Thus it seems that determinism is maximizing of value.
But is it really? Deterministic creating can be likened, and
is by Leibniz, to choosing from among a set of things each of
which is prefixed in value. Now in such a situation, if the
set of things contains a "best" or "greatest", then choosing
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that it0iB would b© maximizing valu©. If l am hous©-hunting
and mon©Y is ind©©d no objoct, th©n of all th© availabl©
hous©s I would hop© to choos© th© b©st. Many choosing-
situations ar© lik© this. But it should b© cl©ar that not all
of th©m ar©, and in this r©sp©ct I think L©ibniz was
surprisingly ing©nuous
.
Th© point is that som© choosing-situations do not hav© a
b©st or gr©at©st it©m, I am not sp©aking of situations wh©re
th©r© is mor© than on© b©st, th© possibility of which was
r©cogniz©d by L©ibniz and dismiss©d (in such situations God
would not hav© chos©n, i,©, not hav© cr©at©d!). Nor am I
sp©aking of situations wh©r© it can't b© known which is b©st;
Leibniz has an answer for these, too, namely that such ar©
impossible on th© grounds that they contradict His
omniscience. I am speaking of situations in which there is
simply no greatest or best, period. For instance, not even
God could make a maximizing choice among th© set of finite
numbers; for there is no greatest finite number! If the
choosing-situation of creation is similar to this, then God
would be stymied; that is if He were constrained, as
determinism would have it, to choose among options of fixed
value
.
The Open-World Option - It will not do here to adapt
Leibniz's argument dismissing more-than-one-best situations
to no-best situations and say that there must be a best,
otherwise God would not have created. For a little
imagination reveals that God may still have a best creative
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choice if He is not limited to options of prefixed value.
That is, He may choose a candidate for creation whose value
continually approaches the limit of the most open sort of
infinity. This could not be a deterministic world, which,
even if it allows ’’growth" in a sense through causation, is
by definition prefixed. It has a determined value known by
God, and if created would be created with all the value it
would ever have already immanent in it by creation. A world
of unprefixed value could only be, therefore, an
incompletely determined "world" - I put ’world’ in scare-
quotes because Leibniz's very use of the term excludes the
indeterministic possibility of an "open" world. From here on
I shall use the term in a manner not exclusive of that
possibility
.
One initial advantage that the open-world option seems
to have over a Leibnizean "best-possible-world" is that it
allows us to make sense of mourning actual evil. In a
Leibnizean world all that occurs, no matter how wicked, is
necessary to the existence of the best possible world. With
this in mind, what sense ultimately could there be in
mourning actual evil? Instead, it would seem that we should
celebrate it, since it, no less than the most blessed actual
good, is required for ushering in the world’s most glorious
outcome. In fact, for that very reason I should prefer the
existence of actual evil to non-actual blessedness, since the
latter’s existence would preclude a most glorious outcome for
the world, while the former helps insure it. In contrast.
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according to an open-world option, we are not forced to
concede the necessity of any wickedness to a glorious
outcome. For in an open world, wickedness may come to exist
without having been chosen by God, that is without being a
necessary condition of the world's bestness. As such the fact
that we mourn wickedness is no puzzle here, as it had to be
for Leibniz.
Problems with the Open-World Option -
The core notion of the open-world option is that of a
world not prefixed in value; that is of a world not all of
whose resultant values and disvalues are created or
preordained by God. There is some question as to whether an
omniscient being could even have such an option. Surely God,
as omniscient, knows exactly what the overall value each
option will turn out to produce if He creates it; doesn't
this fact preclude the possibility of candidates for creation
unfixed in value?
Quite plausibly it doesn't. What makes a candidate for
creation unfixed in value is not that God doesn't know what
value it would eventually produce, but that its "blueprint"
doesn't have all those values already written into it.
Arguably, God may know the outcome without creating it.
Another problem for the open-world option is
identif iability . An open world is a world incomplete in
detail, an incomplete concept. Might there not then be many
possible open worlds that are indiscernible even to God?
An affirmative answer to this question assumes that worlds
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theare defined by their outcomes, not their blueprints -
idea by which their are created. This is a deterministic
prejudice. For in a deterministic setting, the idea
corresponding to the outcome of a world is identical to its
blueprint. This principle is no longer valid once we drop
the determinist assumption. Truly what defines a candidate
for creation is the idea according to which it would be
created. In the case of an open world, this would be an
incomplete idea. An incomplete idea has no identity problem
as long as it is distinct. So it would be accurate to say
that a possible world that is open has no identity problem
even though it has many possible outcomes.
A third problem comes to mind regarding the possibility
that a world God creates still has a variety of possible
outcomes: how can a bad outcome be ruled out? It would be
unfair to make a simple appeal to God's omniscience, i.e.
that He creates only that which He knows will turn out best,
even though He doesn't create it to do so. This is thinly
veiled double-talk: it deceptively reintroduces the
deterministic idea that God creates according to His
omniscience. A creation that has no chance for going afoul
must be conceded to have been predesigned not to go afoul.
The solution to this problem may lie in the following
consideration. Whereas a simple unqualified appeal to God's
omniscience of a good outcome can be construed as a tacit
admission of determinism, a more sophisticated, qualified
appeal may not have this vulnerability. That is to say, the
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world God chooses may be predestined without being
preordained. Indeterminism does not rule out that some things
about creation are fixed by God from the outset. It is not
implausible that there be a possible open world fixed in
enough of its aspects to insure a perfectly glorious outcome,
i.e be predestined, yet not be fixed in all its aspects, i.e.
be preordained. For instance, divine foreknowledge or
Providence" may be appealed to to account for and plan a way
to accommodate and overcome all of the most pernicious evils
that will eventually occur in that world and which, if not
overcome by Providence, could steer the world to an
infelicitous destiny. Plausibly this still leaves room for
many open variables. We could use similar reasoning to
exclude the possibility of chaos which is not caused by
pernicious evil but just by unlucky coincidence.
A fourth problem with an open-world theory of creation
comes from the consideration that the Leibnizean best
possible world, though preordained or "closed", is already
infinite in value; for it has an infinite number of creatures
in it, each of which has some value. Now the sum of an
infinite number of positive values, even if each particular
value is finite, is itself an infinite value. Although
Leibniz would likely say that the whole value of creation is
not equal to the sum of the values of its parts, he is just
as likely to argue that the sum is greater. For the order of
the whole is itself a value. Moreover, it won't be easy to
avert this challenge by appeal to a distinction between open
333
and closed infinities, the former of which presumably are
superior to the latter; for indeed, it appears that the value
of Leibniz's best world is also an open infinity. It appears
so in the sense that it has an uncountable infinity of
creatures in it: uncountable in the sense that in Leibniz’s
best world any creature contains within it an infinity of
creatures just as great as the infinity of the set of
creatures of which it is a member. Like the set of real
numbers, once you have counted one creature it is impossible
to count another without leaving out an infinity of creatures
in between
; it is impossible to develop a strategy whereby
even in an infinite amount of time you could count them all.
How can you get more infinite than that?
In ranking infinities, one plausible strategy is to
discover some finite aspect of one infinity of things which
is conceivably inf initizable
,
or at least could conceivably
be made to approach infinity. In such a case you could rank
as superior another infinity just like the first except with
that finite aspect infinitized or made to approach infinity.
Now the Leibnizean best world is an infinity, but with a
finite aspect, namely that each creature within it has a
fixed, finite amount of value. So we could say that a world
just like the Leibnizean best world but at least some of
whose creatures are not fixed in value but rather have values
continously tending to infinity would be superior. Therefore
despite the fact that the Leibnizean best world is valuewise
334
a high-order infinity, it is plausible to say God yet has a
superior choice.
A final problem I can foresee for the open-world theory
of creation is the increased likelihood it seems to give to
the more-than-one-best dilemma. Leibniz had discounted this
possiblity on the evidence that a world was in fact created,
whereas had there been more than one best world God, being
perfectly rational and thus incapable of an arbitrary choice,
would be stumped and never create. It all may sound silly,
but it is really a formidable problem that needs to be
addressed. Such is especially true for supporters of an open-
world view, since it looks like the dilemma is more likely to
occur if we allow open-world choices. This is because open-
world theory, as seen above, expressly allows for different
world-outcomes resulting from the same open world to be
equally glorious. This requires some explanation.
A world-outcome is an open world all of whose "open
variables" have been filled in by the churning out of the
world's history. Now world-outcomes are extensionally
equivalent to Leibnizean worlds, the sole difference being
that in the latter case none of the variables now in the
"filled-in" state were ever open. With that equivalence in
mind we can see that open-world theory in allowing for
equally glorious world-outcomes is implicitly denying
Leibniz's point that there cannot be two completely filled in
worlds both of which are best. Having made that allowance, it
now seems all the more difficult to imagine how they can
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disallow the same for different open worlds; more difficult
because some open worlds, like Leibnizean worlds, differ only
in what we would normally consider trivial aspects. But
whereas Leibniz could credibly insist that these differences
were not really trivial, an open-world theorist can not do
the same, since for her God is not called upon to create
every detail. So now the dreadful possibility seems to emerge
that creation might have never occurred because God had no
rational way of deciding whether He should create that open
world in which Fred Feldman is created to choose to wear a
bow-tie to his first lecture as a college professor, or
instead that world where the choice is left up to Fred. There
is arguably no difference value-wise.
In fact there is a plausible solution to this problem,
one offered by traditional theology no less than by Leibniz
himself; the principle of divine economy. God creates the
greatest value, and among the ways He could do this He
chooses the most efficient, i.e. the one requiring the least
amount of creative effort. By this principle, Fred's
decision to wear a bow-tie or not would be his own, unless it
just happened to be essential to creation's glorious outcome
that he did.
Regarding the possibility of open worlds which differ
but yet are equally and eminently glorious in outcome and
equally and eminently efficient to create, we are left in the
same boat as Leibniz. If the argument he used is good, then
it would be good here, too. If it is not good, then the
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rationalistic concsption of God is placod in joopardy. In
one sense it is arguably not good, namely in that it only
gives us knowledge of a disjunction: either the rationalistic
conception of God is inaccurate, or there is only one
possible creation eminent in value and eminently efficient to
create. I don't think it is possible for us to go any further
than this.
In short, I think the indeterministic open-world theory
of creation is quite plausible, in fact at least as plausible
as the determistic closed-world theory. If this is so, then
it is also plausible to say that the existence of God is
compatible with indeterminism. Moreover, if the open-world
theory is indeed plausible, then it is just as plausible to
argue that the existence of God is incompatible with
determinism. For the gist of open-world theory is that open
worlds are superior, and, following Leibniz, it is
incompatible with God's perfection to create an inferior
world
.
Final Note to Chapter 4
In closing this Chapter, it can be said that although
Leibniz's metaphysics has some very desirable traits that any
Christian metaphysics ought to have, such as accommodating
the basic possiblility of the Eucharist, providing a
framework for a reconciliatory envisionment of the Eucharist
with respect to interdenominational disputes, providing a
cogent and plausible explanation for the remaining species in
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the Eucharist that is arguably superior to the Scholastic
explanation which has always been in crisis, and justifying
God in the face of evil, it remains difficult to consider it
as a Christian metaphysics or even as the healthy core of one
in that it presents an obstacle to the joint envisionment of
the Incarnation and the Trinity, it adopts determinism, and
moreover it does so without demonstrating the necessity of
doing so. His metaphysics might be excused for obfuscating
the Trinity/Incarnation issue, since it has always been and
will perhaps always remain foggy. But in light of the fact
that he apparently never seriously explored the possibility
of indeterminism whereas determinism c aates serious
difficulties for Christian doctrine, I think the
deterministic aspect of his philosophy should weigh against
his metaphysics being considered as Christian.
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CLOSING REMARKS
Although Leibniz's attempt at a Christian metaphysics
ultimately, I believe, fails on the various counts mentioned,
there are four key insights enveloped in the attempt that are
of great value concerning the prospects of the mutual
supportiveness of faith and reason.
The first insight is that a faith commitment does not
necessarily bias one's thinking; nor does the avoidance of
bias require pretending or striving not to have a faith
commitment. On the contrary, what is required to avoid bias
and hypocritical - that is, insufficiently critical -
thinking is to face up to one's commitments, and have the
courage to use them as aids in developing the formally basic
premises of pure reason and see where they lead. An erroneous
faith commitment could only be exposed by doing so; that
which entails a metaphysical inconsistency can't be true.
The second insight is that bracketing one's faith
commitments when doing philosophy hinders the advance of
philosophy. The subject matter of faith is also potential
subject matter of philosophy, and is of utmost significance
to our lives. By bracketing faith commitment we make it very
difficult for so much significant potential subject matter to
enter philosophy. Formal reasoning, though diligent, is
cumbersome, and many things of which we become convinced by
faith would only with great difficulty enter the
philosophical forum unless they were permitted to enter
escorted by faith conviction. From then on they would be
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subject to the same scrutiny that other beliefs are subjected
to by philosophers.
The third insight is that is that bracketing one's use
of reason with respect to faith only hinders the advance of
and deepening conviction in true faith. Nor would faith
convictions even without qualification as to truth value
benefit, either, if John Stuart Mill was correct in arguing
that unexamined beliefs lose their significance. It is hard
to maintain a strong truth-oriented conviction in things that
are protected from rational critique. In such cases it is
hard as well to escape the impression that confidence in
those faith commitments is lacking.
Finally, the very image of reason among believers is
sullied not by its association with faith, but by its
separation from faith. If faith is truth denied by reason,
then reason must be falsehood. On the other hand, the very
image of faith among non-believers is sullied not by its
association with reason, but by its separation from it. If
faith is belief contrary to reason, then so much the worse
for faith.
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APPENDIX A
THE 1671 LETTER TO ARNAULD
The following is a translation of most of a letter from
Leibniz to Antoine Arnauld, his first, dated 1671. Fifteen
years transpired before another letter passed between them,
at which time their correspondence began in earnest.
The letter in its original Latin is published in C . J.
Gerhardt's Die Philosophische Schrif ten von Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz
,
v. 1, pp. 68-82. It can also be found in Samtliche
Schrif ten und Brief
e
. series 2, v. 1, pp. 169-81. Smaller
portions of the letter have previously been rendered in
English by Leroy E. Loemker in Leibniz - Philosophical Papers
and Letters
. University of Chicago Press, 1956, pp. 229-33).
These portions are fully contained in the following and are
rendered all in a piece with the rest of the composite,
independently of Loemker 's work.
"Although I believe that a letter from an
unknown person is bound not to appear to you to be
intriguing or noteworthy, you, with the customary
gentleness of a great man, excusing all the
egregious error lying therein, nonetheless the
reason and occasion for my writing to you ought to
be set forth.
"When recently, by request, I visited the Most
Illustrious Baron Boineburg, a man of both public
and private achievements who is surprisingly
unaffected by the public acclaim concerning his
renowned undertakings, and so admirable in his
marvelous vastity of erudition that he incites
shame even in those who have done nothing else in
their whole lives; a man, then, of most confirmed
judgment, by which he, if anyone, has the
disposition to recognize the flavor of eloquence
and sublimity of the ancients [i.e. of the Church]
in the writings of more recent times - of which
hardly anything escapes him; a man most ardent
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with the zeal of religion and piety, not merely
choosing to dedicate his liesure to the correction
of public evils, but also concentrating his
thoughts, counsel, and deeds toward all that by
which international unity might be increased and
domestic corruption eradicated; when I recently
visited this man, then, your name continually came
up. He had just returned from the side of the Most
Serene Prince Ernst, Landgrave of Hesse, at a
recent colloquium of yours. He had also just
received a letter from the Most Ample Fraxineus, in
which he was vehemently rejoicing over the
opportunity he would soon have of being revealed a
new idea of yours while in your company, and over
his being on the verge of satisfying, in the near
future, more fully that thirst which makes him
desire to reflect on your writings whenever he
catches wind of even a tenuous rumor of new works
by you.
’’Discussing these things, soon, as it happened,
we slipped into discussing your works on the
Eucharist, in which the truth of the mystery, and,
may I say, its reality, is asserted, in accordance
with the continuous tradition of the Holy Fathers,
in opposition to the symbolists. And we rejoiced in
the Church have finally obtained victory, who, with
repeated replies insisted that she would concede
nothing of substance to adversaries once defeated.
Hitherto, in fact, rarely had a steady battle been
waged. It seemed, rather, that the battle had been
fought only with unsteady, light-armed troops that
were bound to come up lacking.
”At that point I said: don't doubt me, but that
the adversary faction defeated by you, not yet
sufficiently defeated, is gathering itself to
bring up the rear with their boasting about
agreement with the ancients. Specifically they
are putting forth arguments of impossibility which
solely on account of whose failing acuity of
meanings they think themselves able to sustain
against all the centuries of consensus among
Christian peoples, and which they claim ought to
be held every^*here as common sense rather than as
absurdities. In particular they are holding
[first] to a thesis in itself greater, that if the
same body is given in many places, then the body is
given under the quantity of another smaller body,
yet with all its parts conserved. They are holding
to a thesis in itself weaker, although indeed it
has almost been persuaded among recent thinkers,
that the essence of body consists in quantity, i.e.
extension. [With these in hand, they argue that
the Eucharist is impossible because it entails the
following absurdities. 1.] That the substance is
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changed with all the host’s qualities retained;
even though it is seen by more acute philosophers
that substantial form differs from its qualities
only in relation to sense, just as the true outline
of a city, viewed from a tower at its center,differs from its countlessly many variants that
appear when the same area is viewed from without.
[2.
]
That one thing is changed into another, with
no matter remaining; even though this does not
amount to being changed, but rather to a new thingbeing created at the extinction of the old. [3.]
That a thing changes not only into a new
appearance, but
-previously unheard of in reason -
into a new individual; even though change is the
transit of the same individual from state to state.
[4.] That a thing actually changes into a thing
already existing; even though change is the end of
one and the beginning of another, just as what now
exists comes from other things. And finally, [5.]
that the same thing is made out of many different
things, a whole out of singles, and yet, many
things having changed into this one whole, it is
not increased, just as if it had only received one
of them; that is, the same thing is made from the
whole and from the part, as if the whole is equal
to the part
.
"Ultimately change gets rejected by them,
especially substantial change. But it cannot be
said by them what the act of the thing, its force,
is; what effect underlies it; what reality there
is in the host, in virtue of which it is called
the body of Christ, rather than just another piece
of bread, which indeed it resembles in all aspects,
except in that it is honored with another name.
"These arguments they hold, and more challenging
ones still: weapons of which it is to be hoped that
these enemies of the Church may be disarmed.
"I added [in the continuing discussion] that
there are two kinds of people who need to be
persuaded. Some indeed, especially concerning
things remote from common practical experience, are
led by authority, leaving for others the more
pointed inquiry into the heart of things. Among
this kind of people nothing is persuaded by proofs
of long duration, but by consensus of the people.
Others, though, philosophize with their own minds;
they don't choose to accept anything except those
things which can be clearly and distinctly
conceived, much less still those things which
become more entangled the more they are explained.
These people despise all those terms which either
do not signify anything or are unexplained, terms
by which inanities are protected. It has been
persuaded among these people that the ancients.
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most of whom were destitute of philosophy, even
haters of it, indulged in rhetorical disputes in
order to render the mysteries of the faith more
admirable to the masses. Then little by little
opinions passed over into dogma; the later
scholastics, having lost the method of dialectic
and given themselves over to fantastic
speculations, passed down to us that frivolous
philosophy by no one understood, the greater part
of which is solely in defense of
transubstant iation
,
or prepared solely for
defending it. Such conclusions Bacon, Hobbes, and
the author of the astonishing new book De Libertate
Philosophandi [better known as the Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus
. authored by Baruch Spinoza]
have drawn, to the monstrous applause of the great
men of their school of thought. And it is amazing
how much the philosophy of Descartes confirms them
- and it has been quite favorably received by them
- both in that it is meticulous and in that it
seems irreconcilable with the Roman Church. For
will one who believes that the essence of body
consists in extension ever believe that that a body
can take on the extension of something else, while
retaining its own substance? Whence all
Descartes’s protests to the contrary are believed
simulated and inconsistent with fact. Such is the
judgment of the Society of Jesus and of many orders
concerning Descartes; the philosophy of Descartes
is had by these orders as a foe of their religion.
This fact is exploited by opponents of their
religion as an argument of its falsity. For indeed,
that religion is suspect which shrinks back from
the very analysis of its terms, which despises
self-examination, and hates that philosophy among
whose first principles is that nothing is to be
admitted except that which is clearly and
distinctly apprehended. The philosophical age is
dawning in which a more acute interest in truth is
being diffused even outside the schools, among men
born in the Republic. The true propagation of
religion will be hopeless unless it satisfies
these men. A great portion of conversions will be
through philosophy. Nothing works better at
confirming Atheism or certainly at strengthening
naturalism and undermining from its foundation - as
it has nearly already done - the slipping faith of
many important
,
though blameworthy people in the
Christian religion, than on the one hand to
advocate that the mysteries of faith are always
believed by all Christians, and on the other hand
to be convinced of stupidities by certain kinds of
demonstrations of "right reason". There are many
within the Church who are more bitter enemies of
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her than the heretics themselves. It is to be
feared, lest the heresy in the end be, if not
Atheism, then perhaps a vulgarized naturalism, or
even Mohammedism. To the latter belongs very little
dogma, hardly any unless some ritual is joined to
it; it is because of this that it has occupied
almost all the Orient. The Socinians, who are now
lifting their heads throughout Britain and central
Germany, are arriving at such a doctrine, and they
are meticulously occupying themselves with whatever
comes from the minds of great men.
"It is set before us to do battle with these
enemies, whose game is to ridicule the simplicity
of the ancients, after having expounded their own
philosophy
.
"I virtually consider you as one - and by this
we would refute Pascal - who can do battle on
either side, who is equally strong both in
erudition and wisdom, a rare coupling. For example,
take Ars Cogitandi
,
a book of great profundity, the
author of which, whoever he is, is certainly from
your school
.
"I remarked [in the discussion] that many things
had suggested themselves to me in thought on the
same subject, having especially to do with the
Eucharist, which I think largely pertain to this
affair of great moment. At that point, however, the
Most Illustrious Boineburg, who remembered the
things that had already been proposed by me several
years ago in regards to explaining the mysteries of
faith, especially the possibility of the Eucharist;
and who recalled also that these explanations had
received at that time more than mediocre acclaim,
began to exhort me urgently, lest I might lose this
opportunity of writing you. He accepted
responsibility for the realization of this letter.
I, motivated by his authority, yet sure of your
good faith and virtue, have sent you this letter
which you now have before you, whose vastness of
breadth I hope the nature of the matters being
treated will in your eyes excuse. And now, if you
will permit, the motivation for my studies ought to
be outlined a little more in depth.
"Amid so many distractions, I deem myself to
have dwelt more persistently on hardly another
issue in the course of this life of mine, however
short, than on what it is that will render me
secure in the life to come. I confess that surely
this one issue has been for me by far the chief
cause for philosophizing. Through this effort,
moreover, I have obtained a reward not to despised:
peace of mind, and in addition can declare that
there have been proven by me some things which
heretofore either were merely believed, or indeed.
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even though of great importance, ignored. I saw
that Geometry, or philosophy of space, constructs a
stepping-stone to philosophy of motion or body, and
that philosophy of motion prepares the way for
science of the mind. Concerning motion, then,
several propositions of great importance have been
demonstrated by me, of which I shall name two:
first, that there is no cohesion, or consistency,
to a resting thing, contrary to seemed to Descartes
to be the case; consequently, whatever is at rest
can be divided and moved by any motion however
small. I followed up the consequences of this
proposition a long way, and found that a body at
rest is nothing; it does not differ from vacuous
space. Whence follows a demonstration of the
Copernican hypothesis and many other new things in
natural science.
"The other proposition is that every motion is
in a full homocentric circle; rectilinear, spiral,
elliptic, oval, or heterocentric circular motions
can none of them be found in the world, unless a
vacuum is admitted.
"It is not necessary here to speak concerning
the other propositions. I mention these two,
however, because from them follows something
useful for our present purpose: from the latter, it
follows that the essence of body does not consist
in extension, that is, in magnitude and shape;
because necessarily, vacuous space is different
from body, even though it is extended. From the
former of the two propositions, it follows that the
essence of body, rather than in extension, consists
in motion, since the notion of space is resolved
into magnitude and shape, that is, into extension.
"In geometry I have demonstrated certain
fundamental propositions, on which rests the
geometry of indivisibles, the source of inventions
and proofs: that undoubtedly, any point has less
space than any given extension; that that points
have parts, although these are indistant; that
consequently Euclid does not err in speaking of
parts of extension; that nothing is indivisible,
and yet there are unextended things; that there
exists some point greater than some other point,
but greater to a lesser degree than can be shown,
that is, still in infinitesimal proportion to any
sensible extension; and finally, that angle is the
quantity of point. I added then that from the
analysis of indivisibles it follows that the
relation of rest to motion is not like that of a
point to space, but that of zero to one; that force
to motion is as point to space; that there can be
many forces simultaneously in one body, but not
contrary motions simultaneously in the same body;
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that sometimes one point of a body moved of its ownimpetus IS, at a time, in several places, atseveral points of space, that is, in a part ofspace greater in extension than itself; thart thatwhich IS moved IS never in just one place, not even
certain infinitesimal instant of time; andthat. If one body exerts upon another, they areboth at the start of penetration or union, that is,their extremes become one, just as Aristotledefined the continuum as "where the extremes are
one . Hence all and only those bodies are one which
exert upon each other
. There are even certainimmanent parts or "signs" [to points] and this fact
can be confirmed in cased of continously
accelerated motion. Since this motion is growing
at any instant, including the initial instant, and
since growth entails the apposition of a prior sign
and and posterior sign, necessarily, at any given
instant, one sign is prior to another, yet not with
respect to extension, i.e. not with respect to any
distance between signs whose proportion to any
detectable time-span, however small, is greater
than any other specifiable proportion between time-
spans. That is, the ratio is that of a point to a
line
.
"Furthermore, from these propositions I
obtained great fruit, not only regarding the laws
of motion which are yet to be explained, but also
concerning the theory of mind. Since it has been
shown by me that the true place of our mind is a
certain point or center, from this I deduced
certain interesting consequences concerning: the
incorruptibility of the mind, the impossibility
of desisting from thought, the impossibility of
forgetting, and the true and intimate difference
between motion and thought. Thought consists in
exertion, just as body consists in motion. Every
body can be understood as momentaneous mind,
lacking memory. Every exertion in bodies, with
respect to its determination, is indestructible.
Also, since an exertion in the mind is, with
respect to its degree of velocity, like a body in
the course of motions, so then mind consists in
harmony of exertions. The present motion of a body
originates from the composition of preceding
exertions; the present exertion of mind, that is,
will, originates from the composition of preceding
harmonies into a new one: satisfaction. If
something else charged with force disturbs the
harmony of such satisfaction, this results in pain.
These things and many others I hope to explain in
these Elementa de Mente f Elementa de Merite et
Corpore . 1672 (?)] on which I am working. In this
vein I might dare shed something of light in
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defense of the mysteries of the Trinity, of the
Incarnation, of Predestination, and, concerning
which I am about to speak, of the Eucharist.
"....Besides these things, I declare and believe
to have mastered in a brief booklet the ElementsJuris Naturalis [1671 (?)] in which everything is
explained from definitions alone. A good or just
man I define as one who loves everyone. Love is
satisfaction derived from the happiness of others,
and pain derived from the unhappiness of others.
Happiness is satisfaction without pain,
satisfaction is the sensing of harmony, pain the
sensing of disharmony. Sense is thought together
with will, and will is the exertion of acting.
Harmony is diversity balanced by identity.
Certainly, variety pleases us, but only once having
been brought back into unity.
"From these definitions I deduce all the
theorems of natural law and justice. Permissible
would be that which is possible for a good man.
That would be obligatory which is necessary for a
good man. From all this it appears that the just
man, who loves all people, just as necessarily
strives to help all people even when he cannot, as
a rock tries to fall, even when it is hanging. I
show that every obligation is absolved by maximal
effort; that it is the same to love all people and
to love God, the seat of universal harmony; that
indeed it is the same to truly love, that is, to be
wise, and to love God above all things; which is to
love all people; which is to be just. If many
abstained from pleasing themselves, as is
preferable, then a greater good would result in the
sum total. Hence, in the case of a community, all
else being equal, it is better, that is, publicly
more loving, to do so. For whatever is contained
in this community will be multiplied by reflection
into many, just as by pleasing this community many
individuals will be pleased. Indeed, that
community is to preferred, all else being equal,
which has the most good. It will be shown, in fact,
that pleasing has the property not of addition but
of multiplication. Now if two numbers, one greater
than the other, are multiplied by the same number,
multiplication adds more to the greater one:
5 X 2 = 10; 10 X 2 = 20; 6 x 2 = 12; 12 x 2 = 24;
it is clear. But the addition of 5 to itself three
times makes 15, and 6, 18. We profit more in the
total result by multiplying the greater number by
the same multiplicans . This difference between
addition and multiplication has a great use, even
in the doctrine of justice. However, the reason why
to please is to multiply and to harm is to divide
is that that which is pleased is the mind. The
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mind, however, by enjoying all things can devote
itself to all things, which, in turn, is in itself
to produce or multiply. Assign 3 to someone's
having wisdom and 4 to his having ability. His
total estimation will be 12, not 7, for he can use
his wisdom just to the degree of his ability. Even
concerning things of the same kind, he who has a
hundred thousand gold coins is richer than are a
hundred collectively, each of whom has a thousand.
For unity produces utility. The one man increases
his profit even at rest. The others lose wealth
even while working. Therefore, in pleasing, when
the necessity is the same, the wiser person is
always to be preferred; when the degree of wisdom
seems the same, then the more fortunate one is to
be preferred, as he is the one whom God favors. For
to be born well-disposed for having wisdom is a
matter of fortune, that is, it is a gift of God.
From these considerations the abundance of good
things that either derive from happiness or which
result from hard work is explained. And the one
who possesses them is to be preferred for pleasing,
just as he is favored by fate. On the other hand,
in the case of two who are headed together toward
the same loss, to the extent that it is a case of
losing out and being harmed, that one is to be
preferred for helping who is penitent to the one
who is deceitful. But whoever is in such a
situation by chance or misfortune is to be
preferred to both of the other two.
"There is hardly anything which does not admit
of being deduced from these principles. Even this:
that ruler is truly a hero in the end who seeks his
chance for fame in the happiness of the human race.
Thus I have circumscribed a doctrine of
predestination of this sort by means of these
brief, schematized principles, and I have taken
care that it have been examined, point by point, by
several distinguished theologians from all areas
throughout Germany, with all of them being unaware
of its author. It may surprise you that it is
receiving ubiquitous consensus. Of course, most
disputes are in no part resolved by recourse to
certain terms whose definitions are designed to
confound.
"It remains that I speak of the Eucharist. It
has been four years, as was acknowledged by the
Most Illustrious Boineburg, since I have been
reflecting on the following problem; how to explain
the possibility of the mysteries of the Eucharist,
or what amounts to the same thing, how to so
explicate it that we may finally arrive, by
continuous, unbroken analysis, at conceded primary
postulates of divine potency. Now in a certain
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manner it is to be deemed that a geometer has
already solved a problem, that is, he has
explicated some possible manner of being for it and
thus explained its possibility, at that moment when
he has reduced it to other already solved problems,
or to problems not requiring a solution, that is,
to postulates
,
which are to problems as axioms are
to theorems. And this, happily, I seem to myself to
have finally accomplished with respect to the
Eucharist. When it was first grasped by me both
that the essence of body does not consist in
extension, as Descartes thought - a great man
otherwise, without a doubt - but in motion, and
that therefore the substance of body, that is, its
nature - and this agrees even with Aristotle's
definition - is its principle of motion (there
being no absolute resting place in bodies); and yet
also that the principle of motion - the substance -
of a body lacks extension; at that time it appeared
most clearly why substance differed from its
appearances and the method was discovered by which
God can be clearly and distinctly conceived to
bring it about that the substance of the same body
be in many scattered places, or, what is the same,
under many appearances. In fact this will also be
shown - something which has not occurred to
anybody: Transubstantiat ion and Real Multipresence
do not differ in the final analysis. Nor can a body
otherwise be able to be in many scattered places,
but that its substance be conceived as given under
various appearances. The substance of the body
itself is not in fact subject to extension and not,
consequently, subject to the conditions of space,
as will be distinctly shown when the notion of
corporeal substance, as far as it is of importance
in this matter, is explicated. So therefore it is
not the case that Transubstantiation , as expressed
in cautious phraseology by the Council of Trent and
as elucidated by me in accordance with Doctor
Thomas, contradicts the Augsburg Confession. On the
contrary, the former follows from the latter.
"On the surface, then, there remains but one
controversy, if any, between the two parties: is
the Real Presence, or Transubstantiation, either
one - which I will show entail one another -
instantaneous, not lasting except for the moment of
use or consumption, as the Augsburg Confession
teaches, or indeed, after having begun to exist
from the time of consecration, does it last up
until the time of the corruption of its species
[appearance], as the Roman Church teaches? This
controversy does not pertain to the matter at hand,
for either claim is equally possible. For in fact
duration of itself does not alter the nature of a
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thing. Which of the two God has willed is to be
ascertained by the authority of Sacred Scripture
and by Church tradition. But once this question
has been resolved, is it also decided whether
adoration is owed to the host? This is the only
practical question that remains between the Council
of Trent and the Augsburg Confession concerning the
Eucharist. (I don't speak now concerning the
participation of many appearances under one nature,
nor of the nature of these appearances; these
questions do not touch upon the manner of the
mystery.) For if the body of Christ is not present
except in the moment of use, the host ought not be
adored before having been consumed, yet once
consumed it cannot be adored. As for the manner or
way of the mystery, if you take away duration,
those not knowing it will experience the same
thing. Than this observation nothing can be thought
of toward more effectively hammering back at those
who jest you and your colleagues, you who are more
eloquent than they in proving and defending either
Real Presence or Transubstantiat ion
.
"What, however, the substance of body is and how
it differs from its physical appearances I hope
will be placed by me in as clear a light as thought
and motion have been. Let me submit everything to
you censure. I am counting on success and approvers
through you for a matter of perhaps some importance
in increasing the union of souls and in defending
our faith against insults which we have hitherto
countenanced with a refusal to quarrel. That
thunderbolt having been endured by which many great
men are frightened away, a huge door for return to
unity will lay open.
"Furthermore, so that you might have more faith
in my promises, let me say something of the worry
which I have had concerning religion. Now, I am
very far from credulity; none of it for me. I might
nearly say that I've not given in to it even
regarding faith. I have believed in fact that any
amount of rigour that was surrendered in an affair
of such importance as religion amounted to evasion
of the truth. I have researched studiously and read
diligently whoever has been thought of either as
most bitter toward our faith or most felicitous
toward it. I have not wanted any negligence on my
part to ever be able to pose itself as an obstacle
against me. I have pursued whatever has been
authored by innovators everywhereon the subject of
religion, lest in the end some noteworthy objection
or consideration might escape me. ... I did not even
avoid the subtlety of the Socinians - than whom no
one is better in good, no one worse in evil - and
in doing so I experienced an effect contrary to
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what the censors had feared. Nothing, indeed,
confirmed me more in the faith than that the
dreadful names of the rabble did not considerably
move me with fear; than that they restored me even
more deeply and securely in the faith. Indeed,
Et cum fata volunt, hina venena juvant.
[When the fates so will, even double
poisons are healthful.]
In fact, when I was examining together the lofty
thoughts of great geniuses - which on account of
their loftiness were erronious - I often marveled
at the providence of God, placing one of these
thoughts before another so that the judicious
reader could put together out of these very
thoughts a fully admirable system of excellent
documents, if he would just direct his attention
most steadfastly to those points that are in
agreement with the traditions of the Catholic
Church
.
"It remains that I say something to you about
other slightly more popular studies of mine which
are less withdrawn from the senses....
"I have constructed a physical hypothesis...
so great is its simplicity and clarity, that it
even seems to some to be more certain than a
hypothesis. I can but set a summary of it before
your eyes
.
"Before all things it is manifest that either
the earth or the sun moves. Although I may seem to
have proven elsewhere, in effect, the motion of the
earth, on the grounds that there is no cohesion nor
consistency, nor indeed corporeality, to a thing at
rest, still, a light circles around our earth in a
daily motion. This light, in turn, consists in the
motion of a certain body more subtle than air,
which one may call 'aether'. This motion of aether
is twofold. For aether, on the one hand, is set in
a forward direction before the light by rays of
light pressing against it, and on the other hand,
expands laterally. It goes before the light from
east to west lined up with the equator and the
parallels, whereas it moves laterally, toward the
poles, along the meridians.
"From this one obvious and I might nearly say
necessary assumption I deduce nearly all the
phenomena of nature, which I refer to under three
main headings: gravity, elasticity, and verticity.
These I claim are derived from the disturbed and
self -restoring motion of aether. From them are
derived all phenomena. For the circulation of
aether, which is, accordingly, the sufficiently
forceful motion of a body in a thin liquid.
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to rsmov© th© disturbing body; and ©v©ry
motion is disturb©d by int©rposition of a d©ns©r,
mor© solid body. For that is a solid whos© parts
mov© in conspiring motion. A liquid is an aggr©gat©
of small©r solids. H©nc© if a solid is plac©d among
l©ss d©ns© bodi©s, or what amounts to th© sam©, if
a liquid is plac©d among d©ns©r bodi©s, th©n th©
light©r portions or parts, having b©©n ©xcit©d,
pr©ss toward b©coming a solid, that is, into
b©coming not as ©asily divisibl© into small parts.
Th© d©ns©r parts try to dissolv© into small©r
parts. But th© solid, b©caus© of its conspiring
inn©r motion, from which it has b©©n forg©d, will
r©sist ....
"I hav© d©sign©d two d©vic©s, on© for doing
arithm©tic, th© oth©r for doing g©om©try. Th©
form©r, quit© portabl©, works in such a way that
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division
of th© gr©at©st numb©rs ar© quickly carri©d out
with almost no m©ntal ©ffort on th© part of th©
op©rator
.
"Th© oth©r d©vic© will introduc© a n©w m©thod
for m©chanically solving analytic ©quations,
proportions and and transformations of shap©s with
n©ith©r tabl© nor count©r nor sk©tch©s, and for
p©rf©cting g©om©try as much as is n©c©ssary for its
practical application. For to t©ll th© truth, w© do
not n©©d th© tris©ction of an angl© or th© squaring
of a circl©, nor for that matt©r th© solutions of
oth©r probl©ms of th© kind. Th©y hav© alr©ady b©©n
solv©d accurat©ly ©nough for practical purpos©s so
that it is in our pow©r how much ©rror w© wish to
allow. According to this standard, if w© appli©d
th© d©vic© to all imaginabl© g©om©tric obj©cts, I
don't s©© what could b© l©ft to b© d©sir©d.
"Nothing important about my oth©r ©nd©avors
com©s to mind. Som© of th©m may s©©m rash in
promis© unl©ss th©y ar© obs©rv©d at th© sam© mom©nt
in which they ar© being worked on. I submit on© of
them for your consideration: I fell upon a method
of compressing air at least 100 times that pressure
which w© had previously been able to attain.
Therefor© it can b© estimated how much elastic
fore© is necessary for air to b© air.
"I hop© som© day to b© given th© opportunity of
speaking with you in person about these and other
topics. For indeed, I seriously believe, and I am
not alone in so thinking, that such is your
learnedness and authority that, for promoting th©
efforts of those who stick their necks out for th©
advancement of society, another person could not
©asily be found who is mor© skilled than you at
recognizing them and mor© effective than you at
commending them. I hope also to be able to propose
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to you several things
-several contributions to the
sciences - that may lead to a somewhat more
profound access to human happiness; to a
significantly greater certitude in the science of
medicine, of whose now deplorable state of
confusion kings no less than the common folk
complain; to technological success; and to the
defense of religion and the knowledge of God and
mind
.
"Someone other than you would perhaps be
angered at or ridicule the length of this letter,
especially the first part. Of you, that is, a wise
man who considers each thing according to its own
weight and measure, I have been convinced
otherwise. You know that I could in no wise have
spoken excessively in this space on so many things;
and that not everyone who takes up many issues at
once is vain or rash. Still, I may pass over all my
other speculation; I wish one thing: that it be
permitted that your opinion infrom me, in several
lines, at least concerning the subject of the
Eucharist. You also have intimate friends of whom
you may make use of in this regard.
"To anyone else whose hand might reach this
letter: I suspect very little to be of value here;
however, I still very strongly plead that the
letter not be copied from. "I have only written
these things with trust and confidence in your
virtue. What remains to be said is: farewell,
illustrious man, and may you remain to enjoy for a
long time your own repute, which you have earned
from the public on account of outstanding
benevolent actions. Be favorable toward me, a most
devout cultivator of your virtues, etc."
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APPENDIX B
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Many authors have given but well-researched sketches of
Leibniz's life. Perhaps the best source of facts about
Leibniz's life is Kurt Muller's Leben und Werke von G. W.
Leibniz - Eine Chronik (1969).
Leibniz himself has left us two curious autobiographical
sketches from his earlier years. They are recorded in Foucher
de Careil (pp. 379-389), under the titles "Vita Leibnitii a
Se Ipso Breviter Delineata" and "Imago Leibnitii a Se Ipso
Adumbrata"
.
What follows is a translation of the latter.
"His father was slender and bilious, though
more sanguine, and was most greatly afflicted by
stones. He passed away in one week from the
extenuation of this malady, with no suffocation.
His mother, with catarrh obstructing her esophagus
and chest, did suffocate.
"His temperament does not appear to be
straightforwardly either bilious, nor pituitous
[phlegmatic], nor melancholic. It is not sanguine,
on account of paleness in the face and lack of
exercise. Not bilious, as evidenced by lack of
thirst, straight hair, canine appetite, and
propensity to sleep deeply. Not pituitous, on
account of frequent change and speedy development
of mental and emotional states, and slenderness of
the body. Not frigid, that is, melancholy and
desiccated, as shown by rapid movement of the
intellect and will. It seems, however, that
biliousness predominates.
"His stature is average and slender, face pale,
his hands quite cold; his feet are longer than
usual for his stature, just as his fingers are
dryer than normal, lacking the propensity to
perspire. The hair on his head is brownish, and he
does not have a great deal of body hair. His
eyesight from youth is not keen. His voice is soft,
more high and clear than strong; ready of speech,
but not sufficiently composed, for he pronounces
guttural letters and "K" with difficulty. His lungs
are tender, his liver desiccated and hot, and his
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hands are crossed with innumerable lines. He
delights in sweets, as he does in sugar itself,
which he customarily mixes in wine. He also
delights in the comforting aromas of the air,
firmly persuaded that in rejuvenating the spirits
there is much place for these aromas, provided they
are not hot. He is not bothered by coughing, and
rarely sneezes. Nor is he afflicted by catarrh; he
rarely ejects phlegm, but often spits, especially
after drinking, and in proportion to the bitterness
of what he drinks. His eyes are not swimming in
liquid, but are much more dry: hence the dullness
of sight for things farther away; it is sharper for
things positioned nearer. His nighttime sleep is
uninterrupted, since he goes to bed late, greatly
preferring study by lamplight to morning study.
"His lifestyle since youth has been sedentary
with little physical activity. From the start he
has read and reflected on many things, and in many
subjects is self-taught. He goes more deeply in all
matters than most people do, desiring to penetrate
and discover new things.
"He hasn't a great appetite for conversation,
having more of one for meditation and private
reading. Once drawn into conversation, he
continues it with sufficient gusto, enjoying free
and good-humoured discussions more than games, or
exercises of continouos movement.
"Emotionally he is quite easily stirred, but
anger, once arrived, just as quickly dissipates.
"You will never see him sad or cheerful to
excess. He doesn't experience pain or joy except in
moderation. His laugh more frequently causes just
an opening of the mouth than chest convulsions. He
is timid in initiating projects, audacious in
carrying them out.
"Regarding defects, He seems to lack a vivid
imagination
.
"Regarding faulty memory, minor omissions of
the present afflict him more than major omissions
of the past.
"He is given to exceptional inventiveness and
judgment, for it is not difficult for him to do
various things at once: read, write, speak
extemporaneously, and if necessary, get to the
bottom of an intellectual subject matter by
meditating on it. Thus I infer that his brain is
dry and spirited.
"His body-spirits are excessively agitated. For
this reason I fear that he might one day break out
with some sickness or radical humid consumption on
account of assiduous study, excessive meditation,
and physical tenuity."
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